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Abstract 
This dissertation aims to investigate the origins of Internet voting, analyze several 
deployments of Internet voting technology in Austria and identify – based on these 
accumulated experiences – building blocks that can be useful in decision-making on and 
planning of future uses of Internet voting technology within Austria and throughout the 
world.  
 
In line with the goals of this thesis, it will address the following research questions:  
- How did Internet voting originate? 
- What experiences were noted in the process of implementing Internet voting in 
Austria? 
- What building blocks can be identified for developing future Internet voting both 
inside and outside Austria?  
 
Internet voting is part of a transformational movement that applies information and 
communication technologies to daily business activities. It is only logical that elections 
are also considered for applying electronic (remote) communication technologies. While 
early efforts were driven by the belief that elections could make easy use of the Internet, 
it was shown that while the principles have to be interpreted and consequently applied in 
a different way, the same principles can still be derived for Internet voting, like integrity, 
secrecy, transparency, accountability and public confidence. The need to have forms of 
decision making in electronic networks has been identified in its beginnings and has 
received continuous attention throughout its development. At the height of the excitement 
about the possibilities of the Internet, countries raced to become the first to run a legally 
binding election using electronic voting systems. While several candidates emerged (e.g., 
Costa Rica, Bosnia Herzegovina, Germany, United States), Estonia was victorious in 
2005. To date, Estonia is the only country that has introduced this form of voting without 
any preconditions or other limitations.  
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In Austria, the intentions to use information and communication technologies (ICT) in 
elections concentrated on parliamentary affairs. Spurred by the efforts around student 
elections in Germany, Austria sought to conduct Internet voting in 2000. In the years 
thereafter, considerable progress was made at WU Vienna University of Economics and 
Business (WU), and this progress spearheaded the debate in the early 2000s. At the 
beginning in the years 2001-2003, technical solutions were sought to verify voter 
eligibility and maintain voter privacy. Later, more sophisticated algorithms were 
developed, and functionalities like quotas in election commissions were added.  
 
The Federation of Students’ elections in 2009 were a remarkable event that 
demonstrated highly contentious political debate around the topic. This debate continued 
after the elections, which were held in May 2009 and suffered from the intense debate 
and protests and consequential organizational shortcomings. The experiences also 
showed that accurate legal regulations are needed to show interaction with the 
constitutional legal texts and to ensure accountability to a remote electronic voting 
channel through legal means. International standards were a first step, but regulations 
based on actual experience were needed to show how remote electronic voting channels 
could be realized and how to avoid problems identified in pilot implementations. This 
practical knowledge also shows that sophisticated algorithms are not always the key to 
success. Rather, several key implementations make use of very basic technical means to 
realize the tasks given by law. One should not forget about the voters. They not only need 
to use such systems, but they also need to understand the processes in order to build trust.  
 
The constitutional court ruling lifted the election and ruled that the respective 
ordinance was not in line with the requirements of the law. Hereby, the court established 
higher requirements resulting barriers for offering Internet voting channels in future 
elections. While the election administration system, which was a pre-requisite for the 
Internet voting system, was discontinued in the election thereafter, it returned in recent 
elections where postal voting was offered. 
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On the basis of the aforementioned experiences, twelve building blocks were compiled 
discovered. These include design decisions, such as the following: the form of electronic 
voting, adaptations of the legal base, the technical means for identification and secrecy, 
observation, control functions for the electoral commission, evaluation processes, 
transparency functions, ballot sheet designs, controlling the organizational context as well 
as providing options for planning and implementation. This framework therefore 
facilitates and eases the generation of feasibility studies and other analyses and decision 
making ahead of using Internet voting in an election. With little adaption it can also be 
used for the use of other voting technologies.  
 
This work utilizes theoretical work and knowledge from adaptations of legal texts. 
These texts cover a wide range of topics, including methods for implementing 
identification and anonymity functions in remote electronic voting as well as testing and 
certifying systems that require transparent procedures. The findings also show that 
implementing remote an electronic voting system is a complex topic. It requires trust in 
the election administration; otherwise, suspicion will arise when more technology is 
introduced and implemented in an election process. Remote electronic voting is one of 
the most challenging information technology (IT) projects. Most Internet approaches do 
not allow for voter anonymity. Also, elections have a fixed date; therefore, they must take 
place whether or not the system is ready.  
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1 Scope and Aim 
This dissertation investigates the origins of Internet voting, analyzes Internet voting 
technology deployments in Austria and identifies basic building blocks from these 
accumulated experiences to inform future Internet voting systems within Austria and 
throughout the world.  
 
Similar to the rest of the world, the emergence of the Internet in the 1990s led people 
to believe that an Internet-based election may allow voting at any place and any time. 
This idea reached the general political debate when the Federation of Students’ elections 
Hochschülerinnen- und Hochschülerschaftswahlen in May 2009 offered the possibility 
to cast a binding vote in an election regulated by federal law for the first time. While this 
premiere was assessed by the general public as a failure, it nevertheless delivered very 
important lessons for the future.  
 
Surprisingly, the origins of electronic voting (E-Voting) in Austria can be traced back 
to the beginning of parliamentarism during the Habsburg Monarchy. The first person to 
propose using electricity for conducting votes in the Habsburg Parliament was the 
inventor and Austrian telecommunication pioneer Carl Albert Mayrhofer in 1863.1 He put 
forth a petition on 17 September to the Abgeordnetenhaus (Mayrhofer, 1863). Voting at 
that time required the members of parliament (MPs) to either stand up or remain seated 
in order to show their approval or disapproval. His arguments included that, with the use 
of electricity, the voting process could be conducted in less time and in a more efficient 
and secure manner. In addition, he argued that it would allow for a secret vote. 
Nevertheless, the MPs did not take his proposal seriously and simply referred the petition 
to the parliamentary committee for changing the rules of procedure. Several years later, 
between 1878 and 1883, Mayrhofer undertook another attempt to improve the voting 
process, which was motivated by the ongoing construction for the new Parliament located 
                                                
1  He was the first private operator of a telegraphic service as well as a network for 
pneumatic tube mail within Vienna (Herzog and Pensold, 2010). 
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at the Ringstraße. He had further refined his proposal and replaced the use of electricity 
with pneumatics, which was criticized by others (Zetsche, 1881). He had invented this 
mechanism for the purpose of synchronizing clocks within the city limits of Vienna and 
Paris (Sánchez Miñana, 2010). In 1878, he had exhibited a prototype of his machine in 
the parliament of Lower Austria, written a petition to the Herrenhaus and published a 
pamphlet discussing various arguments in favor of the new voting mechanism 
(Mayrhofer, 1880). His endeavors even nurtured the development of a competing solution 
by Josef Schaller and Wilhelm Hauck. Nevertheless, neither petition resulted in the 
installation of voting technology in the Austrian parliament (Haus der Abgeordneten des 
österreichischen Reichsrathes, 1880).  
 
As far as my research has determined, this was the first documented attempt to 
introduce an electronic means for a public voting process. In Austria, unlike in the United 
States, Germany, the Netherlands and France, inventors were not successful in advancing 
mechanical or electronic technologies for casting votes until the new millennium. In this 
regard, the developments in Austria related to Internet voting between 2000 and 2010 can 
be considered a novelty.  
 
In order to accomplish the goals of this thesis, the following research questions were 
formulated: 
- How did Internet voting originate? 
- What experiences occurred when implementing Internet voting in Austria? 
- What building blocks can be identified from these experiences, and how can they 
be used to inform future Internet voting systems within Austria and throughout 
the world?  
 
The dissertation is based on practical and theoretical work regarding Internet voting in 
Austria. This includes actual implementation research as well as presentations and 
discussions of this work at several conferences and research venues. It also includes 
personal conversations with decision makers within Austria and throughout the world.  
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Parts of this thesis have been previously published as research articles as detailed 
below. These articles were either used in full or in parts, and they have also been expanded 
upon for this thesis. The articles focus on analyzing as well as developing an Internet 
voting solution for the Austrian context. They draw upon international experience as well.  
 
• Chapter 2 focuses on the historic development of Internet voting as well as early 
efforts and legal constraints. This chapter is based on the following publications: 
 
o Gibson, J. Paul, Krimmer, Robert, Teague, Vanessa, Pomares, Julia (2016): A 
Review of E-Voting: the past, present and future, Springer Annals of 
Telecommunications, (71) 7, p. 279-286;  
 
o Krimmer, Robert, Triessnig, Stefan, Volkamer, Melanie (2007): The 
Development of Remote E-Voting around the World: A Review of Roads and 
Directions. In: Alkassar, Ammar, Volkamer, Melanie (Eds.): E-Voting and 
Identity – VOTE-ID'07, LNCS Vol. 4896, Springer, Berlin, 1-15; and 
 
o Krimmer, Robert (2016): Constitutional Constraints for the Use of Information 
and Communication Technologies in Elections, Electoral Expert Review, Special 
Issue, 28-35 
 
• Chapter 3 focuses on experiences with Internet voting in Austria and is based upon 
the following publications: 
 
o Krimmer, Robert, Lehner, Christoph, Stangl, Siegfried, Varga, Bernhard, Stein, 
Robert, Wenda, Gregor, Kozlik, Johannes (2009): E-Voting im Rahmen der 
Wahlen zur Österreichischen Hochschülerinnen- und Hochschülerschaft 2009. In: 
Hauser, Werner, Kostal, Mario (Eds.): Jahrbuch Hochschulrecht, Neuer 
Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, Wien, 539-551;  
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o Krimmer, Robert, Ehringfeld, Andreas, Traxl, Markus. (2010): The Use of E-
Voting in the Federation of Students Elections 2009. In: Krimmer, Robert, 
Grimm, Rüdiger (Eds.): Proceedings of EVOTE2010, LNI Vol. 167, GI, Bonn, 
33-44; and 
 
o Krimmer, Robert, Ehringfeld, Andreas, Traxl, Markus (2010): 
Evaluierungsbericht – E-Voting bei den Hochschülerinnen- und 
Hochschülerschaftswahlen 2009, Bundesministerium für Wissenschaft und 
Forschung, Wien. 
 
• Chapter 4 focuses on the building blocks of Internet voting systems and is based upon 
the following publications:  
 
o Krimmer, Robert (2014): Identifying Building Blocks of Internet Voting: 
Preliminary Findings, Proceedings of Informatik 2014, GI LNI Vol. 232, p. 1381-
1389; and 
 
o Krimmer, Robert (2016): Verifiability: a New Concept Challenging or 
Contributing to Existing Election Paradigms? 13th EMB Conference. Council of 
Europe. 
 
The thesis consists of three parts, as shown above. The first part gives an overview of 
the early experiences and legal constraints of Internet voting in chapter 2, the second 
presents the collected experiences in Austria in regard to Internet voting in chapter 3 and 
the third part analyzes this and uncovers the building blocks for Internet voting in 
chapter 4.  
  5 
2 History of Internet Voting 
In this chapter, we will analyze the historic origins of Internet voting, the first Internet 
voting efforts and the frame that constitutions and legal frameworks provide.  
 
2.1 Roots  
Using information and communication technologies for elections has always been a 
common theme for elections. We can differentiate two main forms that are used within 
elections—those being conducted in controlled (voting in polling stations) and 
uncontrolled environments (remote voting). Postal voting is the earliest example of 
remote voting— early ideas can be traced back as far as the Roman Empire (Staveley, 
1972)—that depends on an underlying communication network to properly function. 
More reliable records date back to the seventeenth century where postal voting was 
allowed for merchants in Switzerland (Braun, 2006). Postal voting is still used in many 
elections around the world, and it is the standard against which remote electronic voting 
is most often compared (Krimmer and Volkamer, 2005). The next major communications 
infrastructure that facilitated remote voting was the telephone network, which has 
provided an alternative voting procedure for a specific subset of the electorate—usually 
those with disabilities—in a small but significant number of democratic elections. The 
telephone network is also used to support convenience voting (Gronke et al., 2008), 
including voting by FAX. In contrast to the primitive technology used in postal voting, 
some American astronauts have been able to vote from space since 1997; the first 
American to do so was David Wolf, who was living on Russia’s Mir Space Station and 
was granted special disposition to remotely vote by his home state of Texas. 2 
 
Since then, there has been much research regarding remote voting using the Internet. 
As the Internet evolves, we expect that remote voting systems will also evolve. As we 
progress towards cloud services and virtual networks (Fernandes et al., 2011), then the 
                                                
2  http://www.nasa.gov/mission pages/station/expeditions/expedition18/vote.html 
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future of remote voting may be simply another trustworthy e-government service (Carter 
and Bélanger, 2005) that is run on the cloud (Zissis and Lekkas, 2011). Configuring and 
running elections on a virtual machine is certainly appealing, but we must address the 
problems associated with Internet voting in general before we can examine the additional 
complexities introduced by virtualization. 
 
Unlike the storm that shocked the traditional business world, developments in the 
electoral process take much longer, mostly because introducing remote electronic voting, 
or Internet voting, involves many more questions than the basic ones of who is able to 
offer the cheapest and fastest product. 
 
The foundations of Internet voting are found in the democratization movement and the 
general availability of mass electronic media (e.g., television) after the second world war. 
At the same time, at this time, the Internet was simply a network of distributed computers, 
communicating using packets of information (Davies et al., 1967). During this time, the 
idea of enhancing democracy through the use of electronic means was supported by 
several bright minds (Dahl, 1956, Zittel, 2001) in order for ‘democracy to finally come 
true’ (Fuller, 1963).  
 
The idea of enabling remote voting through electronic means needed some time before 
it could be implemented. Similar to the developments associated with paper voting, first 
implementations of remote electronic voting focused on recording votes without 
necessarily guaranteeing secrecy. In a first attempt, Murray Turrof came forward with an 
implementation of a group-based decision-making process in a closed networked 
environment in the 1970s (Turoff and Hiltz, 1977). He started his work while the Internet 
mainly served as an exchange for data between researchers. He used a decision-making 
process based on the Delphi method (for an introduction, see Häder [2009]), which is 
usually structured in two phases: first, the experts gather ideas; then, they vote on their 
personal preference for these proposals. While limited to experts and closed networks, it 
still constituted one of the first implementations of an electronic voting process that 
included voting from remote locations.  
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While it was possible in the closed networks to use some more complex decision-
making rules, more simple forms of decision making were possible with the general 
public. Here, the mass media – and with it the general availability of the (color) television 
that soon became a ubiquity – played an important factor. For many, including Etzioni 
(1972), Becker (1981) and Vowe and Wersig (1983), the emergence of cable TV brought 
with it the possibility of bi-directional communication and allowed electronic town hall 
meetings to be held. However, due to the high costs for bi-directional switches and hubs, 
the cable networks only allowed for uni-directional broadcasting of TV programs3. Due 
to this deficit in infrastructure, these hopes did not materialize. A different mass 
communication technology brought more success for participatory and voting means: the 
telephone and ‘televoting’4. Televoting was used in the U.S., for example, in Hawaii for 
public deliberative polling (Slaton, 1990). In Austria, Alton-Scheidl (1997) implemented 
a similar effort with his so-called ‘Grätzltelefon’, a public messaging board, where one 
could call a telephone line and leave messages for public deliberation. However, it was 
only implemented for one pilot case in Austria and did not find further adoption. One of 
the identified issues was that it was very hard to communicate the technical parts of the 
projects to the general public. 
 
Following the model of the British Post Office’s view data service (Bright, 1979), in 
the early 1980s, many European telecoms introduced publicly available 
telecommunication networks that were accessible through special terminals. Minitel, the 
French implementation of view data, was the most successful, with several million of 
installed terminals. In Germany and Austria, the system was called Bildschirmtext or short 
BTX, and its success was limited. Common to all of these first public data networks were 
                                                
3  This only changed with the need for broadband Internet access through the means of 
cable TV networks that led to a considerable amount of investment in this 
infrastructure in the 1990s.  
4  For a discussion of security concerns with regards to voting by phone, see Saltman 
(1990). 
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many different applications, such as each country’s phone book in electronic format.5 In 
some cases, these systems offered simple voting applications. In Germany, where the 
newly formed Green party agitated against the systems’ introduction, a treaty of all 
German Länder required that any public polls using BTX had to ensure the anonymity of 
the participants (Kuhn, 1984).  
 
Given the technical possibilities of the BTX system, it must have been clear that 
anonymity can only be guaranteed organizationally, and hence, for political voting, more 
sophisticated technical solutions would be needed.   
 
The first online polls were rather easy to realize technically, because secrecy was not 
required, or it was sufficient to rely on the organizational guarantees of vote secrecy. The 
first efforts that would minimize the requirements to the organizational context were 
developed in the context of asynchronous cryptography. Most proposals during this time 
were associated with secure multi-party communications (Schoenmakers, 1999), for 
which elections turned out to be an interesting application field. For an overview of early 
proposals and protocols, see Horster and Michels (1995).  
 
  
                                                
5  In Austria, WU was one of the largest content providers, and they offered their students 
the possibility to register for university courses online (Göpfrich, 1985). 
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After the first theoretical discussions, some researchers were followed with 
implementations such as the Sensus system by Cranor and Cytron (1997) or the 
Cybervote system (EU, 2000), which was one of eight projects within the EU 5th Research 
Framework program featuring research related to E-Voting6. Since then, subsequent EU 
framework programs have provided no further funding related to E-Voting to date.  
At the time, several new economy start-up companies focused on realizing Internet 
voting, such as Election.com, Safevote.net or Votehere.net. 
 
With this increasing interest, a ‘political race’ began in the mid-1990s to be the first 
country to allow Internet voting in general elections. At the time, it seemed to be only a 
matter of time rather than a question of technical feasibility—particularly after Bill 
Clinton ordered further investigation of the issues at the end of 1999. The resulting report 
was published at the beginning of 2001 (Mote et al., 2001), but the events in the 
November U.S. presidential elections (Bush vs. Gore) focused American attention on the 
integrity and auditability of election results. Most Internet voting trials have taken place 
outside the U.S. The following chapter provides an analysis framework for these early 
efforts.  
 
2.2 Early Internet Voting Efforts 
The development of an electronic democracy with a transnational character (Held, 1999) 
needs the further development of e-enabled instruments of democracy (Heindl et al., 
2003), including e-initiatives, e-referenda and E-Voting instruments. Amongst them, 
remote E-Voting has received the largest attention, and it reached the national level in 
                                                
6  These included, in addition to CYBERVOTE http://cordis.europa.eu/project/ 
rcn/52634_en.html, the following projects: EVE, http://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/ 
57874_en.html; AGORA 2000, http://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/52651_en.html; 
DEMOS, http://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/52637_en.html; E-POLL, http://cordis. 
europa.eu/project/rcn/57444_en.html; EURO-CITI, http://cordis.europa.eu/project/ 
rcn/52635_en.html; WEBOCRACY http://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/ 
52649_en.html; and EDEN, http://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/57135_en.html.  
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Estonia first. On March 3, 2007, the Estonian national election offered the world’s first 
legally binding remote e-voting possibility (Estonian National Electoral Committee, 
2007). With that event, remote E-Voting finally gained international attention even 
though experts warned three years earlier in the SERVE report that the internet was not 
yet ready to support elections (Jefferson et al., 2004). Today, most other nations are still 
in the phase of experimentation. To date, most trials do not follow classical experimental 
setups (Alvarez and Hall, 2004) and are embedded in their national context (Svensson 
and Leenes, 2003), which makes comparison and learning from others difficult. 
 
This analysis was the first attempt to conduct a state-of-the-art analysis (Fettke, 2006) 
of 104 remote E-Voting uses of Internet voting between 1995 and 2007. We analyzed 
research articles, working papers and press releases of 104 e-elections conducted around 
the world. While we aimed to obtain a representative sample, it is clear that the current 
cases cannot serve this purpose. Rather, they give an indication of how remote E-Voting 
has developed so far. In the following, we will first provide theoretical background 
regarding remote E-Voting; then, we will present the results of our review. Finally, we 
will discuss the findings and provide conclusions. 
 
2.2.1 Theoretical Background 
In this chapter, we will define remote electronic voting and explain our research 
methodology. 
 
2.2.1.1 The terminus technicus remote electronic voting and its variants 
Definition. The Council of Europe recommendations define electronic voting as “the use 
of electronic means in at least the casting of the vote” (Council of Europe, 2004). We first 
must consider elections in a broad sense (for our purposes, this includes e-referendums) 
and then concentrate on the implications of ICT usage therein.  
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The Electoral Process. The United Nations facilitated the agreement on the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (United Nations, 1966). Article 25 defines eight 
principles for elections that depict the entire electoral process: (i) periodic elections, (ii) 
genuine elections, (iii) stand for election, (iv) universal suffrage, (v) voting in elections 
on the basis of the right to vote, (vi) equal suffrage, (vii) secret vote and (viii) free 
expression of the will of the voters. Suksi (2005) groups these principles into a cycle 
consisting of three periods: 
1. Pre-Election Period: The period from calling an election until the actual start of the 
polling. 
2. Election Period: The actual Election Day when the voting takes place. 
3. Post-Election Period: The period during which the results are announced and a new 
election is called. 
 
 
Figure 1: The Electoral cycle (Krimmer, following (Suksi, 2005)) 
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Local/Remote. The electoral process usually takes place at the polling station and is 
supervised. This can be referred to as voting at presence. There is also the possibility of 
remote voting. The criterion to differentiate those two is if an election commission 
supervises the act of voting or not (Krimmer, 2002). At current elections, the voter comes 
to the polling station, and the election commission checks the identity and eligibility and 
ensures the voter’s anonymity when casting the ballot. When the election has finished the 
election, the commission counts the votes. With remote elections, the identity and the 
right to vote is checked beforehand or remotely, and the voter has to make sure that his 
anonymity is not compromised. This raises questions of voter coercion and vote buying 
(Krimmer and Volkamer, 2005).  
 
Forms. Voting systems can be assigned to six basic groups with regards to their form or 
place. The medium hand requires the presence of voters and is limited to a certain number 
of people; it does not allow for voting in an uncontrolled environment. In modern 
institutionalized elections, this medium is very seldom used. Most modern-day elections 
use paper as a medium of choice. Polling station voting using paper ballots is 
characterized by the controlled environment and the usage of paper as a medium. Postal 
voting also uses paper but provides no controlled environment. If the ballot is cast 
electronically, one can differentiate between voting machines that are placed in the 
controlled environment of a voting station and remote electronic voting that also uses an 
electronic channel as a medium but provides no controlled environment. Table 1 gives an 
overview of different types of media (Volkamer and Krimmer, 2006): 
 
 Environment 
Medium 
Controlled 
 
Uncontrolled 
 
Hand In-Person - 
Paper Polling Place Postal Voting 
Electronic Voting Machine Remote Electronic 
Voting 
Table 1: Forms of electronic voting  
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Multi-Channel. It is possible that one election uses more than one form of voting. From 
the operational viewpoint, it is important to note whether or not more than one channel is 
allowed and if paper and electronic channels must be combined. When counting the votes, 
the system must ensure that multiple voting through different channels is not possible. 
One has to make sure that the individual results of the channels are combined in such a 
way that the end result is correct. For the time being, democracy theory and constitutional 
law (requirement of universality) require additional paper channels if everyone does not 
have access to the Internet (or the skill to use the Internet); thus, remote E-Voting can 
only be an optional channel in legally binding elections for the time being. 
 
Levels. Remote E-Voting can take place at elections of diverse levels of attention. We 
differentiate five different levels determined by political importance, legal commitment 
and parallel testing. The political importance is defined by Lijphart (1998) as such that 
the first and the second level elections are politically binding, which means they are 
regulated by law and the results of the elections have consequences. The most rigid legal 
framework is found with first-level elections (e.g., presidential, parliamentarian). On the 
second level, less important political elections can be found. Typical elections for that 
level may be local elections. Elections of lesser importance, because of their lesser 
political impact like federations of students or union elections as well as elections in 
corporations can be considered as the third level. These tend to have fewer rules on how 
the election must be conducted. Still, some kind of outcome is dependent on the result of 
the election. They must all fulfill certain rules so the outcome of the election can be 
binding and some kind of action can be derived. This leads to another classification of 
elections. A test can be defined as an election that has the sole purpose to test the system. 
Such tests are often conducted in an early stage of system development, and their sole 
purpose is to test the system. A logical next step is to simulate an election and test the 
system parallel to a binding one. The aim of such a test is to test the system under realistic 
conditions, and the results of which are not legally binding. These five categories build 
the five levels of elections, as shown in Table 2. 
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Levels 
Leg. 
Binding 
Org. 
Binding 
Non-
Binding 
1st Level:  national þ   
2nd Level:  regional, local þ   
3rd Level:  org., assoc., companies (þ) þ  
4th Level:  shadow, parallel   þ 
5th Level:  technical test   þ 
Table 2: Levels of elections 
 
Identification and Anonymity. The basic problem of electronic voting requires solving 
the unequivocal identification of a voter and, at same time, being able to guarantee 
anonymity with a secret ballot casting (Kofler et al., 2003).  
 
Identification. For identifying a voter, three basic criteria can be used to differentiate the 
technologies: (i) knowledge, (ii) possession and (iii) properties. A fourth possibility is a 
combination of any of the three technologies. The following identification technologies 
are used in remote E-Voting: 
1.  Username and Password: The voter must remember a secret. 
2.  Transaction Number (TAN): The voter possesses something that identifies 
him/herself.  
3.  Biometrics: The voter him/herself with his/her individual biometric properties 
identifies him/herself. A biometric feature reader is needed.  
4.  Smart Cards: The voter knows a secret and also has possession of a card that identifies 
him/her. Otherwise, a property pattern of the voter is stored on a smart card that can 
be checked against the voter’s property when casting a ballot – either way, a smart 
card reader is needed. 
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Anonymity. It is critical for a voting system to guarantee anonymity. There have been 
many articles written to categorize and cluster protocols that guarantee anonymity 
(Schlifni, 2000, Mitrou et al., 2003, Horster and Michels, 1995, Smith and Clark, 2005). 
While the criteria used in these papers are very sophisticated, in practice a simpler and 
more distinctive criterion is time (Puiggali and Morales-Rocha, 2007)—that is, at which 
point in the electoral cycle is secrecy (anonymity) established? 
 
1.  In the pre-election period: Anonymity is established in the pre-election period by the 
organizing institution. The most common implementation of such a system uses 
transaction numbers (TAN). These numbers are generated centrally and a scratch-field 
is applied. Then, in a second step, the voter’s address is applied and sent to the voter 
who can use the number anonymously for exactly one vote. 
 
2.  During the electoral period: With this method, anonymity is established during the 
vote-casting procedure. It can either be done by separating the servers in an 
identification and ballot box server or by blind signatures; the most common 
implementation of Chaum’s blind signature (Chaum, 1981) is used in the Fujioka et 
al. algorithm (Fujioka et al., 1993). The process can be explained as follows: the voter 
fills out the ballot sheet then puts it in a carbon-copy envelope. The voter then signs 
another envelope with his/her personal signature and inserts the carbon-copy envelope 
and sends the package to his/her register. They check the voting eligibility based on 
the voter’s signature, then they sign the carbon copy envelope and return it to the voter. 
The voter opens the cc-envelope and has a signed ballot sheet (due to the carbon copy) 
and the voter’s register has never seen the ballot sheet. Finally, the voter returns the 
ballot sheet to the ballot box and has thereby cast a valid vote anonymously.  
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3.  In the post-electoral period: In this case, anonymity is established after the end of the 
election day; the votes can still be identified, but the count can only be conducted 
together, meaning the content of a single vote is never released. The most common 
implementations use homomorphic encryption like the Schoenmakers algorithm 
(Schoenmakers, 1999) or hardware security modules like the Estonian system 
(Estonian Election Committee, 2004).  
 
Provider. To conduct an electronic election is a complex undertaking and is usually 
operated by a consortium. We identified the provider that was critical or characteristic for 
the entire system. Of special interest was in which country the provider operated and how 
much experience the company had. 
 
Size. One important criterion for assessing E-Voting use is the number of votes that are 
cast. Looking at the sample, we grouped the elections into three size groups. The first 
group (A) contains all elections with more than 30,000 votes. The middle group (B) 
contains elections with a number of e-votes between 3,000 and 30,000. The last group 
(C) consists of small elections with a number of e-votes smaller than 3,000. 
 
Criterion Category 
Level National Regional Association Shadow Test 
Channels Electronic Paper and Electronic 
Identification Username/PW TAN Signature Biometric 
Anonymity Pre-election period Election period Post-election period 
# Votes 
A 
# >30,000 
B 
 30,000 > # > 3,000 
C 
# < 3,000 
Table 3: Criteria to categorize remote E-Voting 
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2.2.1.2 Methodology 
A review can be organized in many ways. The approach we selected follows the 
handbook of review synthesis (Cooper and Hedges, 1994), which proposes five phases: 
(i) problem description, (ii) literature research, (iii) literature analysis, (iv) analysis and 
(v) presentation.  
 
(i) The goal was to conduct a review of the progress of remote electronic voting. (ii) 
We used research articles, system documentation, whitepapers, technical reports, and 
even press releases as information to conduct our review. As remote electronic voting is 
a very new topic for the general public, often more than one source had to be consulted 
to gain a complete picture of the topic. Not surprisingly, research articles usually provided 
more insight on the project setup and system description yet lacked actual election-related 
data. Therefore, press releases were used to supplement this information. To find 
appropriated sources, we used a network of experts around the world that we invited to 
provide data or point to relevant documents. We provided them an online questionnaire 
on a public website to identify relevant elections. Because of the multitude of sources, 
the data was consolidated. This consolidation made it difficult to find common ground, 
so we needed to add an extensive array of integration work. (iii) The criteria that were 
developed in the previous chapter were used to characterize the elections. (iv) The 
collected data were then entered into a database for analysis. Finally, we (v) presented 
and discussed the analyses in the following chapters. 
 
2.2.2 Results 
In total, we identified 139 elections in 16 countries between 1 January 1996 and April 30, 
2007 where remote E-Voting occurred. For the analysis, we needed a minimum amount 
of information regarding every election. We had to eliminate 35 elections in total. Three 
elections were excluded from analysis because of missing data about voters and turnout. 
The most common reason for exclusion was for not having system documentation 
available, which applied to thirty elections. Without documents, we could not assess 
which forms of identification or anonymity were used. Finally, two elections could not 
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be included because we lacked information on the voter data and on the system that was 
used. In total, we had 104 fully documented elections that we could include in the 
following analysis. These elections were held in 13 different countries on three 
continents; two elections were held trans-nationally. The first election was held in 1996 
in Finland, and the last was held in 2007 in Estonia. The following table shows the 
distribution of all elections over time and by country. From the analysis, excluded 
elections are put in brackets. 
 
 
Table 4: Number of elections per year and country included (excluded) in review 
 
The countries with the most elections were Germany (30), Switzerland (24) and the 
United Kingdom (19). Surprisingly, the United States has just 2 publicly documented 
elections.  
 
Example. As an example, we will walk you through the process of classifying elections 
with the example of the 2007 parliamentary elections in Estonia. The election was on the 
national level and was legally binding. This places the election into level 1 of the 5 levels. 
It was also a multi-channel election that offered both paper and remote E-Voting 
Year AG AT AU CA CH DE EE ES FI FR NL PT SE UK US WW Total
1996 1 1
1998 1 1
1999 1 (1) 1 2 (1)
2000 1 2 (3) 1 (1) 1 5 (4)
2001 (3) 4 (1) 1 5 (4)
2002 (2) 2 (1) (1) 3 5 10 (4)
2003 1 2 3 1 (2) 2 14 23 (2)
2004 2 7 4 (2) 2 (3) 2 1 18 (5)
2005 (1) 10 3 (3) 2 2 (3) 1 18 (7)
2006 1 (1) 1 4 9 (4) 1 1 17 (5)
2007 (1) 1 1 1 1 4 (1)
???? (2) (2)
incl.
(excl.) (1)
5
(2)
1 24 
(5)
30 
(11)
3 5 
(15)
2 7 3 1 1 19 1 
(1)
2 104
(35)
Countries
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channels. Voters could cast their vote electronically over the Internet before Election Day 
or at local polling stations on or before Election Day on paper. The voters could use the 
remote E-Voting system with their national ID card, a smart card which bears a digital 
signature. The vote is first encrypted using the public key of the ballot box, and it is then 
signed by the voter with her private key. To count the votes, Estonia uses a hardware 
security module for hidden result calculation, which means anonymity is established in 
the post-electoral period. The provider of the system was Cybernetica AS, which is of 
Estonian origin. Approximately 940,000 people were eligible, registered voters, and 
30,275 cast their votes electronically. This places the election into the group A of large 
elections. 
The other elections were categorized in the same way. The result of the systematization 
is depicted in Table 5 and is described below. 
 
Criterion Category 
Level 
National 
(4; 3.8%) 
Regional 
(38; 36.5%) 
Association 
(30; 28.9%) 
Shadow 
(27; 26%) 
Test  
(5; 4.8%) 
Channels 
Electronic  
(39; 37.5%) 
Paper and Electronic  
(65; 62.5%) 
Identification 
Username/PW  
(4; 3.9%) 
TAN  
(84; 81.5%) 
Signature 
(15; 14.6%) 
Biometric 
(0; 0%) 
Anonymity 
Pre-election period 
(53; 50.9%) 
Election period  
(29; 28.2%) 
Post-election period 
(21; 20.4%) 
# Votes 
A, # >30,000 
(9; 8.7%) 
B, 30,000 > # > 3,000 
(30; 28.9%) 
C, # < 3,000 
(65; 62.4%) 
Table 5: Overview of the results 
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Level. With 38 cases, the 2nd level group is the biggest. The 3rd level is the second largest 
group with 30 elections. Of all of the binding elections, the group of national elections is 
the smallest (one in Estonia, one in Switzerland and two in the Netherlands). 27 elections 
had shadow elections, and only five elections had a sole test purpose. Interestingly, the 
legally binding elections account for over 40% of the cases. 
 
Multi-channel. In one third of the cases, the remote voting channel was the only method 
to cast votes. For the majority (65 cases) of the elections, E-Voting was just an additional 
channel to the traditional paper method. 
 
Identification. With 84 elections, the most favored way of identifying voters was the 
TAN system. 15 elections used signature cards, and only 4 elections used a relatively 
insecure username and password system. Biometric systems were not used at all. 
 
Anonymity. In two-thirds of the investigated remote E-Voting elections, the anonymity 
was established before Election Day using organizational pre-registration. The second 
most common way was to establish it during the electoral period, which was used in 
28.2% of the cases. The use of establishing anonymity after the election was used in 
20.4% of the cases.  
 
One election did not fit the categorization in the field of identification and anonymity 
because the identification was done based on IP-address, and anonymity could therefore 
only be guaranteed organizationally. 
 
Size. The elections with remote E-Voting have a large span width between the largest 
(130,000) and smallest (54) number of voters. Most elections were rather small, as 65 
elections had fewer than 3,000 votes cast. 28.9% of the elections had between 3,000 and 
30,000 voters. In the largest group with over 30,000 votes, only 9 elections could be 
found. 
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Provider. In total, 25 different providers organized the analyzed elections. Four of them 
account for 54.8% of all of the conducted elections, while the other 45.2% were 
distributed amongst 21 providers. Most providers (76%) only had experience in their 
home country; the six who had operated elections outside their home country had done 
so in a maximum of three foreign destinations. Only one provider had operated solely 
abroad, which is due to the fact that it is located in the U.S. but also has a strong base in 
European countries. 
 
2.2.3 Discussion 
Starting with the reported findings in the previous chapter, we will now discuss the results 
more closely. The “idea” of collecting all elections was very ambitious. 1st level and most 
2nd level documentation is publicly available. Most of the time, election information is 
not in one place, but with enough work, the information can be gathered. For elections on 
the third level, public information is oftentimes difficult to obtain. We know that there 
are a lot of elections in the U.S. in the private sector, but we simply could not obtain 
public documentation for them. 
 
Everybody wants to sell a success story. This is especially noticeable when looking at 
turnout data. The most inconvenient low numbers simply are left out. The problem of 
selective information is not just a problem with result numbers but with information about 
elections in general. A language and regional bias is noticeable and also inherent in the 
method of experts referring to experts and resources. Nearly all papers and documentation 
only deal with single cases. There are very few comparative sources. Some initiatives can 
be found, but nothing is comprehensive.  
 
Generally, it is hard to maintain data quality. The problems result from combining 
multiple sources that use different wording, are incomplete and may even be 
contradicting. A broader constant process would be needed. The U.S. and Asia can surely 
contribute to the process. Experts are asked to leave their box and overcome their bias. A 
start would be the 30 elections that had to be excluded because of missing technical 
system documentation. 
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Elections. The number of elections that use remote E-Voting has risen during the time 
span of our review. Interestingly, most of the cases took place in the new millennium with 
a heap in 2003 and have maintained at that level since then. Further, the number of 
countries using E-Voting is rising as well. Still, the average cycle for political elections 
is 4-5 years, which also limits the number of possible legally binding E-Voting uses. We 
also noticed a strong bias of remote E-Voting in Europe, where 100 of the 104 cases are 
located. This is of course due to the fact that Europe has a large number of countries and 
also inherently has the largest number of elections to conduct. Furthermore, the biggest 
potential of remote E-Voting (i.e., to conduct trans-national elections) has not yet been 
widely implemented. Only two elections in that area have been noticed so far. This may 
be because these elections could only happen on a 3rd level as the potential candidate for 
this (i.e., the European Union) has no mandate for elections yet and cannot make 
legislation for this as of now. 
 
Level. We were surprised that 40% of the conducted elections were legally binding (1st 
and 2nd level). A large stake can be attributed to the pilot series at the local level in 2002 
and 2003 in the United Kingdom. On the national level, the number is much smaller and 
has happened only in three countries (Estonia, Netherlands and Switzerland). In most 
countries that use remote E-Voting channels, laws or even the constitution have to be 
changed, which makes remote E-Voting very unlikely to occur spontaneously. E-Voting 
requires a strategic intention of the government. On the third level, with not legally 
binding elections, we expected to see more cases; instead, they make up only 29% of the 
total number. This could relate to a lack of interest in publishing the experiences 
associated with remote E-Voting. Reasons could be due to a low public interest or because 
it has already been conducted more than once. In the field of non-binding elections, i.e., 
the area of testing a system, it is clear that most cases took place in parallel with a real 
election, and only few are pure functionality tests or fictional elections. The reason for 
this is the problem of motivating the voters – why should they participate?  
 
  23 
Identification. Much attention should be placed on identification (ID). The numbers 
showed very clearly that the ID of choice for electronic voting is a TAN. A TAN system 
is easy to handle because voters recognize it from lottery tickets. In addition, it is also 
cost effective since no reader is needed. Furthermore, the TAN is a good way for the 
election organizers to conduct project marketing. The most secure way (i.e., signature 
cards) has the obvious problem associate with usability, and it is too costly. 
 
Anonymity. Similar to the case of identification, we found that most election organizers 
(71.3%) choose algorithms that establish anonymity in their premises – either before or 
after Election Day. This has to do with the fact that in these algorithms, the least number 
of calculations is necessary on the side of the voter, which means that the voting 
procedure requires less additional software (e.g., Java programs, applets) and can run in 
an ordinary browser. Establishment during the electoral period was used in 28.2% of the 
cases. 
 
Multi-channel. If we check the use of multiple channels in combination with the five 
levels, a clear pattern emerges. 99% of all legally binding elections at the national and 
regional levels have at least one paper channel parallel to the electronic channel. In the 
3rd level, 58% use only electronic channels, and 42% also use paper and electronic 
channels at the same time. The 4th level excludes, per definition, paper-based channels, 
and the 5th level only uses electronic channels.  
 
Size. When looking at numbers for votes cast, one can clearly see that electronic elections 
are still an emerging field. Systems are gradually tested starting with smaller numbers. 
But, in absolute figures, all of these elections are not comparable to traditional elections. 
The biggest legally binding election to date (i.e., the Arizona State Democratic Preference 
Primary in March 2000) had around 40 thousand votes cast. 
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Provider. Only four providers organized the majority of elections. These are also the 
providers that organized elections in different countries. The rest is distributed among 21 
providers, which in most cases only operate in their home country. This is most probably 
explained by the lack of trust in foreign companies and the fear of outside countries 
controlling such a core element of democracy. 
 
2.2.4 Summary 
Since this field has been around for 12 years, a review of the collected experience was 
greatly needed. A review of the conducted e-elections on a structured basis was a 
challenge due to the fragmented characteristic of the available information. Our sample 
of 104 cases covers 12 years, 3 continents and 14 countries. In general, data quality is the 
biggest obstacle to overcome. 
 
Our research shows that although there have been four legally binding, top-level, 
remote E-Voting elections, the field is still not yet mature. The best indicator is the 
relatively small size of the cases. 62% of the elections have less than 3,000 voters, and 
only 8.7% have more than 30,000. These numbers are far from any traditional election. 
 
The obvious target area foreseen by the visionaries – that is, citizens living abroad and 
transnational elections – was the focus of only seven elections. 
 
Conducting e-elections needs a technical provider that is usually is an IT-company. 
Interestingly, they operate only in their home country. There seems to be resistance in 
engaging companies from abroad. 
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For implementation, selecting the right identification and anonymity schema is crucial 
for success. Here, most cases selected a combination of TAN and pre-electoral 
establishments of anonymity. The information of a theoretically secure signature and the 
establishment of anonymity during voting falls back in adoption most probably because 
of needed infrastructure. However, the Estonian example shows that legally binding 
remote E-Voting with signature smart cards is possible. 
 
Handling multiple channels involving paper and electronic vote casting does not seem 
to be a problem. On the contrary, 99% of all legally binding elections offered remote E-
Voting in addition to paper-based vote casting. 
 
Future research should focus on understanding and learning from what has been done 
so far. In this way, any academic involved in remote E-Voting should follow basic 
academic styles. This means that experiments should follow basic experimental designs, 
but documentation should also be comprehensive, analytic and comparable. Based on 
existing approaches (Buchsbaum, 2005, Krimmer and Triessnig, 2007), academics should 
develop guidelines for how to properly document E-Voting uses, similar to election 
observation reports (Eriksson, 2002, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights (ODIHR), 2005). 
 
To make this research more valuable, it should be accessible by third parties in a public 
database. This would help readers learn from the results and also gain further insights in 
projects not included in this review. 
 
It would also be interesting to deepen the analysis of the available material, especially 
in the field of technology following a longitudinal approach. Here, development could 
deliver interesting insights into the adoption of identification and anonymity 
technologies. 
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Overall, remote electronic voting has not reached the maturity needed to be applied in 
large-scale elections of major importance. More research is needed related to the effects, 
outcomes and security of remote E-Voting. Documenting the experience, as has been 
done here, is a first step to building a research strategy. 
 
2.3 Legal Constraints 
An analysis addressing whether the use of information technologies for electoral 
processes would be legally possible is typically found when analyzing the beginning of 
any electronics voting proposal. Often, law and regulations have been cited as an excuse 
for not pursuing the implementation of a technology, despite the possibility to change 
such laws/regulations if a majority of the policy makers so decided. 
 
We use the definition put forward in the OSCE/ODIHR Handbook (2013) for how to 
observe New Voting Technologies, which it defines as “the use of information and 
communications technologies (ICT) applied to the casting and counting of votes”, 
including ballot scanners, electronic voting machines and Internet voting, whereby we 
understand its application to parliamentary elections, thus involving regular citizens. 
 
Such an introduction of new technologies requires careful discussion of electoral 
reform, which is usually initiated by the drafting of a feasibility study. Such feasibility 
studies will encompass technical, political, social and legal elements and will need to 
examine all of the possibilities of such a system as well as proposing which technical 
features should be brought forward.  
 
These general considerations are important, since they determine to what extent 
existing legal basis of an election would need to be modified. However, technical choices 
are influenced by the legal framework, thus creating a difficulty in deciding which 
decisions to make first – those regarding the technical means or changes to the legal basis. 
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The technical possibilities of electronic elections are beyond the scope of this study. 
This study instead focuses on the constraints and guidance that the legal basis can provide. 
This is typically the starting point of any national debate on electronic voting where two 
main questions arise: Is the proposal in line with our legal basis? If so, is it also in line 
with international standards? 
 
There are some general reports and studies that address these issues, such as a study 
commissioned by the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe in 2004, which found 
general compatibility of remote voting with international commitments, including postal 
voting and Internet voting (Grabenwarter, 2004b). In the same year, the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe passed a recommendation for how electronic voting 
systems should be designed (Council of Europe, 2004). At the third meeting of reviewing 
the recommendation, it was amended by two documents to reflect recent developments 
in transparency and certification (Council of Europe, 2011b, Council of Europe, 2011a). 
Consecutively, the fourth and fifth review meeting recommended updating the 
recommendation, which has been passed by the Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe in June 2017. For a more indepth background on the genesis, see Wenda and 
Krimmer, 2016.  
 
At a national level, most publications that address legislation regarding remote 
electronic voting concentrate the discussion on whether it is in line with the constitutional 
requirements of the respective country.  
 
Elections are essentially the expression of the socio-political culture of a country and, 
therefore, naturally depend on the context in which they are held. However, a certain set 
of common set of standards have evolved over time. These are best described in 
international documents, such as the United Nations’ International Covenant of Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), the OSCE 
Copenhagen and Maastricht Documents and other regional electoral standards.  
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The ICCPR describes in its article 25 that elections should give …“Every citizen [...] 
the right and the opportunity [...] (a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly 
or through freely chosen representatives; (b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic 
elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, 
guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors; (c) To have access, on general 
terms of equality, to public service in his country”. 
 
Based on Art. 25 of the ICCPR, Markku Suksi developed an 8-stage cycle depicting 
the electoral process (2005). Today, ICT can be used in any step of an electoral cycle, 
which is increasingly being done. Examples include the use of sophisticated election 
management systems for election administration, electronic voter registers, electronic 
mark-off systems/poll books, biometric voter identification, electronic voting machines, 
ballot scanners and, most often, electronic result transmission and vote tabulation 
systems.  
 
The use of ICT challenges not only the election process per se but also the election 
legislation. Thus, most national discourse around this issue begins by examining relevant 
parts of the constitution. The legal basis should describe the principles and electoral 
process in a way that is technologically neutral. However, since constitutions have been 
written and modified with paper-based processes in mind, it is important to question 
whether or not new standards are required for electronic election processes.  
 
While this question has never been answered definitively, the absence of new 
international standards or principles suggests that new voting technologies will be held to 
the same standards as paper-based elections.  
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In this regard, data protection laws (e.g., the CoE convention on data protection comes 
to mind (Council of Europe, 1981)), which originally dealt with the transition from paper-
based to electronic processes, are the best available guide for how to approach the 
modernization of an electoral process. Unfortunately, this is often neglected. A vote can 
be considered sensitive personal data, as it contains one’s personal political opinion. 
Therefore, two important principles should be considered:  
 
Proportionality. The documentation should include the principle of proportionality 
when handling personal data, and it should serve as a guiding indicator. In other words, 
the use of ICT in elections should add value to the groups affected and should only then 
be pursued. 
 
Accountability. Documentation should provide necessary accountability to the voter, 
since an electoral code is often one of the first sources of information that a voter consults. 
It should provide any affected individual/group with the ability to see how his/her/their 
personal data (i.e., vote) is being processed. 
 
First, let us come back to constraints put forward by the electoral principles, which are 
often summarized with universal, equal, free, secret and personal elections:  
 
Universality. All eligible voters – without undue restrictions – should be able to cast their 
vote. This requires the establishment of a voter register, either through active or passive 
registration. In most countries, this already takes place using electronic means. The 
principal problem here is to ensure that all voters are able to participate in the election via 
the electronic channel, avoiding establishing unsurmountable barriers to voter 
participation (e.g., in cases of ICT illiteracy or literacy in general). For this reason, the 
CoE recommends that electronic means should only be used as an alternative option 
rather than replacing paper voting completely. This led to some debate in the case of 
Kazakhstan’s experimentation with electronic voting machines during the early 2000s: 
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should voters be given the choice between electronic voting machines in polling stations 
and voting on paper? When given the choice, most voters opted to vote using the paper 
method, and this ultimately led to the abandonment of the system in 2011 
(OSCE/ODIHR, 2011). 
 
Equality. Each vote should carry equal weight. In the context of electronic voting, 
equality requires that all voters have an equal chance of their vote counting. This is of 
particular importance in cases of multi-channel elections (e.g., paper-based voting in 
polling stations, postal voting and Internet voting7). For example, electronic voters might 
have a higher chance to secure a valid vote, because the system will not allow them to 
cast an unintentional spoilt ballot, which cannot be prevented in paper-based systems. 
Also, the ballots should look similar, giving each candidate equal possibilities to be 
elected. This can be bothersome, as the equidistance between candidates on a ballot (often 
referred to as an “Australian ballot”) cannot be guaranteed on a technical device. Also, it 
cannot be guaranteed that all candidates will be displayed at the same time. 
 
Secret election. The requirement for secrecy ensures that a voter does not have to fear 
coercion or intimidation and can therefore vote freely. The voting booth under 
supervision of the polling station committee is normally a reliable protection from such 
undue influences; however, in remote voting, the voter has to guarantee this him/herself. 
To address this, Estonia introduced the possibility for a voter to cancel his/her Internet 
vote by subsequently voting at a polling station on paper as well as allowing Internet 
voters to recast their vote an infinite number of times (one voter in the 2011 Riigikogu 
elections cast their vote 500 times), where only the last cast vote would be counted. Secret 
elections also require that no link can be established between the voter and their vote.8 In 
particular, the system should ensure that no voter can be associated with his/her vote using 
                                                
7  For a more in-depth discussion of postal voting vs. Internet voting, see Krimmer and 
Volkamer, 2005. 
8  For an overview of the technical means associated with ensuring vote secrecy, see 
earlier in this chapter. 
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the sequence in which the votes were cast, the time when the vote was cast, any disclosure 
of information such as IP-addresses or other identifying information such as digital 
signatures, etc. This is not technically trivial in remote electronic voting systems; the 
electronic voting system used for the 2005 Venezuelan parliamentary election included a 
programming error that allowed detection of the sequence of how a vote was cast (EU 
Election Observation Mission to Venezuela, 2006). In elections where voter verifiable 
paper audit trails (VVPAT) are kept, these must represent the individual vote of a single 
voter rather than storing all votes together on one roll of paper and thereby revealing the 
sequence of how the votes were cast. This could consequently endanger the secrecy of 
the vote.  
 
Integrity of the Election / Personal Elections. To ensure the integrity of an election, 
only eligible voters should be able to participate. For this, polling stations require voters 
to show identification documents, and electronic mark-off systems help to ensure that no 
voter can vote more than once—this is particularly important for elections involving 
multiple channels.  
 
In addition to the traditional election principles, there are three additional principles 
that are important for the credibility of an election: transparency, accountability and 
public confidence, all of which are political commitments of the Copenhagen and 
Maastricht documents of the OSCE. 
 
Transparency. Janez Lenarcic, former OSCE/ODIHR director, once said that one can 
touch, see and feel paper – but not bits and bytes (Lenarčič, 2010). This essentially 
outlines the challenge that E-Voting poses for elections. By introducing advanced 
technology, one removes the essential possibility for the average person to understand the 
electoral process from casting the vote to entering the overall election results. This 
requirement of knowledge is disadvantageous in general, but it is particularly bothersome 
with elections, where nobody should be excluded. The German constitutional court 
argued in its judgement from (2009) that any election technology needs to be verifiable 
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without any prior specific knowledge, and they thereby introduced a new principle of 
publicity. This basically requires voting technology to provide a means of voter-
verifiability, whether on paper (e.g., ballot scanners) or E-Voting machines (with 
VVPAT). For Internet voting, this probably mandates the introduction of individual 
verifiability, which uses cryptographic means to verify that the vote was essentially 
recorded as cast and cast as intended.  
 
Accountability. This principle complements the requirement for election integrity, 
because it fosters the overall trust in an election. If every step of the election’s preparation 
and completion is properly documented, one is always in a position to precisely determine 
what has happened. While electronic systems can help with accountability, such systems 
cannot document everything, so some aspects must be left to the human observer and the 
election commission (e.g., the setup of such systems and interactions beyond the 
command level). For this purpose, some election authorities are engaging with 
professional IT auditors that are in the position to document every interaction with the 
system and conformity with a pre-defined set of commands/operating manual. 
Nevertheless, for courts, this expert rule is not always sufficient, as in the case of the 
Austrian elections, where the constitutional court demanded full accountability of the 
process, which can also be assessed without the help of experts. Again, a system that 
allows both individual verifiability and universal verifiability (that all votes that have 
been recorded are also counted and tabulated) is required.  
 
Public confidence. Public confidence is particularly difficult to achieve in an election 
because it is not based on facts or measurable items but on understanding and perception 
of individuals that form the collective trust in a given election system. The German 
constitutional court (2009) differentiates between blind trust and established trust. Blind 
trust refers to the unverified trust in a technology because one cannot understand it, 
whereas verified or established trust refer to cases in which the election stakeholder has 
challenged the system, verified its proper functionality and built their confidence in the 
system over time.  
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To date, most E-Voting studies discuss approaches for developing more sophisticated 
algorithms to solve the problems of unequivocally identifying voters, secretly casting 
votes and counting them honestly and accurately. Few authors have addressed how the 
technology influences the legal basis or provided actual guidance on how to use such a 
system (Krimmer, 2012). However, following recent high-profile courts decisions on this 
issue, collaborations between technical and legal sciences are emerging, leading to more 
sustainable electronic election projects.  
 
While there is no definite solution to the problem of whether technology depends on 
law or law depends on technology, it is clear that single-disciplinary approaches are 
insufficient and that integrated, collaborative efforts are required to deliver legislation for 
electronic elections as well as the procurement of such systems.  
 
Security is the ultimate concern when discussing the use of electronic election. Due to 
their complexity, important principles are sometimes questioned. However, it should be 
made clear that any electronic system must always meet the exact same standards applied 
to traditional paper-based systems. While some of the principles need interpretation 
and/or translation into digital realities, this does not necessarily mean that they should be 
altered.  
 
2.4 Summary 
In this chapter, we have demonstrated the origins of Internet voting, provided an analysis 
of some of the first remote electronic voting systems and analyzed the frame that 
constitutions and international standards have provided for the conduct of Internet voting.  
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3 Internet Voting in Austria 
Austria debated the use of electronic means for voting in its parliament several times in 
the second half of the 19th century. Unlike the neighboring countries of Germany, which 
used it for some years in the 1970s (see documentation of its last use in 1973 in Schindler 
[1999]), or Switzerland, where it was permanently installed for the Nationalrat (federal 
council) in 1994 (Das Schweizer Parlament, 2014), the topic never reappeared in serious 
discussions in Austria. Furthermore, despite that mechanical and electronic voting 
machines have been used in Germany (for information regarding mechanical voting 
machines, see Amt für Statistik und Wahlen der Stadt Dortmund [1961], and for 
information regarding electronic voting machines, see Bundeswahlgeräteverordnung 
[1999]) and have been considered for elections in Switzerland (Schweizer Bundesrat, 
1975), no use or discussion of such devices have been considered in Austria to date.  
However, the case of Internet voting is different. Here, Austria has developed 
considerable interest and experience over time.  
 
3.1 The Beginnings 
During the 1990s, the Internet developed quite rapidly. Generally, it was considered that 
the time was ripe for the Federal Chancellery of Austria to develop its own information-
society strategy with the help of a large group of experts. The report was finalized at the 
end of 1996, but Internet voting was not considered feasible for the near future due to 
concerns about voting secrecy and the danger of manipulation (Knoll and Grossendorfer, 
1996). 
 
The first attempt in regard to the organization of an Internet election came from private 
actors in 1999. One of the primary Internet providers in Austria, offering Internet through 
its cable television network in the city of Vienna and other municipalities in Austria, had 
a very active user base. Users were not very satisfied with the quality of the Internet 
service and decided to establish a group that would represent their own interests. The first 
working group that set up the election decided to hold it between October 19 and 
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November 28, 1999 using a basic web page. The customers’ official e-mail addresses and 
passwords were used to verify eligibility. Furthermore, the participation of a self-set 
minimum of 1,500 customers was required. For further details, see the regulations in 
Plattform Anwender.Interessen.Gemeinschaft. (1999b). With 557 participating 
customers, this quota was not reached, and the election was thereby considered invalid 
(Plattform Anwender.Interessen.Gemeinschaft., 1999a). 
 
A month later, in December 1999, a second attempt was initiated. It was decided to 
hold the election in the following year between May 1 and 31, 2000 (Arbeitsgemeinschaft 
Uservertreter Wahl, 2000). In the second attempt, identification was based on the IP 
address of the voter, meaning that the Internet voting platform accepted only votes from 
within the provider’s network. Similar to the first attempt, secrecy of the vote was 
provided by organizational means since – according to their own statement – the 
organizers of the election had no possibility of identifying the owners of the IP addresses. 
In order to offer proof of the election’s integrity, the server was handed over to an 
independent auditor/observer for verification (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Uservertreter Wahl, 
2000, Krejcik, 2003a, Krejcik, 2003b). 
 
Apart from these limited practical experiences, the only other work noticeable around 
Internet voting were several elaborations of voting protocols for Internet voting, such as 
those from Hassler and Posch (1995), Horster (1995) and Schlifni (2000) as well as the 
participation of the city of Vienna in the EU-funded electronic democracy research 
project known as EDEN (Bertorello, 2001).9 
 
                                                
9  The EU funded a number of research projects dealing with Internet voting, such as 
Cybervote or E-Poll, with the aim of cost reduction and fast and clear results 
presentation within the fifth framework program (Galetsas, 2001). It did not do so 
under the sixth or seventh framework program. 
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Changing the Federation of Students’ Law. This was expected to change when the 
legally binding election of the German University of Osnabrück’s student parliament on 
February 2-3, 2000, conducted by the Wählen im Internet (Voting in the Internet) project, 
gained a great deal of media attention not only in Germany but also in Austria 
(Forschungsgruppe Internetwahlen, 2000). In particular, the Österreichische 
Hochschülerschaft (ÖH, Austrian Federation of Students) as well as the Österreichische 
Hochschülerschaft an der Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien (ÖH WU, Federation of Students 
at WU Vienna University of Economics and Business) were very interested in this project, 
since their election had suffered from a particularly low voter turnout for several decades 
(Krimmer, 2002).  
Furthermore, WU had gained a reputation as the most-advanced university in Austria 
in terms of university administration. The rector of the WU, Hans-Robert Hansen, had 
pushed for replacement of the paper-based student ID with a multifunction plastic 
smartcard. As early as the 1980s, during his first term as WU rector, he had advocated 
for the introduction of such a card, but the project was halted early on because of data 
protection concerns. In 1995, the WU PowerCard enabled some 250 students to use the 
PC labs 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, in a pilot project, much to the satisfaction of all 
involved (WU Zentrum für Informatikdienste, 1997). Based on its success, the 
administration’s modernization project WU-IS/200010 included equipping all 20,000 WU 
students with such plastic cards, but the project also had the intention to include digital 
signature functionality (WU Zentrum für Informatikdienste, 1998). Together with Austria 
being the first country to implement the European Digital Signatures directive 
1999/93/EG with the enactment of the Austrian Signaturgesetz (Digital Signature Law), 
which went into effect on January 1, 2000 (Menzel, 2000), it seemed only a matter of a 
few months before students could receive their new student IDs in the fall of 2000. 
Motivated by the Osnabrück example, the ÖH and the ÖH WU formed an internal 
working group to pursue the intention of introducing Internet voting for the upcoming 
                                                
10  The project consortium that implemented the WU-IS/2000 project consisted of 
Siemens Austria, init GmbH, and Datakom GmbH. Siemens was responsible for the 
hardware and project management, init for the software and Datakom for the provision 
of the fully qualified digital signatures.  
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elections. It was clear that this would result in a need to change the legal framework for 
the bi-annual elections, which are governed by the Hochschülerschaftsgesetz 1998 (Law 
on the Federation of Students). There proved to be a window of opportunity as the 
government at the same time planned to establish student federations also at the 
Pädagogische Akademien (pedagogical academies), which would require a change in the 
law. When the draft law was sent out for comments, the chairman of the Federation of 
Students, Martin Faißt, sent a letter to the Austrian Federal Minister of Education, Science 
and Culture, Elisabeth Gehrer, on May 15, 2000 (Faißt, 2000). In this letter, he requested 
that the minister introduce a form of remote voting, whether via post or electronically, for 
the elections to the Austrian Federation of Students, the legal representation of students 
in Austria, regulated by its own federal law. 
 
Gehrer’s ministry, the Bundesministerium für Bildung, Wissenschaft und Kultur 
(Federal Ministry for Education, Science and Culture, BMBWK), in response formed a 
new working group together with the ÖH and ÖH WU to discuss possible ways of 
introducing remote voting. For the ministry, it was clear that the introduction of remote 
voting could take place only in a “modern form,” meaning using electronic means. In a 
first effort, a study trip was undertaken from September 18-20, 2000 to learn from the 
experiences of the University of Osnabrück as well as the returning officer of the state of 
Brandenburg in Germany.  
 
Only weeks before this visit, the WU had originally planned to replace the paper-based 
student IDs with new smartcard-based plastic ID cards (Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien, 
1999). However, the provider of the digital signatures, Datakom Austria GmbH, was 
behind schedule, because they had difficulty accrediting their services by the oversight 
body, Rundfunk & Telekom Regulierungs GmbH (RTR).11 Nevertheless, they were still 
                                                
11  At that time, Datakom was a daughter company of the Austrian Post and the Austrian 
pioneer in terms of digital signatures. After the enactment of the Austrian Digital 
Signature Law on January 1, 2000, Datakom wanted to become the first accredited 
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expecting to receive the accreditation before the end of the year, since it was a high 
priority for them because the equipment of the then 20,000 WU students with digital 
signatures would have been Datakom’s first large-scale deployment. So, the working 
group traveled to Osnabrück with the assumption that all WU students would have new 
student IDs with digital signatures by the time the Federation of Students elections would 
take place. 
 
The talks with Dieter Otten, head of the research group Internetwahlen from the 
University of Osnabrück, went well, so the working group prepared a contract of 
cooperation between the ministry, ÖH, ÖH WU and the University of Osnabrück. The 
working group sought to use the Internet voting solution developed by the University of 
Osnabrück at the WU because of the availability of infrastructure and the perceived high 
comfort level of the students for using IT. The students would use their new digital student 
IDs to cast their votes at specially prepared voting terminals in the polling station at WU 
during the May 2001 Federation of Students’ election.  
 
  
                                                
trust center to offer fully qualified digital signatures to the public. It was able to offer 
simple digital signatures with lesser legal quality almost immediately on January 27, 
2000 (Tischler, 2000). But, it was more complicated for them to fulfill all the technical, 
organizational and security requirements for fully qualified digital signatures that were 
requested by the Bestätigungsstelle (certification body), the Zentrum für sichere 
Informationstechnologie - Austria (A-SIT, Center for Secure Information Technology 
– Austria). Its approval needed to be accredited by RTR. 
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In spite of the fact that protesting against the introduction of tuition fees for studying 
at Austrian universities took most of the student representatives’ attention, the working 
group had prepared the changes to the Hochschülerschaftsgesetz (HSG, Federation of 
Students’ law), so the Ministerrat (ministerial council) of the government decided that 
Internet voting would be introduced on November 29, 2000 (BMBWK, 2000). The 
changes included the amendment of Sections 34, 39 and 48 of the HSG. 12 
 
The amendment followed the principle of technological neutrality, although essential 
core elements are mandated by it. Section 34 Para. 4 HSG provides that the technology 
used to verify the identity of the voter must comply with the requirements of electronic 
signatures in accordance with the Signature Law and must comply with the provisions of 
the Data Protection Act 2000. In particular, this meant that the Data Protection 
Commission is required to approve the system, because sensitive data will be processed 
by the election system in accordance with § 18 Para. 2 DSG 2000, i.e., the political 
opinion of the voter. The electronic election system must provide a technical setup for the 
Election Commission so that it can carry out its tasks in accordance with § 34 Para. 5 (4) 
HSG. 
 
As part of the election process, a provision was made in § 34 Para. 5 (5) HSG to 
provide a confirmation of consent step – in other words, a question asking if the voter 
wishes to cast the vote in the format indicated. Furthermore, computers set up on the 
premises of the university offering the possibility of electronic voting were to be equipped 
with visual protection. This does not apply for electronic voting over the Internet on home 
personal computers according to the explanations in the 2001 parliamentary discussion. 
This is also conclusive in the sense that, in the case of a conventional election, persons 
                                                
12  The introduction of electronic distance voting in the area of interest groups has been 
made possible by the Constitutional Court decision of 1996 - VfGH, VfSlg 14440, 
according to which election law can be interpreted more broadly in the case of interest 
group elections as compared to national elections. In the case of the latter, the 1985 - 
VfGH, VfSlg 10412. See also (Menzel, 2001). 
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casting their vote by mail are themselves responsible for exercising the right to elect 
freely, secretly and personally without supervision by the Election Commission. After the 
Election Commission made computers available for electronic voting in the Austrian 
Federation of Students’ Union elections, the establishment of visual protection facilitates 
this type of voting. Furthermore, certification according to § 34 Para. 6 is required for the 
E-Voting system, which must be carried out by the Confirmation Authority according to 
the Signature Law. This Confirmation Authority may also be consulted to conduct a 
review in the event of irregularities pursuant to § 39 Para. 7 HSG before any declaration 
of invalidity is issued by the Election Commission. In Article 48 HSG, the responsible 
Federal Minister shall be empowered to introduce E-Voting through a regulation. 
 
On December 21, the ministry also sent out a draft version of the 
Hochschülerschaftswahlordnung (HSWO), the ordinance regulating further details of the 
voting process (Stangl, 2000), including some for the conduct of Internet voting, which 
includes the following: 
 
- The election commission should make sure before the beginning of the election – 
if necessary with the help of technical experts –that the hard disks are empty; 
 
- The election commission should ensure that enough voters should participate in 
the election so that there are enough votes to safeguard the anonymity of the 
voters; 
 
- Information about voters and anonymized votes should be stored on separate hard 
disks; 
 
- Any data produced by the electronic election should be transferred to read-only 
media (CD-ROMs), and any data should be deleted. 
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The working group was assured several times that new student IDs would be rolled 
out in February 2001. However, shortly after the beginning of the new year, before the 
co-operative agreement could be signed or the ordinance passed, it became clear that the 
time frame anticipated by the WU and its service providers could not be achieved, and its 
introduction would be further delayed until summer.13 Hence, on January 17, 2001, the 
working group announced the postponement of the effort (Österreichische 
Hochschülerschaft, 2001). 
 
Nevertheless, the changes to the Federation of Students’ law were passed in parliament 
on February 1, 2001 (Brinek et al., 2001). However, the ordinance for the conduct of the 
Federation of Students’ elections did not include the previously proposed changes with 
regards to Internet voting (Bundesministerium für Bildung Wissenschaft und Kultur, 
2001). Hence, the student elections in May 2001 did take place in all Austrian universities 
using paper ballots.14 
                                                
13  The rollout of the smartcards finally took place without equipping them with digital 
signatures. On December 17, 2001, Datakom received the necessary accreditation 
(Telekom-Control-Kommission, 2001) and started public offering of digital signatures 
on February 4, 2002. Shortly thereafter, it announced that the issued student ID cards 
had to be replaced during the summer 2002, as the original chip was suitable for fully 
qualified signatures (Tischler, 2002). Then, on September 27, 2002, Datakom sold its 
digital signature products to its only competitor A-Trust GmbH. On October 1, 2002, 
Datakom was reintegrated within its mother company, Telekom AG, and ceased to 
exist. In 2005, WU started to offer services using digital signatures (WU Zentrum für 
Informatikdienste, 2005). 
14  For a description and lessons learned from running the Federation of Students’ 
elections at the University of Vienna and the potential of Internet voting, see Menzel 
and Stöger (2003). 
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Later that year, the parliament also passed similar amendments to the 
Wirtschaftskammergesetz (law for the chamber of commerce) in order to allow electronic 
voting for their elections as well (Kopf and Haigermoser, 2001).15  
 
After the elections, as one of its last efforts, the ÖH WU published a questionnaire in 
its biweekly magazine WUaktuell. The survey aimed to determine the interest of its 
members in Internet voting (ÖH WU, 2001a). Approximately 84 percent of the WU 
students were actually in favor of its introduction (ÖH WU, 2001b). This gave 
encouragements to all persons involved that Internet voting would really be more a matter 
of time. 
 
  
                                                
15  Next to the Federation of Students, the Austrian Chamber of Commerce was a second 
driver – at least for some time – for the use of ICT in elections. Its elections take place 
every five years, and in 2000, for the first time, a networked voter register was used to 
identify the voters as well as an optical scanner to count the votes in its elections in 
Vienna (Nettig, 2000). In 2005, five polling stations were equipped with self-
developed electronic voting machines (de Carlo, 2007, Hantsch, 2006). These 
machines did not fulfill the criteria (no digital signature, no evaluation by A-SIT) set 
forth in the chambers law. However, nobody appealed against its use, so the results 
remained legally binding. Nevertheless, the machines were not used in the 2010 
elections. For a general overview of IT use in preparation of elections in Austria, see 
Botz (2008). 
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3.2 The Research Group E-Voting.AT 
The public discussion of Internet voting for the Federation of Students’ elections revived 
the academic discussion in Austria as well. WU researchers Alexander Prosser and Robert 
Müller-Török presented a paper at the ICEIS conference in July 2001 in Setubal, Portugal, 
where they proposed the first version of their algorithm, which separated the voting 
process into two phases: identification and vote casting. Furthermore, the algorithm was 
designed for multifunctional smartcards to ideally fulfill three functions: (i) to identify 
the voter, (ii) to store the anonymous voting token and (iii) to provide for a secure 
processing environment (Prosser and Müller-Török, 2001).16  
 
In July 2001, WU Professor Alfred Taudes learned of the efforts of the ÖH WU and 
proposed to join efforts with Alexander Prosser and Robert Krimmer. Shortly thereafter, 
Robert Kofler, who had programmed the department’s webpage as part of his master’s 
thesis under the supervision of Alexander Prosser (Kofler, 2003), also joined the team. In 
September 2001, the research group E-Voting.AT was founded and began to develop a 
working prototype. As one of the first steps, the research group negotiated a cooperative 
agreement with the ÖH WU, which was signed on November 10, 2001 (Panny et al., 
2001).  
 
Furthermore, the research group established a consultative body, where members from 
the BMBWK, the City of Vienna, A-SIT, ÖH WU and the Bundesrat (Federal Council, 
upper house of the Austrian Parliament) took part. Between 2001 and 2003, the body met 
four times. The aim of the advisory body was to raise awareness for Internet voting with 
relevant stakeholders in Austria. Early on, it became clear that developing an Internet 
voting project would require substantial legal knowledge, and a second, less formalized 
cooperative arrangement was established with Professor Michael Holoubek from the WU 
Institute for Public Law as well as assistant professor Patricia Heindl.  
                                                
16  Refined versions of the algorithm were later published in the journal 
Wirtschaftsinformatik (Prosser and Müller-Török, 2002) and in the proceedings of the 
Hawaiian International Conference on System Sciences (Kofler et al., 2003). 
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Next, the research group looked for an industry partner that could help with the 
implementation of the project. The trust center Datakom was first chosen, despite their 
problems with offering fully qualified digital signatures.  
 
After initial positive sounding meetings in fall of 2001, a project proposal was 
prepared by E-Voting.AT together with Holoubek & Heindl on behalf of Datakom in 
order to develop a pilot implementation of the E-Voting.AT algorithm intended for use 
in the 2003 WU Federation of Students’ elections.  
 
On November 19, 2001, a project proposal was submitted to the research agency FFF 
with the aim to develop a prototype and to use it in the 2003 Federation of Students’ 
elections at the WU (Datakom Austria GmbH, 2001). 
 
After the submission of the proposal, the work continued. One of the challenges during 
the beginning of the project was to assess the feasibility of whether the multifunctional 
smartcards available at the time in Austria would be able to fulfill the required functions 
as designed (Prosser and Müller-Török, 2002). The research project put a strong focus on 
the calculation and storage of the voting token, including how to best protect the token’s 
secrecy. In order for the smart card to calculate and store a voting token, it would require 
the card to not disclose any information that could lead to the identification of the voter 
(Kofler et al., 2004). 
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However, talks with Siemens and A-SIT identified the following problematic issues 
with using the smartcard, which was to be deployed to WU students: 
- The smartcard’s unique ID and the certificate of the owner of the smartcard could 
not be read freely; 
- Neither the owner of the chip nor other applications on his/her behalf were able 
to write onto the smartcard; 
- The smartcard contained only a signature key pair and was missing a key pair for 
encryption; 
- The standard operating systems for multifunctional smartcards did not provide the 
necessary operators in order to be a secure processing environment (Kofler et al., 
2004). 
 
On January 18, 2002, Alexander Prosser informed the group’s partner, Datakom, about 
these issues and had them withdraw the submitted project proposal before the scientific 
committee could decide whether or not to fund the project (Prosser, 2002). Despite some 
continued talks with Datakom, including discussing how to equip the WU students’ cards 
with the missing second key pair, the funding application was not taken up again, and the 
partnership ended.  
 
Without consistent funding, the research group decided to continue its efforts. The first 
research results were published at the International Legal Informatics Symposium in 
Salzburg in February 2002 (Prosser et al., 2002a). There, a working contact was 
established with Nadja Braun, who was then working for the E-Voting project of the 
Swiss Federal Chancellery. 
 
Next, the development of the prototype was intensified, as it was the group’s intention 
to maintain cooperation with the ÖH WU. In the summer of 2002, Martin Karl-Unger 
joined the research group in order to strengthen the development efforts of the client. The 
focus of the work was now to find a partner for modifying an existing or developing a 
new multifunctional smartcard from scratch.  
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Despite the fact that no partner was found right away, an e-government infrastructure 
project by the Austrian government facilitated the further development. The project was 
able to make use of a newly developed interface based on the HTTPS protocol to interact 
with Austrian smart cards. This interface had been presented earlier in the year by the 
Bundesministerium für öffentliche Leistung und Sport (BMÖLS, Federal Ministry for 
Public Service and Sport) as part of a new service in addition to the digital signature, the 
Bürgerkarte (citizen card or national ID). The need for it arose because digital signatures 
only allow for authentication of a person but not for its identification (unless the digital 
signature is known beforehand). The purpose was to link a digital signature to the 
respective data record of the citizen in the Zentrales Melderegister (ZMR, central 
population register). In addition, the concept also contained a so-called security layer that 
would provide access to the smart card using standard HTTPS commands (Leitold et al., 
2002). The concept and its specification had been released to the public on August 30, 
2002.  
 
The initial prototype implemented the first step of the algorithm, which consisted of 
verifying the voters’ identity using the security layer and generating the anonymous 
voting token. It was presented to the public together with its source code in December 
2002 (Prosser et al., 2002b). The source code was obfuscated, which made it hard for 
third parties to understand. 
 
3.2.1 First Shadow Election with Internet Voting and the E-Voting.AT 
Action Plan  
Based on the prototype, talks with the ÖH WU were taken up again. It was also clear that 
legally binding elections could not be held because the appropriate digital signature 
infrastructure would not be available. Hence, the plan was to conduct a shadow election,17 
where the identification using digital signatures would be replaced by using the students’ 
                                                
17  A shadow election is a mock election that took place at the same time as the real, 
legally-binding election. A voter participating in a shadow election must participate 
twice to both test the e-voting system and to cast a legally binding vote (on paper).  
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usernames and passwords, which they use for accessing their e-mail accounts. Further, 
the eligible students were limited to participants in the elective courses of the WU 
Institute for Information Processing and Information Management; this comprised 980 
students.  
 
For identification, the E-Voting.AT project sought support from the Zentrum für 
Informatikdienste der Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien (ZID, WU center for IT services), to 
which E-Voting.AT gave the student ID numbers of the eligible participants. ZID then 
created a hash number on the basis of the student ID (without corresponding names), 
which served as internal IDs for the test. This ensured that the identification and 
authentication of the test participants were completely in the hands of the ZID. Hence,  
E-Voting.AT had no information about the names of the students that participated in the 
shadow election.  
 
The shadow election required the students to conduct two steps: (i) to obtain a voting 
token issued any time between May 1 and 19, and then (ii) to use this voting token 
between May 20, 2003, 9:00 and May 22, 2003, 15:00 to cast their vote. In order to ensure 
that the encrypted votes were not opened before the end of the election, representatives 
from the three largest parties in the Universitätsvertretung (UV, Federation of Students’ 
university parliament) held the three shares of the decryption key. 
 
When looking at the usage numbers, 412 students had a voting token issued, but only 
355 students actually cast a vote (86%) (Prosser et al., 2003). As the client of the Internet 
voting software required the use of Java, several users had issues installing the software 
because they did not realize that the test election would require the installation of the Java 
runtime environment (JRE). In a survey conducted amongst the participants of the test, a 
large majority (81.2 %) turned out to be in favor of voting online. The most important 
factor was to be able to vote without having to go to the polling station, i.e., it was a 
matter of convenience. The participants also felt that E-Voting was a very secure and 
anonymous process. The survey also found that the participants were generally interested 
in politics, which lends support to the belief that Internet voting will activate the already 
activated (Dickinger et al., 2003). 
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In the aftermath of the shadow election, the project team conducted several activities 
to increase the outreach of the project:  
- the advisory board held another meeting; 
- an outreach campaign was started in order to set the public agenda to foster 
Internet voting efforts; and  
- a meeting with stakeholders was held in order to disseminate the project results 
and find potential new partners. 
 
The E-Voting.AT advisory board met for a fourth time on June 24, 2003 to discuss the 
results of the shadow election. One of the major outcomes of this meeting was the 
decision to organize an international conference to reach out to other groups working on 
electronic voting issues within Europe. Jürgen Weiss, the chairman of the federal council 
at that time, recommended the conference be held in Schloss Hofen in Lochau near 
Bregenz, the center for continuing education of the region of Vorarlberg.18  
 
The outreach campaign was started in cooperation with the research colleagues from 
the WU constitutional law department, Michael Holoubek and Patricia Heindl. The 
project team wrote a letter to the president of the Verfassungskonvent (constitutional 
convent), a body installed by the Austrian government to discuss possible changes to the 
constitution (Holoubek et al., 2003). The intent of the letter was to make the convent 
discuss the possibility of introducing Internet voting.  
 
 
 
                                                
18  This was the start for the EVOTE conference series, which took place between 2004 
and 2014 every second year. In 2016, the conference was merged with the Vote-ID 
conference to become E-Vote-ID and since takes place every year.  
  49 
During the summer of 2003, the Österreichische Computer Gesellschaft (OCG, 
Austrian Computer Society) Arbeitskreis für E-Democracy/E-Voting (working group on 
e-democracy/E-Voting)19 held a strategic discussion on the possible introduction of E-
Voting, in particular, to give further input to the constitutional convent. An action plan 
was prepared, which included the following steps in sequential order: 
 
1. Identification of Target Groups 
This included elections to pressure groups within the country as well as federal 
elections for citizens living abroad. 
 
2. Development of the Infrastructure 
The necessary infrastructure (e.g., a central voter register) as well as distribution 
and daily use of appropriate smart cards with digital signatures. 
 
3. Gaining Experience 
The introduction should follow a step-by-step approach with a slowly growing 
user group before implementing the project at full scale. 
 
4. Legal Adaptations 
According to the previously identified target groups, the necessary adaptations 
of the legal base including the constitution should be discussed.  
 
                                                
19  This working group was established in late 2002 to build a network of people in 
research and practice who were interested in the topic of e-democracy and e-voting 
issues around these topics. In eight meetings in 2002 and 2003 some twenty 
presentations by experts on the topic were held and a proceedings band with the results 
of the presentations was published (Prosser and Krimmer, 2003b). While the working 
group still exists today, it is significantly less active than in the initial phase. It 
currently focuses on organizing e-democracy and e-participation conferences 
including a public wiki (www.ocg.at/ak/edemocracy/wiki2). 
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This action plan was presented at a press conference on July 29, 2003 (Prosser and 
Krimmer, 2003a). Later that day, the president of the constitutional convent notified the 
project team that he had forwarded the letter sent by the project in May to the members 
of the convent (Fiedler, 2004). Consecutively, the bureau of the convent discussed the 
topic of E-Voting together with postal voting. While there was a general agreement that 
postal voting should be introduced, such an agreement could not be found for E-Voting 
(Fiedler et al., 2005).  
 
As the third activity for project outreach, meetings with several electoral stakeholders 
were held. The project had already met regularly with the Stadt Wien (Administration of 
the City of Vienna), the Bundesministerium des Inneren (BMI, Ministry of the Interior) 
and the Bundesrechenzentrum (BRZ, Federal Computing Center) a daughter company of 
the Finanzministerium (BMF, Ministry of Finances) to gain additional input and make 
them aware of the project. But, with the successful conduct of the shadow election, the 
interest in the project grew. Further meetings were held with the following groups: 
Wirtschaftskammer Österreich (WKÖ, Austrian Chamber of Commerce), several big IT 
companies including IBM and Oracle, and the Bundesministerium für auswärtige 
Angelegenheiten (BMaA, Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs). The interest of the BMaA 
came, in particular, from the department for Austrians living abroad, which was led by 
Thomas Buchsbaum. He had contacted the research group at the beginning of 2003, 
because he was looking for input on remote electronic voting for his participation in the 
working group for establishing a standard on electronic voting within the Council of 
Europe.20 Furthermore, citizens living abroad were identified as a group that could 
                                                
20  Upon suggestion from the British delegation, the Council of Europe had established a 
working group in order to create a European standard for electronic voting in 2002. 
This group eventually managed to conclude its work in summer of 2004 and the 
committee of ministers adopted the “Recommendation (2004)11 on Electronic 
Voting” on 30 September of that year. (For background of the project, see Remmert, 
2004)  
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potentially benefit from using Internet voting.21 Also, in the discussions during a 
presentation in the BMaA in June 2003, it became clear that the role of the election 
commissions was underestimated so far—in particular, their ability to start, interrupt or 
close an election, which set the agenda for the further work of the research group.  
 
3.2.2 Federal Presidency Election and Inter-Ministerial Working 
Group on Electronic Voting 
During the public outreach campaign, the Austrian branch of IBM expressed particular 
interest in collaborating with the project. While IBM itself had no experience with 
Internet voting as such, they had commissioned studies on electronic democracy (for 
example, Davies [2000]) and were interested in several e-government projects. In August 
2003, a mutual understanding was reached that IBM Austria would explore entering a 
strategic partnership with the E-Voting.AT initiative, including forming a research 
project where IBM would invest considerably. As a second partner, the BRZ was 
considered. Together, E-Voting.AT, IBM and BRZ began to work on a project proposal 
to be submitted to the Forschungsförderungsgesellschaft (Austrian research council, 
FFG), which had a funding scheme for public private partnerships for applied research.  
 
Before the research proposal could be submitted, several rounds of negotiations took 
place. In order to test the newly formed partnership, a new shadow election was planned, 
and the upcoming Bundespräsidentschaftswahl (Federal Presidency Election) at the end 
of April 2004 was chosen as the ideal candidate. However, BRZ canceled its participation 
in the shadow election shortly before. A-Trust, the successor of Datakom as trust center 
for providing digital signatures, was able to quickly replace BRZ’s role as the sponsor of 
the event. 
 
                                                
21  In February 2004, e-voting for citizens living abroad was made the topic of discussion 
during the e-democracy sessions at the IRIS conference in Salzburg Austria. For more 
information, see Braun, Buchsbaum, Krimmer, and Prosser (2004). 
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This time, all WU students – which included approximately 20,000 people – were 
entitled to participate in the shadow election in order to cast votes for the new Austrian 
president via the internet. The two major parties nominated two strong candidates: Heinz 
Fischer from the SPÖ and Benita Ferrero-Waldner from the ÖVP. Soon, Internet voting 
also became an issue in the election—both candidates held different opinions, although 
they pretty much followed the party lines. While Fischer was against the introduction of 
Internet voting,22 Ferrero-Waldner, not surprisingly as minister of foreign affairs, 
supported the topic, in particular, because of the benefits for Austrians living abroad.  
 
The set-up of the project was very similar to the 2003 shadow election, except that this 
time all 20,000 WU students were entitled to participate. The WU ZID again provided 
support for the student logins. Voting tokens were issued between March 22 and April 22 
around the clock, and students were able to vote online any time between April 23 09:00 
and April 25 17:00. A total of 1,786 voting tokens were issued (some 9% turn out), and 
of these, 961 were used to cast a vote (reducing the turn out to some 5%), so nearly 47 % 
of the voting token holders did not participate in the second step of the process. This may 
have been due to problems with Java, as some 120 support incidents had to be solved, 
mainly concerning the installation of JRE.23 The role of the electoral commission was 
strengthened this time; however, the recent research results that allowed for majority 
decisions of the election commission were not implemented in time. The members of the 
commission consisted of Gabriele Kotsis, president of the Austrian Computer Society, 
Horst Breitenstein, WU vice rector, and Michael Holoubek, professor for constitutional 
law.  
                                                
22  Heinz Fischer mentioned during a public debate at the WU on March 16, 2004 (ÖH 
WU, 2004) that his son, Philipp Fischer, had written a diploma thesis on the topic at 
the Danube University Krems in the late 1990s. According to Fischer, his son 
concluded that this form of voting should not be pursued. Philipp’s thesis was one of 
the first Austrian academic theses on this topic. University employees confirmed its 
existence; however, it was not possible for the university library personnel to retrieve 
a copy from their archives.  
23  In a subsequent research project, an auto-install process was developed by Daniel 
Walch that could reduce the number of support incidents (2006).  
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The counting ceremony on April 25 became a major event attended by some 100 
visitors during which the encrypted electronic votes were loaded, the key shares entered 
by the electoral commission, the decrypted votes counted, and the results presented. In a 
survey conducted after the shadow election, it came as no surprise that E-Voting ranked 
high amongst WU students as a future application for multifunctional cards (Arami et al., 
2004). 
 
After the successful election test and EVOTE conference, the consortium of IBM, 
BRZ and E-Voting.AT continued negotiations and talks for submitting a joint research 
proposal. These discussions developed very slowly. When it became known that decision 
makers within the WU would not support the submission of the research proposal, the 
interest of the project partners IBM and BRZ faded. The attempt to achieve sustainable 
financing for E-Voting research at WU failed once more.  
 
Despite this failure to institutionalize E-Voting research at the WU, the two test 
elections put pressure on political decision makers to discuss whether or not voting via 
the Internet was a possible future option for Austrian elections.  
 
In an interview on the evening of April 25, 2004, after the count of the Internet votes, 
the head of the election department in the BMI, Robert Stein, announced that the Federal 
Minister of the Interior, Ernst Strasser, had commissioned a feasibility study for the 
introduction of Internet voting in the form of an inter-ministerial working group (Stein, 
2004).  
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The group immediately began work in May 2004. Three sub-working-groups each 
focused on different aspects: international aspects, chaired by Thomas Buchsbaum from 
the BMaA; technical aspects, chaired led by Herbert Leitold from A-SIT;24 and legal 
affairs, chaired by Robert Stein. Over a period of half a year, some 50 experts, including 
Robert Krimmer and Alexander Prosser, met several times to discuss the issues and 
develop a final report addressed to the minister of the Interior. The work was concluded 
on December 15, 2004. The conclusions of the report were as follows: 
 
- The introduction of electronic voting for elections to federal, regional, or 
municipal parliaments requires a change of the constitution.  
 
- Electronic voting must fulfill the principles for elections in the same way as paper-
based elections. 
 
- The Council of Europe’s “Recommendation (2004)11 on Electronic Voting” does 
not in any way conflict with existing Austrian legislation. 
 
- Electronic voting must give the election commissions the same opportunities for 
control as paper-based elections do; in particular, results of electronic voting 
should only be accessible by a joint effort of a majority of election commission 
members. 
 
- The citizen card shall be the form of identification for any electronic voting 
efforts. 
 
- Costs of electronic voting cannot be assessed; however, they must be split evenly 
between municipal, regional and federal institutions. 
                                                
24  Within the framework of this technical working group, Thomas Rössler – on behalf of 
A-SIT – presented an overview of the state of the art in electronic voting, which served 
as a basis for the discussions (Rössler, 2004a).  
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- A central voter register is a pre-requisite for electronic voting and would 
potentially result in synergy effects, i.e., lower costs in the long run. 
 
- Technical challenges mainly stem from the requirement of keeping votes secret 
while also avoiding the cast of multiple votes in different voting channels. 
 
- Due to the high number of polling stations, it is not an aim to equip them with 
electronic voting machines. 
 
- The introduction of Internet voting at the federal level requires a series of tests at 
lower levels, including regional and municipal. Furthermore, tests that include 
only a subset of voters should not be pursued due to the possible unequal treatment 
of voters within the electorate. Instead, gaining experience with electronic voting 
in the elections of pressure groups (e.g., Federation of Students or the Chamber 
of Commerce) should be considered. 
 
- The introduction of electronic voting requires proper preparation over a period of 
several years. Potential accelerating factors could include the existence of a 
central voter register and a high degree of diffusion of the citizen card amongst 
the Austrian population. 
 
- Electronic voting should be used only as an additional means of casting a vote and 
should not result in any reduction in the opportunity to cast a vote on paper 
(Bundesministerium für Inneres, 2004). 
 
While most of these recommendations were in line with international practice, the 
requirement that electronic votes can only be conducted for the whole of a given 
electorate is specific to the Austrian context. Other countries have chosen to handle 
deployment differently, such as Switzerland’s incremental approach to deployment. 
 
  56 
After this report was published, it seemed as if a long-standing discussion had ended. 
It was clear that E-Voting could be done technically, and it was legally possible to conduct 
elections within the Federation of Students or the Chamber of Commerce. However, E-
Voting in national elections would require changes to the constitution, which would 
require the agreement of ÖVP and SPÖ.  
 
As no sustainable funding could be acquired, the E-Voting.AT research group 
disintegrated within the second half of 2004, as Martin-Karl Unger, Robert Kofler, and 
finally Robert Krimmer decided to focus on other work. 
 
3.3 The Competence Center for Electronic Voting (E-Voting.CC) 
When the long-planned first EVOTE conference took place at Castle Hofen in 
Lochau/Bregenz, Austria, in July 2004, the dissolution of E-Voting.AT research group 
had already started; Robert Kofler did not participate. At the conference, several 
interesting perspectives on electronic voting were presented, including new E-Voting 
algorithms (Riera and Cervelló, 2004), empirical analysis of early user assessments of E-
Voting (Oostveen and van den Besselaar, 2004), security assets (Prosser et al., 2004b) as 
well as the soon-to-be finalized Council of Europe “Recommendation (2004)11 on 
Electronic Voting” (Remmert, 2004). During the course of the conference, it became clear 
that the landscape of electronic voting was quite scattered at that time, and there were 
similar experiences in different projects and contexts. The proceedings (Prosser and 
Krimmer, 2004b) were soon out of print due to high demand. This gave the organizers 
reason to believe that an increased, structured exchange of ideas, research and experiences 
would generally improve the quality of conduct of E-Voting. In early 2005, Robert 
Krimmer and Stefan Triessnig joined forces to develop an E-Voting competence 
community that was based around a database to contain a structured collection of all 
Internet voting experiences that could be found in literature, classical media and the 
Internet.  
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When it was time to organize the second EVOTE meeting for 2006, the Council of 
Europe was particularly fond of the idea of making the conference an academic forum for 
reviewing its E-Voting recommendation. It seemed to be the right time to start a 
competence center instead of a community, and so E-Voting.CC was founded on 24 July 
2006. Besides organizing the EVOTE conference series, E-Voting.CC focused on 
conducting studies and providing consulting on the topic of E-Voting and e-democracy.25  
 
After the 2006 conference, the work with Triessnig continued, and data on some 110 
uses of Internet voting around the world were collected.26  
 
The Gesellschaft für Informatik (GI, German association for informatics) was one of 
the first associations in Germany that organized their internal elections mainly via the 
Internet (but maintained the ability for voters to apply to vote by mail). The GI had 
established an Arbeitskreis (consultative body) on E-Voting with several members from 
German academia, such as Rüdiger Grimm, Melanie Volkamer and Robert Krimmer on 
behalf of E-Voting.CC. The aim was to review and improve the overall security of GI’s 
Internet voting procedures through proposing an evaluation and certification process. The 
group decided to draft a protection profile in accordance with the Common Criteria 
standard (2012); the profile was completed as one of the first for electronic voting 
worldwide (Grimm et al., 2006).27 
                                                
25  One major activity in this area was the contribution to the CoE recommendation on 
electronic democracy, for which the center drafted annex 1 (Krimmer et al., 2009). 
26  This data is accessible publicly at http://db.e-voting.cc (Krimmer and Triessnig, 2007). 
The database itself was originally implemented by Daniel Botz and later improved by 
Martin Androsch (2011). 
27  Other known profiles include the French PP-CIVIS (Direction centrale de la sécurité 
des systèmes d’information, 2006), the proposed US IEEE standard 1583 (IEEE 
Standards Coordinating Committee 38, 2005) and the Chinese proposal (Lee et al., 
2010). 
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In a separate effort, Volkamer and Krimmer collaborated to develop criteria for the 
critical issue of ensuring the everlasting secrecy of a vote (Volkamer et al., 2006). With 
paper-based elections, it seems obvious that if a vote cannot be attributed to a voter at the 
time of an election, it will stay unattributable in the future. With electronic elections, 
however, where the secrecy of a vote often relies solely on the need for enormous amounts 
of computing capabilities to break its protection, time has become an issue. In this effort, 
Volkamer and Krimmer identified weaknesses in post-election Internet voting schemes, 
where the vote and the voter’s identity are jointly communicated in one package and only 
separated during counting.  
 
Further studies by E-Voting.CC included work on election observation (Krimmer and 
Volkamer, 2006a), E-Voting readiness (Krimmer and Schuster, 2008) and verifiability 
(Weddeling et al., 2008). 
 
3.4 E-Voting2006.AT 
Two years after the second election test of the original E-Voting.at team, Alexander 
Prosser undertook a third test with a new team and a new cooperation partner, the Wiener 
Zeitung (Viennese Newspaper). This newspaper is the official journal of the Republic of 
Austria, and it has a special status due to its ownership by the Federal Chancellery. With 
this project, the newspaper ventured into new areas in order to broaden its business 
concept. The idea of the project was to run another election test, but this time, the test 
would be aimed at the prime target group for Internet voting: Austrian citizens living 
abroad. This project also implemented the original algorithm (Prosser and Müller-Török, 
2002) and incorporated lessons learned from the first two tests, such as exploring the 
possibility of recovering voting tokens in order to lower the number of voters lost between 
the first and the second phase of the test. In this test, Austrians living abroad had to 
register themselves for the test, and 293 actually did. However, only 148 actually 
participated in the second phase and cast a vote. During the election test, several 
researchers, including some from A-SIT and the GI consultative body on E-Voting, 
detected weaknesses in the implementation that would have allowed full access to the 
project database (Grimm, 2006). This problem was confirmed by the project team and 
further discussed in their report (Prosser and Steininger, 2006).  
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3.5 TU Graz 
The Technische Universität Graz (TU Graz, Technical University of Graz) and its Institut 
für angewandte Informationsverarbeitung und Kommunikation (IAIK, institute for 
applied information processing and communications) with its head, Reinhard Posch, 
always had a special role when it comes to E-Voting in Austria. In 1995, a first protocol 
was written at the institute about conducting elections in local area networks by Vesna 
Hassler and Reinhard Posch (1995), and in the years thereafter, he was actively involved 
in making Austria the first country within the European union to pass a law to allow for 
electronic signatures. He even coauthored the first commentary on the 
Signaturverordnung, the ordinance of the Austrian signature law (Brenn and Posch, 
2000). Together with the signature law, the association A-SIT was also given the role as 
the certification agency for digital signatures (Bundeskanzleramt, 2000). Since its 
foundation in 1999, Reinhard Posch has been its technical managing director. Also, in the 
summer of 2000, Reinhard Posch was appointed Chief Information Technology Officer 
of the Austrian Government. During the negotiations for the passing of HSG in 
parliament, and section 6 of paragraph 34 was included, which tasked A-SIT to evaluate 
the conformity of the given E-Voting system with the law without specifying the 
requirements any further. In 2002, when the work in the Council of Europe started to 
develop a recommendation on E-Voting, Herbert Leitold, took a leading role in drafting 
technical parts of the recommendation, including a strong reference to Common Criteria.  
 
Within Austria, he led the BMI technical sub-working-group for technical aspects of 
E-Voting in 2004.28 His colleague, Thomas Rössler, prepared a state-of-the-art document 
on the technical aspects (Rössler, 2004a), as his PhD thesis project “eVita” dealt also with 
the Internet (Rössler, 2004b). In 2005, they jointly developed an E-Voting protocol 
(Leitold et al., 2005). In this proposal, they used the Austrian citizen card for 
identification purposes as well as a hardware security module to decrypt the votes. The 
protocol establishes the anonymity during the counting of the votes; this approach is very 
similar to the one chosen in Estonia (see Madise and Martens [2006]).  
                                                
28  For more information on this working group see previous section thereon. 
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At the end of 2005, Martin Mayer, whose diploma thesis Thomas Rössler supervised, 
approached the Federation of Students of the TU Graz to develop a prototype to be used 
in the 2007 Federation of Students’ elections.29 In the beginning, the student body was 
positively inclined towards supporting this effort and debated actively in two meetings of 
the Federation of Students’ university representation body in December 15, 2005 and 
January 18, 2006. After the debate, the body decided to pursue this project under certain 
conditions, including full access to the source code of the E-Voting components. One 
student representative, Hartwig Brandl, expressed in that meeting his discomfort with this 
decision and pointed out that the representative body for the study program Informatics 
had passed a resolution against the introduction of Internet voting (Hochschülerschaft an 
der Technischen Universität Graz, 2005, Hochschülerschaft an der Technischen 
Universität Graz, 2006). Despite the overall positive decision by the student 
representatives at TU Graz to pursue this project, it did not take off.  
 
In the fall of 2006, a meeting of all chairpersons of the 21 Federation of Students’ 
organizations in Austria was held by BRZ to determine whether they were interested in 
organizing an Internet voting pilot. The discussion ended without a concrete decision. 
Discussions, however, continued in the background. Hartwig Brandl, who was also a 
member of the national Federation of Students’ parliament, had been actively discussing 
the problems of E-Voting. In the end, various bodies passed three resolutions: the meeting 
of the student representatives in informatics from Germany, Austria and Switzerland, 
which met in Graz on 10 December, passed the first resolution (Konferenz der 
Informatikfachschaften, 2006). It was followed by the student representative body from 
the faculty of informatics of TU Graz on December 12 (Fakultätsvertretung Informatik 
an der HTU Graz, 2006). Finally, the national Federation of Students’ parliament passed 
a resolution on December 15 against the use of Internet voting (ÖH Bundesvertretung, 
2006; see also Brandl et al. [2007]).  
 
                                                
29  He finalized his master thesis two years later (Mayer, 2008). 
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3.6 E-Voting in the Austrian Federation of Students Elections 2009 
Building upon the work in the inter-ministerial working group, the agreement of the new 
government at the end of 2006 agreed to introduce postal voting. The coalition agreement 
also included an agreement to investigate the feasibility of E-Voting.  
 
On May 11, 2007, the Federal Minister for Science and Research Dr. Johannes Hahn 
took the occasion of a speech at the University of Linz to announce the plan to implement 
E-Voting in the 2009 Austrian Federation of Students’ elections. (Hahn, 2007)  
 
3.6.1 The Project 
The first step in this project was a feasibility study conducted in the summer of 2007 
(Krimmer, 2007). The main task was to integrate E-Voting without compromising the 
existing paper-based voting in the polling station. To do so, an additional voting channel 
via the Internet was to be offered from Monday 8:00 through Friday 18:00 during the 
week before the paper-based election days. During these days, all students of Austrian 
universities should have the possibility to participate in an Internet election without pre-
registration. For identification purposes, the Austrian citizen card (a smart card bearing a 
digital signature) in accordance with section 2 nr 10 of the 2004 Austrian E-Government 
law was to be used. After the end of the Internet-based vote casting, the votes were to be 
stored in an encrypted way until the general counting of votes at the end of the last voting 
day. Students who had voted through the Internet would be marked “voted” in the voter 
register, thereby guaranteeing the one-man-one-vote principle. The next step was then to 
adapt the legal framework. 
3.6.2 Updating the Federation of Students’ Act (HSWO) 
As the HSG already allowed the use of electronic voting, only the HSWO had to be 
changed to give directions on how to implement electronic voting. The Federal Minister 
was authorized by virtue of § 48 HSG to introduce electronic voting with a regulation. 
The corresponding amendment to the Austrian Federation of Students’ Act was issued on 
October 2, 2008 in BGBl II 351/2008. The amendments included the following: 
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- The definition of specific E-Voting terms; 
 
- The integration or modification of deadlines, which depend on election day; 
 
- Adaptations, additions and amendments resulting from the introduction of the 
electronic voting system and the election administration system.  
 
3.6.2.1 Definition of terms 
The terms necessary for E-Voting were specified by the definitions of the new § 1 HSWO. 
With reference to § 34 Para. 4 HSG, it was determined that E-Voting is an electronic 
procedure of distance voting using the Internet. This requires two systems: 
 
- The electronic voting system used to conduct E-Voting. According to § 64 Para. 
1, the Internet portal consists of the central access point for all eligible voters to 
vote and obtain information on E-Voting as well as the election server software 
and the E-Voting client. 
 
- The election administration system function is to assist the Election Commission 
in the performance of its tasks during the election. 
 
Both systems are maintained by the Federal Minister in accordance with § 61 HSWO 
and are made available to the election commissions.  
 
3.6.2.2 The Electronic Voting System  
The additions required for the use of the electronic voting system were mainly regulated 
in the newly inserted section 8 HSWO. This included regulations on the type of identity 
verification, requirements for the electronic voting system, operation of and access to the 
electronic voting system, counting and declaration of invalidity of votes cast by means of 
E-Voting. Moreover, § 61 HSWO stipulates that the electronic voting system must 
comply with § 34 and § 39 HSG. 
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3.6.2.2.1 Technical Requirements for the Voting System 
The technical requirements for the voting system (i.e., client, election server software, 
Internet portal) are regulated by § 64 HSWO. The regulatory authority specified that the 
system being used must be state of the art (e.g., it must include blind signatures, 
homomorphic encryption, mixers30), and the points below must be ensured: 
- Anonymity of the election process, (§ 64 Para. 2); 
 
- The client must be able to run on standard operating systems and Internet browsers 
(§ 64 Para. 5); 
 
- The election process must be offered uniformly in German as well as in other 
languages if necessary and possible (as required by § 64 Para. 5) and  
 
- The Internet portal must be designed in an accessible way (§ 64, Para. 6). 
 
3.6.2.2.2 Certification of the election system 
The election system shall be certified by the Confirmation Authority 60 days before the 
first day of the election. In particular, the recommendation of the Committee of Ministers 
of the Council of Europe to the Member States should be reviewed and existing, 
applicable protection profiles31 should be drawn up in accordance with Common Criteria 
(§ 64 Abs 3 HSWO). Moreover, for the purpose of verification by experts, the members 
and observers at the Election Commissions are also given access to the source code of the 
client and the election server software and the verification report of the Confirmation 
Authority (§ 64 Para. 7 HSWO). 
 
                                                
30  For an overview of the technologies used, see Volkamer and Krimmer (2006). 
31  The deadlines specified in §§ 20 Para. 3, 22 Para. 1, 26 Para. 6, 28 Para. 3 and 29 Para. 
1 to 3, § 51 Para. 1 and 2 were accordingly moved earlier by one week. 
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3.6.2.2.3 Operation and access 
After the election server software has been examined within the scope of acceptance of 
the voting system, § 65 HSWO stipulates that it must be operated in a highly secure data 
center with the greatest possible transparency while maintaining secrecy of the ballot and 
protected against physical and virtually unauthorized access. Access to these premises 
may only be possible to persons previously accredited by the chairperson(s) of the 
Election Commission. The criteria for accreditation are to be decided at a meeting of the 
Austrian Federation of Students’ Election Commission. 
 
In § 66 HSWO, the Austrian legislation specified special electronic voting system 
security requirements for the time period where E-Voting starts until the votes are 
counted. The votes cast by E-Voting shall be kept secure until the vote count is carried 
out within the framework of the electronic voting system. The decryption of the secured 
votes shall only be possible with the entering of two keys, which are sealed by the Election 
Commission and remain sealed until the end of the election. 
 
3.6.2.2.4 Archiving 
Under the continuous protection of secrecy of the ballot, the client and the election server 
must be archived three weeks after the last election day and will be handed over to the 
chairperson of the Austrian Federation of Students’ Election Commission. The latter must 
keep the archive for at least five years, in the event of an objection, at least until the end 
of last-resort proceedings (§ 69 HSWO).  
 
3.6.2.2.5 Starting, interrupting, resuming and terminating 
With the introduction of electronic voting (E-Voting), the task field of the Election 
Committee had to be expanded and adapted to the requirements of E-Voting. According 
to the HSWO amendment, the Election Commissions are now responsible for starting, 
interrupting, resuming and terminating the E-Voting process at the respective universities 
(§ 14 Para. 1 (17) HSWO). 
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3.6.2.3 Electronic Voting Process 
3.6.2.3.1 Deadlines and access to the voter lists 
The realization of E-Voting as an advanced vote requires some changes in election 
procedure. Thus, according to § 62 HSWO, electronic voting takes place from 8:00 a.m. 
on the eighth day to 6:00 p.m. on the fourth day before the first election day. In case of 
interruptions, this period may be extended to 12:00 a.m. Since § 35, Para. 8 of the 
Federation of Students’ Act stipulates the time between the deadline and the first election 
day as seven weeks, the time period for the inspection of the voter lists was reduced to 
one week (§ 20 Para. 1 HSWO), and the other deadlines needed to be adjusted as well.32 
To compensate for this, a new option was created in section 3 for individuals to be able 
to review their voting eligibility via the Internet portal using their citizen card. The paper-
based election register had to be used to check the voting eligibility of other voters. 
 
3.6.2.3.2 Voting 
The citizen card serves as a proof of identity for participation in the election by means of 
E-Voting, according to E-GovG (§ 63 HSWO). 
 
Changes were made to §§ 37, 38 and 39 HSWO with regard to exercising of the right 
to vote, the determination of voter identity and the avoidance of double votes. § 37 Para. 
1 HSWO added E-Voting as an alternative voting method; § 38 in conjunction with § 63 
HSWO specified that a citizen card can be used as proof of identity. In § 38 Abs 3 in 
conjunction with § 39 Abs 1 HSWO, the Austrian legislature regulated that voters who 
cast e-votes get tagged on the voter list as having e-voted and thus can no longer 
participate in the conventional paper ballot process in order to exclude a double vote by 
means of E-Voting and conventional paper ballot process. This can only be done by 
scheduling E-Voting a week before the conventional paper ballot process. 
 
                                                
32  See Grimm et al. (2006) and FN 27. 
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A number of additional adaptations were necessary to handle E-Voting ballots the 
same as paper ballots. Thus, a consent confirmation provision was made for all e-votes. 
This stipulates that before the vote can be cast legally, the selected voting option has to 
be reconfirmed with a validity note (§ 39 Para. 5 HSWO in conjunction with § 34 Para 5 
(5) HSG). This regulation is intended to be the equivalent of another look over the ballot 
before casting it into ballot box. In addition, it was stipulated that the election options 
must be represented as much as possible on the electronic ballot the same way as on they 
are on the traditional paper ballot, and, by means of appropriate technical measures, all 
election options must be brought to the attention of the voter before casting the final vote. 
Invalid votes33 shall also be allowed (§ 43 Para. 1 HSWO). The validity of the started 
election activities by means of E-Voting must be ensured in the same way as the 
conventional paper ballot by the chairman or at the end of the period. 20 minutes were 
granted in §39 Para. 6 HSWO for this purpose. 
 
If the student’s PC does not work for electronic voting, the student may also cast 
his/her vote on a computer provided by the Principal with visual protection and the 
technical components for the use of the citizen card pursuant to § 33 Para. 1 HSWO at 
the university.  
 
3.6.2.3.3 Rules for declaration of invalidity and interruption 
In order to safeguard the secrecy of the ballot, the legislature stipulated that a certain 
number of votes must be given per Election Commission, since there would otherwise be 
a risk that conclusions could be drawn about the electoral behavior of individual persons 
due to the low number of votes. If fewer than three votes are cast for an institution to be 
elected, they must be deleted and declared invalid. The E-Voting tags on the list of 
eligible voters must be deleted, the affected voters must be immediately informed about 
this and they must be invited to recast their vote in writing (if possible also by telephone 
and email or fax) (§§ 66 and 67). 
                                                
33  Invalid votes are possible by selecting more options than allowed. 
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In circumstances that prevent voting, the Election Commission must interrupt the 
election. Such a circumstance is, in particular, the non-availability of the electronic voting 
system due to technical problems or attacks on the election system that hinder the proper 
conduct of the election process. In case of imminent danger, such an interruption or 
postponement may also be carried out by the chairperson of the Austrian Federation of 
Students Election Commission. It is also their responsibility to resume the E-Voting 
process once the danger has passed (§ 48 Para. 1 HSWO). 
 
The respective Election Commission decides on the validity of the votes cast before 
the interruption, after consultation with the Confirmation Authority pursuant to the 
Signature Law (§ 39 Para. 7 HSG). 
 
3.6.2.3.4 Vote count 
The legislation stipulates special security requirements for the electronic voting system 
for the time from voting by means of E-Voting until the votes get counted. The votes cast 
by E-Voting shall be kept secure until the vote count is carried out within the framework 
of the electronic voting system. The decryption of the secured votes shall only be possible 
with the entering of two keys, which are sealed by the Election Commission and remain 
sealed until the end of the election (§ 66). 
 
The safeguarding of the secrecy of the ballot is regulated, in particular, by the fact that 
the individual vote is encrypted with the public key of the Election Commission.34 This 
prevents the vote from being counted before the end of the paper ballot. For this purpose, 
the Election Commission for the Austrian Federation of Students had to be assigned the 
task of handling the generation, administration and addition of two electronic keys for the 
encrypting of the vote while preserving anonymity (§ 15 (7) HSWO). The chairperson 
                                                
34  An asymmetrical encryption method is used for this purpose. The public key is made 
available to the Election Commission; the private part is only used for decoding at the 
beginning of the vote count. 
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must generate the two electronic keys—one must remain with him/her, and the second 
one must be left to the entire commission (§ 35, Para. 5 HSWO). The entering of the 
electronic key in the electronic voting system must be carried out by the chairperson and 
another member designated by the Election Commission. Thereafter, the keys shall be 
kept sealed until the beginning of the count (§ 35 Para. 6 HSWO), and the presidents of 
the Austrian Federation of Students Election Commissions shall be informed about the 
entering of the key ((§ 35 Para. 7 HSWO).  
 
This procedure takes place at the premises of the datacenter after conclusion of the last 
election activity (§ 66 HSWO) on the last election day after 5 p.m. 
 
3.6.2.4 Election Administration System 
The election administration system was developed to support the Election Commissions 
necessitated a number of changes to the HSWO. 
 
3.6.2.4.1 How is the data for the creation of voter lists collected?  
The data regarding the voters are based on the databases of the universities and are 
regulated in § 7 UniStEV 2004 and operated by BRZ ex lege. This is an information 
system according to § 50 DSG 2000, which is operated by the BRZ based on § 7 UniStEV 
2004 and is reported to be DSG 2000-conform. In order for the chairpersons of the 
Election Commissions to be able to create voter lists, they are authorized to access this 
database in accordance with § 7a UniStEV 2004 (in conjunction with § 6 Para. 1 (2) 
HSG). This authorization is further regulated by § 8 Para. 2 BiDokG, where 
administrative procedures for data security are set out. 
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3.6.2.4.2 Creation of voter lists 
In § 18 Para. 1 and 3 HSWO, the respective chairperson of the Austrian Federation of 
Students Election Commission is entrusted with the task of drafting a preliminary voter 
list; then, the final voter must be drafted by comparing with the reporting date during the 
winter semester. The duplicate creation is necessary because of the complex 
organizational effort required to create area-specific person identifiers. This register must 
be generated in paper form up to five weeks before the first election day, and it can be 
updated and printed out after electronic voting at the latest one day before the first election 
day pursuant to § 18 Para. 7 HSWO. 
 
3.6.2.4.3 Sector-specific person identifiers 
Sector-specific person identifiers (bPK) are required according to the E-Government Act 
(E-GovG) so that citizen cards can be used without prior registration for electronic voting. 
Pursuant to § 10 Para. 2 E-GovG, area-specific person identifiers can only be created 
without a citizen card by the Civil Registry Office. To this end, the chairman of the 
Election Commission submits a request to the Civil Registry Office for initial provision 
of an entire data application with area-specific person identifiers according to § 16 Para. 
2 StZRegV. Since area-specific personal identifiers can only be generated by the Data 
Protection Authority as the Civil Registry Office according to § 7 Para. 1 E-GovG, the 
processing of the personal data in accordance with DSG 2000 is ensured. 
 
3.6.2.4.4 The Chairperson of the Election Commission and Clients in the Sense of the 
Data Protection Act 2000 
In § 18 HSWO, the chairperson of the Election Commission is assigned the task of 
creating the voter lists. For this purpose, he/she can use a service provider pursuant to § 
10 Data Protection Act 2000 and conclude an appropriate agreement. It must be taken 
into account that sensitive data is being processed, i.e., the political opinions of 
individuals, and therefore a preliminary verification of the data application is required 
pursuant to § 18 Para. 2 DSG 2000. 
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3.6.2.4.5 Documentation of the Election 
The Election Commission is supported in documenting the election in that the predefined 
documents have been translated into corresponding electronic forms with fill-in 
assistance. In the unlikely event of a failure of the election administration system, it will 
be ensured that the paper-based templates of documents 1 to 13 can be used,35 since only 
the respective paper-based document is legally binding. 
 
This particularly facilitates documentation of the election process, since according to 
§ 33 HSWO, the president of the university shall provide computers with which a non-
binding and additional electronic voter lists and voting record must be kept using the 
election administration system pursuant to § 40 Para. 2 HSWO. 
 
The results of the election are also transmitted with the election administration system 
according to § 46 Para. 9 HSWO. 
 
3.6.2.5 Summary of Principles for Electronic Elections 
With the approval of electronic voting within the framework of §§ 34, 39 and 48 HSG, 
the legislators have created the legal basis for E-Voting for the first time in Austria. 
 
With the amendment of the Federation of Students Elections Act published in October 
2008, the Federal Minister for Science and Research issued the applicable law to be 
implemented by the Federation of Students elections in the second quarter of 2009. 
 
Overall, the first-time implementation of E-Voting in Austria represents a particular 
challenge in which many legal aspects had and still have to be taken into account. The 
provisions of HSWO 2005 presented in more detail here thus represent a milestone in the 
path towards an electronic democracy. 
                                                
35  See §§ 34 Para. 2, 46 Para. 9, 47 Para. 1, and 57 Para. 1 HSWO 
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3.6.3 E-Voting from the Voter’s Point of View  
The following chapter explains E-Voting from a voter’s point of view. In addition to the 
web portal, checks on voting entitlement, management of the election and the test code 
verification is described. 
 
3.6.3.1 The Web Portal 
For the elections to the Austrian Federation of Students in 2009, a web portal was 
provided for the first time on the part of the Federal Ministry of Science and Research 
(BMWF) at www.oeh-wahl.gv.at. On technical safety grounds, it consisted of two 
websites—one with the contents (web front end) and one with the voting technology 
(application). The website’s aim was to provide students and interested parties with 
information on the Austrian Federation of Students elections with its contents as well as 
to provide them with all the official documents available for download. 
 
Figure 2: Design of the web portal  
 
The second voting technology website can be described as an electronic "voting 
booth". The actual electronic election took place on it. The URL for this website was not 
communicated on technical safety grounds but was merely linked to the banner on the 
www.oeh-wahl.gv.at website. The electronic voting booth could be directly accessed 
through corresponding clicks. 
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Students who vote or wish to inform themselves about the elections, members of the 
Election Commissions, Federation of Students representatives, journalists, Federal 
Ministries, advocates of E-Voting and interested parties (nationally and overseas) and 
opponents of E-Voting-were identified as target groups. 
 
Figure 3: Access statistics for unambiguous visitors to oeh-wahl.gv.at 
 
Established Internet portal. Visitor statistics show that on the first day of voting for the 
electronic elections, over 4,000 unique visitors accessed the website of www.oeh-
wahl.gv.at. The number of daily visitors then dropped at an increasing rate until, on the 
last day of online voting, once again almost 2,000 visitors accessed the website. At the 
end of the paper-based election, the number increased significantly to 7,000 visitors per 
day. This allows us to conclude that the website not only established itself successfully 
as an E-Voting platform, but it also became a central website for information on election 
results and additional information relating to elections to the ÖH. 
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The content of the website was continuously delivered, improved and extended 
throughout the course of the project by the project team of the Federal Ministry for 
Science Research and Economy. Information on concrete use by the election client was 
in turn handled by the Federal Ministry. In any case, the structure of the website fulfills 
and exceeds the legal requirements for barrier-free access. 
 
A version of the Internet portal was placed on the Internet by a group running in the 
election. 
 
 
Figure 4: Persiflage of the oeh-wahl.gv.at website (image altered) 
 
Trusting the Internet portal. The choice of an “.gv.at” address represents an important 
security feature. In addition to certification by a trustworthy service provider, it would 
have been possible to use what are known as Extended Validation Certificates, with which 
additional identification characteristics are anchored in the website’s certificate. In 
principle, we should ensure that a certain address becomes established among the student 
body so that other websites with similar content are not called up by accident (for 
example, through a Google search) when trying to vote in the election. For example, a 
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canvassing group published a fictitious election website at a similar web address (see 
illustration above), where visitors were also offered election-based services, and an 
election was simulated. We must add that precisely these actions contradict the statement 
of principles recommended by the Council of Europe and presented to the groups 
campaigning in the elections to the Austrian Federation of Students. 
 
3.6.3.1.1 The Self-Diagnosis Tool 
A self-diagnosis tool was presented to the students, making it easier for the end user to 
determine whether they had installed the software required for E-Voting.  
 
Figure 5: Self-diagnosis Tool 
 
Furthermore, students could call up all the documents provided by the respective 
electoral commission as well as the ordinance on the voting dates. Altogether, around 400 
documents were available. Sub-dividing them according to universities and subject 
majors ensured simple and rapid access to documents sought. The results were published 
in the results region after the elections and were structured according to university.  
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Helping students to help themselves. The self-diagnosis tool was very well received 
and was used by students. It proved to be an important tool for fault analysis as part of 
the support process during the election. In terms of improving the self-diagnosis tool, 
experiences in the 2009 elections for the Austrian Federation of Students revealed the 
following:  
 
- It is necessary to check the Java version, and it is very helpful to check the Java 
distribution; 
 
- The interface between Java applets and the citizen card environment should be 
tested.  
 
3.6.3.2 The E-Voting Process from Voter’s Point of View 
We can supplement our discussion of an electronic election from the voter’s point of view 
by listing the procedures in the election App. In the present project, the following steps 
occur: 
 
1. First, the website http://www.oeh-wahl.gv.at is visited, and then the field "To 
field for submitting vote electronically" is selected in the top right.  
 
2. Next, the student selected the university at which they wished to exercise their 
right to vote. In cases where the potential voter wished to vote at more than 
one university, the election process described below would have to be repeated 
for each university. 
 
3. After selecting the university, the voter received precise instructions for how 
they could register their citizen card securely: 
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- Firstly, the card-reader device must be connected to the computer, and then 
the citizen card must be inserted into the reader device. 
 
- Now, the voter has the opportunity to either use the online citizen card 
environment or the previously installed local citizen card environment.  
- Following this, the voter is prompted to input their four-digit PIN Code36 
in order to identify themselves.  
 
- Next, the voter had to confirm their identity with an electronic signature, 
triggered by inputting the six-digit PIN Code. 
 
4. All ballot cards were displayed in sequence once the voter’s right to vote had 
been successfully checked.  
- First, the ballot card for the university representative board is displayed. 
The voter could select one of the groups standing for election. 
 
- Next, the ballot paper for the university studies representative board is 
displayed, for which the corresponding voter was entitled to vote. The 
voter is able to select three to five candidates here. The exact number that 
could be chosen is shown in the top half of the screen above. 
 
5. Invalid votes could be triggered by selecting no candidates or too many 
candidates.  
                                                
36  The length of the PIN Code that must be input will differ according to the signature 
card used. Details in this document refer to e-card on the basis of the high distribution 
where the PIN Code to approve the personal identifier has four digits and the PIN Code 
to trigger the qualified signature has six digits.  
  77 
6. Once all the ballot papers have been completed, the ballot sheets are displayed 
once again in an overview with all options chosen. This protects against 
submitting votes too quickly (Protection against Haste).  
 
7. Finally, the vote is submitted with a declaration made in place of an oath that 
the electronic vote was filled out personally, unobserved and uninfluenced, 
through inputting a six digit PIN Code. 
 
8. Following the successful storage of the vote(s), the voting system displayed a 
check code and the associated confirmation code. Once this is noted by the 
voter, the user is then able to check on the website after the end of the election 
whether their own vote has also been counted.  
 
The e-voting process is supplemented by cryptographic steps, which are represented 
here for submitting and counting postal votes in a postal election. 
 
Figure 6: Overview of the e-voting process 
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3.6.3.3 The E-Voting Process as an Election Application  
The following portrays reproduce the process of the voting event.  
 
3.6.3.3.1 Selecting the University 
In an initial step, the student selects the university at which they wish to cast their vote. 
 
Figure 7: Selecting the University  
 
3.6.3.3.2 Selecting the Citizen Card Environment  
Next, the student must select the citizen card environment they wish to use. Voters have 
the choice here between the local citizen card environment and an online citizen card 
environment. The local citizen card environment requires successful installation of a 
version of the citizen card software, whilst the online citizen card environment is a Java 
applet, which can be downloaded from the respective website prior to each use. 
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These screens further offer a representation of subsequent authentication. Here, we 
portray the difference between the two PIN Codes required for this in text and also using 
graphics.  
The online citizen card environment is used as a further consequence. The local  
citizen card environment has an analogous format.  
 
 
Figure 8: Selecting the Citizen Card Environment  
 
The online citizen card environment is signed digitally on safety grounds. The digital 
signature can be checked by the voter. 
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Figure 9: Signature in the Online Citizen Card Environment 
 
3.6.3.3.3 Inserting the Citizen Card  
As soon as the online citizen card environment has started up, an iFrame opens with 
appropriate instructions to insert the citizen card into the card-reading device (if it has not 
already been inserted into the card-reader) to input the four-digit PIN Code and after this 
the six-digit PIN Code. 
 
Figure 10: Registration 
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3.6.3.3.4 Displaying the Ballot Paper for the University Representative Board 
The E-Voting client opens following successful authentication, which was likewise 
realized as a signed Java applet on safety grounds. Analogous to paper-based voting, the 
voter first receives the ballot sheet for the election to the University Studies 
Representative Board at the chosen university. 
 
Figure 11: Ballot Sheet for the University Students‘ Representative Board 
 
3.6.3.3.5 Displaying Ballot Papers for Student Subject Representative Board 
By pressing “Continue”, the voter now receives the next ballot sheet. After the ballot 
sheet for elections to the University Representative Board, all the ballot sheets for the 
election to the University Students‘ Representative Board follow. A student may take part 
in none, one or a number of the elections to University Students‘ Representative Board at 
a university corresponding to their voting rights. The voter can decide for each ballot 
whether the ballot paper should be submitted electronically or in the traditional paper 
form. A mixture of routes is possible, so that, for example, votes for the University 
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Representative Board and the Study Representative Board may be submitted by  
E-Voting, while the remaining University Representative Board votes may be submitted 
via the paper-based election.  
 
The box labeled “I should like to submit my vote for this elected body by E-Voting” 
is activated by default. If it is deactivated by the student, then the ballot sheet is grayed 
out, and no voting option can be selected. This also includes when using a screen reader. 
This means that it is not possible to submit a vote electronically for the elected body given 
on the ballot sheet, but a paper-based route is instead required. 
 
 
Figure 12: Ballot Sheet for a University Studies Representative Board 
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3.6.3.3.6 Protection Against Haste 
Once the last ballot sheet has been filled out, the so-called excess haste protection appears. 
All of the voting options selected are displayed here once again, and the voter must 
confirm them once more. If a ballot sheet should prove invalid or if all of the voting 
options have not been exhausted, then the student is informed of this in the images 
portrayed — for example, in the election to the University Studies Representative Board, 
the choice of three to five options is possible, which are often not all used. In this case, 
these are merely instructions, and submitting invalid ballot sheets is still possible in spite 
of these instructions. 
 
 
Figure 13: Protection Against Excessive Haste  
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3.6.3.3.7 Declaration in Place of an Oath and Confirmation 
Immediately before submitting the vote, the student is prompted once again to input the 
six-digit PIN Code. The voter signs a declaration in place of an oath in a similar way to 
paper-based elections that the vote was submitted unobserved in secret and without any 
undue influence. The encrypted ballot sheet is signed by the voter electronically. 
 
Figure 14: Confirmation of Casting the Vote 
 
3.6.3.3.8 Depicting the Check Code and Confirmation Code 
Once the vote has been submitted, the student reaches a page that confirms the vote has 
been successfully cast. In addition, the check code and confirmation code are portrayed 
including an explanation. The confirmation page provides the opportunity to print it off, 
as some web-browsers merely print off the web-page with their internal browser print 
option; it does not not, however, print the content of the applet. Using the button “Return 
to University selection”, we return once more to the page that lists all of the universities. 
To cast a vote at another university, the voter must first authenticate themselves once 
more.  
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Figure 15: Confirmation Page with Check Code 
 
Example of a check code: 
8bef3c8e07b8fe76 
Example of a confirmation code: 
KYPquQl2IuFkABwFKIYia0v95NQKqJCOanWXAVIdj7nYTh0HuD57srqp+wfNEgPSLw
H3cxExyItV1zI5D6oLRjdfJqzJiBusZNSITEtEyDpeT1D7FEpcm4tlRm 
FPLteKTCj1TSmw9crO7fvbJhC+u1uIZJTZfbaz9C69l2B0nvKI7IaIyH7F+nHn 
G2hFAnHSznJ5sLmCJTlMND+rb9YgtJasXkScIghTf4pZz0D9QWRjrSnTfL1+UbAKqL
GbWNwKljFwrdw/0c8gCac5fMhn5z2iSuUw4DbFJvEEeokrr1nwrc9 
snaY96z8/kadZ1KxUVSSbz7nDZF9iQWwDuQ6XCA== 
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3.6.3.3.9 Attempt to Submit a New Vote  
If a student has exercised their right to vote at a university and has registered again, then 
a corresponding instruction is issued. 
 
 
Figure 16: Notice of renewed registration after successfully submitting a vote 
 
3.6.3.3.10 Opportunities for Improving the Election Process  
Submitting a new vote by overwriting the previous vote submitted would be technically 
possible without endangering the secret election process; however, this is not provided 
for in HSWO 2005. Theoretically, changing votes with subsequent votes (i.e., over-
writing votes) would also be possible during paper-based voting. 37 
                                                
37  These processes were introduced in Estonia as a measure against vote-buying and 
voter coercion. 
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Since the choice of the citizen card environment has proven in part to be not user-
friendly, interactive selection is possible using the Ministry of Finance’s E-Government 
solution. 
	
Figure 17: Authentication on FinanzOnline by means of an integrated online citizen card environment  
 
Selecting the citizen card environment. The intention was to let students select the 
citizen card environment. This is not uploaded until the citizen card environment to be 
used has been selected. Selecting the citizen card environment was viewed by students as 
not necessary and complicated. Integrating citizen-card-based authentication in a similar 
format to that used by Finanz-Online38 would be worth considering. 
 
Here, the online citizen card environment is launched straightaway, and the user – in 
order to use the local citizen card environment – must click on his or her own button. This 
normally saves the user an additional selection step. 
                                                
38  Finanz Online offer authentication by means of the citizen card, see 
https://finanzonline.bmf.gv.at. Improvements to the images portrayed are possible 
using the online citizen card environment. The iFrame was judged by students as being 
too small or not sufficiently clearly noticeable, although it appears in the center of the 
browser window. The size of the representation of the iFrame for the online citizen 
card environment could be dynamic, appropriate for the computer screen resolution 
and the size of the browser window, or it could blank out the remaining content of the 
browser window or could “gray it out”. 
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Figure 18: Sketch – Highlighting the Citizen Card Interaction 
 
In this illustration, we portray how the citizen card interaction could, for example, be 
emphasized or highlighted by darkening the remaining area of the screen. 
 
Improved citizen card integration and interaction. The difference between inputting 
the six-digit PIN code (for the digital signature) and inputting the four-digit PIN code (to 
authorize the identity link) should be clear and understandable throughout the entire 
election process and in all components required for it (e.g., in the online citizen card 
environment and the local citizen card environment). An advantage for the online citizen 
card environment arises here, since this can be designed in a manner to better integrate it 
into the overall process in terms of a user interface.  
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The error messages from both MOCCA and MOA should be more easily configurable 
for users. For example, in the case of non-modified implementation of MOA, “identity 
link not found” means that the four-digit PIN code was entered incorrectly.  
 
For security reasons, a time-out was implemented when using the online citizen card 
environment for signing the statutory declaration and the encrypted ballot sheet.  
 
The time-out was configured at thirty seconds. Should the time-out be exceeded, the 
student is logged out, and a page opens with an additional indication that the vote was not 
cast and that it is therefore possible to try again. This restriction of a time-out did not pose 
a problem for the test group in the run-up to the election, but it led to several phone calls 
during electronic voting. 
 
Both over-writing votes by casting more than one electronic vote as well as over-
writing a vote submitted electronically by casting a paper vote represents an interesting 
possibility regarding additional security against vote-buying. Furthermore, it would 
combine the advantages of both election procedures. Adapting the Austrian Federation of 
Students electoral rules would be necessary in order to render this principle possible. 
 
The voter did not have full orientation throughout the entire voting process This could 
be improved using graphic elements. 
 
Figure 19: Sketch – Voting process guided by Graphics 
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Graphic representation of the election process. The election process was found to be 
simple and understandable. Graphic representations of the process present throughout the 
entire election process would ensure additional transparency. Particular attention should 
be paid to ensuring universal accessibility.  
 
3.6.3.3.11 Usability of the Voting Software  
The Usability Test, which was designed as an on-site survey including a questionnaire, 
was carried out using a stabilized initial version of the voting software. This version did 
not yet contain any of the usability improvements the project team had already reported 
to the software manufacturer. The improvement possibilities noted by the students were 
taken into consideration in the next version of the voting software. 
 
The usability of the voting software was improved as well as possible from the project 
team feedback corresponding to the requirements of election rules for elections to the 
HSWO 2005. To this end, primarily the pilot application as well as screenshots delivered 
by the software manufacturer were used. 
 
Improving ease of use. For more comprehensive usability tests, corresponding cycle 
times should be taken into account in overall project planning for any coming elections. 
The election client and integration of the election client into the Internet portal must be 
analyzed by a test team, whereby it should be possible to carry out tests in an in-house 
test laboratory. It is recommended that the election software manufacturer provides the 
project team with up-to-date ready to use versions, so that feedback can be derived as 
efficiently as possible through concept and design tests and can be directly entered and 
integrated into the development process. Creating the definition file for output texts 
should be explicitly taken into account in the project plan. The texts must be quality-
checked several times for comprehensibility and accuracy by a test group. 
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3.6.3.3.12 Universal Accessibility 
Universal accessibility of both voting software as well as web portals was one of the 
mandatory criteria requiring to be fulfilled by the software producer and the operator. The 
companies Scytl as well as BRZ possess great experience regarding the requirements for 
universal accessibility from other projects39. 
On safety grounds, the election client based the system on a Java applet solution. 
Screen readers were required to have Java Support or the possibility of addressing SUN 
Java Access Bridge40 in order to be able to process the election client’s representations.  
 
                                                
39  Universal accessibility is a mandatory requirement of all E-Voting projects. The 
company Scytl has already co-operated closely with many blind people and 
organizations for the visually impaired in different projects. Amongst these we must 
highlight ONCE (http://www.once.es/new/home/) and Vision Australia 
(http://www.visionaustralia.org.au/). The voting solution was successfully validated 
on WAI AA Standard. The company BRZ has built up competence both throughout 
our country and overseas in the field of universal accessibility of web services. We 
must highlight here the realization and operation of the help.gv.at portal 
(https://www.help.gv.at), which was distinguished with BIENE Award 
(http://www.biene-award.de/award/). The official assistant received the golden 
BIENE (‚Accessible Internet Provides New Insights‘) in the category “Complex 
Procurement and Transaction service provisions”. 
40  The Java Access Bridge makes addressing and interaction with the Java Accessibility 
API possible. The Java Access Bridge is freely available at 
http://java.sun.com/javase/technologies/accessibility/accessbridge/index.jsp. We 
referred to the necessity of carrying out an additional installation in the help region of 
the Internet portal, in so far as the Java Access Bridge is not already included in the 
screen reader’s installation packet anyway.  
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Figure 20: Observing the portal page using Screen Reader 
 
The voting software was tested for universal accessibility at the earliest point possible 
in the project. During the course of iterative modifications within the Release Cycles and 
internal test applets, additional improvements were obtained both through testing with 
the appropriate accessibility tools as well as through collaborating with blind people. In 
this case, it is worth a particular mention that focusing of Java applets presents a problem. 
Some screen readers that were tested treat a Java applet similarly to an independent 
window; however, we cannot switch back to this window with the usual keyboard 
commands if we should lose focus.  
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The focus is of course set automatically on the applet; however, in order to solve the 
problem of changing focus, an “invisible” button/link41 for people with good vision was 
built into the website, in which the Java applet was integrated. Through exiting as well as 
switching back into the Java applet again, this no longer presented a problem. 42 
 
 
Figure 21: Test of Voting Processes using Screen reader 
 
                                                
41  The button “To submit electronic vote” was set invisibly via Stylesheet, so that this 
could no longer be detected visually on the website. Screen reader, however, 
reproduced the button as a reference. 
42  An example of verification tools for accessibility, which was used for testing the 
voting client based on Java, is the Java Accessibility Helper. In this case, we are 
dealing with a graphic tool, which verifies all UI components for their accessibility by 
means of the keyboard, that names, status values, etc., are correct through so-called 
Assistive Technologies (for example Screen reader, Screen Magnifier) can be selected 
and processed. The result of the test is an Accessibility Report, in which defects are 
classified („must be fixed“, „not serious“ etc.) an are listed. See 
http://java.sun.com/developer/earlyAccess/jaccesshelper/docs/index.html 
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Particular attention was given to simple navigation. To do this, the voting process was 
designed in a very linear manner. Following selection of the university, authentication 
takes place, then the individual ballot sheets are filled out, followed by confirmation and 
submission of the ballot sheet with the declaration in lieu of an oath. Finally, the student 
is directed back to select the university again.  
 
Both the portal pages as well as the voting client, self-diagnosis tool, pilot application 
and the verification of the right to vote followed a standardized layout and have uniform 
navigation elements and page structures. All functions are accessible both via the mouse 
and using keyboard commands, whereby all the usual browsers43 were supported. 
 
In the overall layout design, the needs of color-blind and people who perceive colors 
incorrectly were taken into consideration.  
                                                
43  Internet Explorer, Firefox and Safari were actively tested and were supported; less 
well-known browsers such as Opera or Google Chrome were not constituent parts of 
the actual testing and approval cycles; however, we do not know of any problems 
associated with using them. 
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Figure 22: Testing the Web Portals for the Color-Blind  
 
The entire portal has the opportunity to enlarge the size of the text, which was made 
easily visible in the top right-hand corner of every page. At the same time, the size of the 
election client’s text within the Java applet was scaled (up or down) via the same element. 
 
Universal accessibility. The universal accessibility of the portal system and election 
services as well as the project’s efforts to ensure universal accessibility were praised by 
the monitoring committee for implementing the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities in accordance with § 13 of the federal law on treatment of people with 
disabilities (Bundesbehindertengesetz)44. 
                                                
44  We will refer to this as Monitoring Commission from now on. 
Original Image	
Test 2	 Test 1 and Test 2 combined	
Test 1	
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It was proposed that training videos be accompanied by interpretation by a sign 
language interpreter. Furthermore, the needs of non-verbal students should be met.  
 
The provision of information in the Internet portal regarding use and support of explicit 
screen readers proved difficult. The risk of advertising or favoring commercial and 
competing products had to be taken into account here; therefore, the information provided 
was limited to general aspects. Nevertheless, possible provision of information for 
various named screen readers is desirable. 
 
In order to improve the issue of screen reader support by Java, the responsibility for 
which lies primarily with the screen reader manufacturers, timely provision of a demo 
application to test accessibility is suggested. This demo application should be tested 
directly by screen reader manufacturers. Both the appeal to screen reader manufacturers 
to carry out tests and processing of feedback should take place as part of a cooperation 
between the project team and various associations and organizations that support people 
with disabilities. The results should at least be published in the information portal. In 
particular, this includes naming all screen reader products, versions and runtime 
environments that do not correctly correspond to the Java accessibility API. This will 
allow qualitative improvements to screen reader products in the medium term. 
 
3.6.3.4 Checking the Right to Vote  
Corresponding to § 20 para. 4 HSWO 2005, any member of the Austrian Federation 
of Students can verify their right to vote for the respective university Federation of 
Students’ body on the Internet four to five weeks prior to the last day of voting date using 
the citizen card in accordance with § 2 Z 10 E-GovG.  
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3.6.3.4.1 Selecting the University 
First, the student selects the university. 
 
Figure 23: Checking the Right to Vote – Selecting the University  
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3.6.3.4.2 Authentication 
Finally, authentication is carried out by means of the citizen card using the MOA Module. 
 
Figure 24: Checking the Right to Vote – Authentication using the Citizen Card  
 
The personal identifier is read off by inputting the four-digit PIN Code. 
 
Figure 25: Checking the Right to Vote – Registration 1/2  
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The registration is signed by inputting the six-digit PIN Code. The user is authenticated 
in this way.  
 
 
Figure 26: Checking the Right to Vote – Registration 2/2 
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3.6.3.4.3 Displaying Rights to Vote 
The voting entitlement rights are displayed after successful authentication. 
 
Figure 27: Checking Voting Entitlement – Representation of Rights to Vote  
 
3.6.3.4.4 Realization 
The verification of rights to vote does not require a Java applet. The rights to vote are 
listed on an HTML-based paged. The website refers to the fact that people should contact 
the respective electoral commission if voting entitlements are not correct. To this end, all 
of the contact details were listed on one of the pages. 
 
The check of voting entitlements can be used by every person who has a citizen card. 
If no right to vote can be found, the user is informed of this. 
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Online citizen card environment for checking voting rights. For project-related 
reasons, the online citizen card environment (MOCCA) was not yet available at the time 
of verifying students’ right to vote. Integrating the online citizen card environment would 
lead to higher acceptance and use. 
 
3.6.3.5 Individual Verifiability 
A simple version of individual verifiability in the form of a check code was realized 
within the information portal. A simple website for inputting a form served this purpose, 
which compared the input against a database.  
 
 
Figure 28: Check Code Verification – Request 
 
At least the first five symbols of the check code had to be input into the system, and 
following this, all possible matches were listed. 
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Figure 29: Check Code Verification – Output 
 
Availability of individual verifiability. It is not known how many students used the 
security code verification function. The communication as to when this function was 
available needed improvement. It was clear that security code verification could not be 
placed online until the public announcement and the objection period that commenced 
with that public announcement. 
 
Furthermore, positioning the function within the Internet portal was less than ideal. 
The primary reason for this was to locate the function in the area “Submit electronic vote”. 
A more active application is desirable. This defect can be easily remedied the next time 
the function is used by publishing a separate, clearly visible area for security code 
verification within the web portal for the entire duration. This will then represent a 
constant integral component of the web portal; the function will, however, only be 
activated during the period for objections.  
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3.6.4 E-Voting from the Server Side 
This chapter describes significant aspects of the voting system. There is an overview of 
the process actions, method of functioning and also of the security principles. At this time, 
we limit ourselves to the significant areas, so this is not an exhaustive and comprehensive 
list and description of all of the security mechanisms used. First, the technical process is 
described in principle in the following sequence: the voting server, monitoring, voting 
the voting administration system as well as the personal computers in the universities.  
 
3.6.4.1 Functional Description 
In the foreground of voting, the so-called Mixing Laptop is set up. This takes place in an 
audited process. The voting is configured on this notebook, a cryptographic key is created 
and at the end of voting, the electronic ballot boxes are opened and counted. 
 
The notebook must satisfy the highest security requirements. To this end, the notebook 
may never be connected to any network or computer/ device. This is likewise the case 
during the installation process. The installation must take place in the presence of an 
installation consultant and in the presence of an installation monitoring body. 
 
The integrity of the system and monitoring of the installation process is guaranteed by 
the people in attendance and, furthermore, through physical security measures. The 
mixing notebook is kept physically secure at all times. 
 
The implementation of the installation is designed transparently. The integrity of all 
installation media is checked by the people in attendance for the installations. Each step 
of the installation is implemented step-by-step according to the installation description 
and is protocolled.  
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Figure 30: Installation process Mixing Notebook 
 
The mixing laptop (target system) must be set up with end-to-end auditing. In order to 
do so, all installation media are compared using binary comparison and/or check sums 
with reference media prior to being inserted into the target system. Exclusively 
trustworthy sources must be used as data sources – both for the installation medium as 
well as for the reference media. This includes hardware and software companies (e.g., 
Microsoft, Oracle). The following factors are decisive here: distribution, age and service 
life of the software, region of use of the software and field of activity of the company 
providing the software. 
 
In order to ensure that no manipulations can arise through the examination itself, the 
installation media must be unalterable, referring exclusively to CDs/DVDs with a closed 
setting. 
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Furthermore, the check system itself must be open to examination, and it must be 
transparent. In order to achieve this, a system provided on a Knoppix is used. Following 
installation, the Knoppix CD is mutually checked and archived by all of the participants 
to verify its authenticity. 
 
With the exception of the Pnyx software packet and the Oracle configuration scripts 
(which deposit the corresponding tables and users for the Scytl software), all of the 
installation media can be copied and passed on to observers. This step is merely subject 
to technical licensing limitations (e.g., freely passing on Windows XP Installation CDs). 
 
In a process similarly audited by the Election Commission45 corresponding to § 15 
para. 7 of HSWO 200546, a cryptographic key pair was generated on the mixing laptop. 
In this instance, public and a private keys are used for voting. The private key is divided 
up digitally and is handed over to members of the electoral commission on password-
protected smartcards. The passwords are determined by members of the voting 
commission and are input. When doing so, the classic security principles of ownership 
and knowledge are used. The private key can only be reconstructed through consolidating 
the electoral commission’s smartcards.  
                                                
45  Exactly two representatives of the Electoral Commission. The private key is divided 
up onto four smartcards, each of the people receive two cards each; three smartcards 
are required to re-create the private key (threshold value 3). 
46  § 15 HSWO 2005. The Electoral Commission is liable in particular for the production, 
administration and addition of two electronic keys for the electronic voting system. 
  106 
 
Figure 31: Progression of Key generation  
 
Finally, the mixing notebook is stored securely until electronic voting has ended. The 
physical security of the mixing notebooks is a part of monitoring the election. It is stored 
in a high-security region of the computer data center and is sealed. The seals are only 
broken and re-sealed in audited process steps in the presence of the Electoral Commission 
at the end of electronic voting, for counting the votes cast and for final destruction of the 
data. 
 
In order to take part in the electronic voting procedure, the student must fulfill the 
following requirements. He or she must have an active citizen card and a card-reader 
device. The computer or the notebook used must have one of the customary browsers47 
installed, and it must support the use of Java48. The student can check whether these 
requirements are fulfilled before voting using an appropriate self-diagnosis tool. The self-
diagnosis consists of a webpage, which requests the system components required and 
checks their version and functioning. 
                                                
47  Internet Explorer 6+, Internet Explorer 7.x, Firefox 3.x. 
48  Java Version 1.5 for using the local citizen card environment; Java Version 1.6 for 
using the online citizen card environment. 
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Since it is possible to vote at a total of 21 different universities overall, the student 
must first select the corresponding university.  
 
In accordance with the election rules § 63 HSWO 200549, the citizen card is used for 
voter identification and authentication. This is the case both for the voting transaction as 
well as for verifying the right to vote in accordance with § 20 para. 4 of HSWO 2005 50.  
 
Once the voter has their personal identifier approved by inputting the four-digit PIN 
Code (identification), he or she is prompted to sign a standard text. With this step, the 
voter can prove his/her identity (authentication). 
 
 
Figure 32: Identification and Authentication of the Voter 
                                                
49  § 63 HSWO 2005: The citizen card is used to provide the identity of the student in 
accordance with § 2 Z 10 E-GovG. 
50  § 20 para. 4 HSWO 2005: During this period, every member of the ÖH may check 
their entitlement and right to vote for the respective elected bodies by using the citizen 
registration card in accordance with § 2 Z 10 E-GovG on the Internet. 
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Identifikation **** 
Identifikation über Bürgerkarte 
mittels vierstelligen PIN-Codes 
Authentifizierung am Server mittels 
sechsstelligen PIN-Codes 
****** 
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Finally, the ballot sheets are presented. With each ballot sheet, the voter can decide 
whether he/she wishes to submit this electronically or at the polling station. By filling out 
all the ballot sheets, if the voter wishes to submit electronically, the student is presented 
with all of the selected voting options once again. In addition, in each case, for every 
ballot sheet, a note is made of whether there were more voting options available or 
whether too many options were chosen. In a similar way to paper-based voting, 
submitting a vote with an invalid ballot sheet is not prevented. 
 
 
Figure 33: Protection against Excess Haste 
 
With the confirmation of all voting options chosen, each ballot sheet is encoded with 
the public key. Finally, the student is prompted to input the six-digit PIN Code, whereby 
the ballot sheets51 are signed. The signature guarantees that each manipulation of the 
ballot sheet is acknowledged.  
 
 
Figure 34: Encrypting and applying the signature 
                                                
51  Precisely, not only the encrypted ballot sheet is signed, but parts of the transfer 
protocol are signed. This includes the check sums amongst other things of the 
encrypted ballot sheets. 
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The encrypted ballot sheets including their signatures are deposited and linked up 
cryptographically in the corresponding digital ballot boxes. By means of the encrypted 
ballot sheets, voting rights that have been exercised – similar to sealed a sealed envelope 
that has the name of the voter on it – is registered in the voter’s name. 
 
 
Figure 35: Transferring the Vote to the Election Server 
  
The check code serves as an additional security function. In this case, we are dealing 
with a randomly generated combination of numbers and letters, which is generated on the 
student’s computer and is added to the electronic voting envelope. Here, it is important 
that the check code is known only to the student. Neither assignment to the student nor 
assignment to the voting options is possible using the check code. In this way, we can 
exclude vote-buying. Furthermore, at the end of the voting transaction, the student is 
issued a control code. This is required together with the check code for any appeals that 
may occur following the count.  
 
On completion of electronic voting, the voting rights exercised are selected and 
marked off in the electoral roll, so that there is no possibility of people submitting votes 
more than once.  
 
When counting the votes, the digital ballot boxes are transferred to the mixing laptop. 
Secure data transfer is protected both through technical measures as well as through 
cryptographic processes. 
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The entire integration chain is checked on the mixing laptop. This includes, amongst 
other things, that all signatures are valid, that no closed electronic envelope lies in the 
wrong ballot box or that no unknown person or persons have submitted votes more than 
once. This process step consciously mistrusts the integrity of all other systems used in the 
election. The check for integrity is carried out prior to the paper-based vote. Should any 
errors occur following the verification, the Electoral Commission can also declare the 
electronic voting as invalid and can inform voters of this in plenty of time to take part in 
the paper-based election and to cast their votes once again52. 
 
During the course of counting, which according to § 46 para. 8 HSWO 200553 may not 
take place until after the end of the voting transactions, the signatures are firstly removed, 
then the electronic envelopes are mixed and are decoded through adding the Electoral 
Commission’s key.  
 
 
Figure 36: Anonymization of ballot sheets 
                                                
52  § 48 para 4 HSWO 2005: if E-Voting is declared invalid in accordance with§ 39 para 
7 HSG 1998, then voters who submitted their votes by means of E-Voting are 
permitted to cast their votes once again at the polling station. 
53  § 46 para 8 HSWO 2005: Counting votes submitted by means of E-Voting is started 
by adding the electronic key in accordance with § 35 para. 6 HSWO 2005 by the 
Electoral Commission for the Austrian Federation of Students. This must take place 
on the final day of voting following the final voting transaction. 
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At the same time with the opening of the voting envelope, the check codes are also 
recorded. Following official approval, the results of the election are published on the 
Internet. 
 
 
Figure 37: Reconstructing the Electoral Commission’s key  
 
The voter can verify by means of an online request whether their ballot sheet reached 
the count and was counted by the Electoral Commission. Should the check code not 
appear on it, then the student is responsible for notifying their Electoral Commission. The 
student can prove cryptographically together with the control code that the vote really did 
need to be counted. 
 
IT Experts / Audit. During implementation of the project, it was decided that all audited 
processes should be monitored by a legally authorized IT expert and the Confirmation 
Agency in accordance with § 34 para. 6 of the law governing the Federation of Students 
(HSG) 1998. This contributed considerably towards increasing transparency. Monitoring 
by the Confirmation Agency in accordance with § 34 para. 6 HSG 1998 was part of the 
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condition for implementation54. The installation process for the mixing notebook satisfied 
the high requirements in terms of control, traceability and transparency. Throughout the 
project, the integrity of the hardware used was verified through tests. The hardware was 
not part of the certification in accordance with § 64 para. 3 HSWO 2005. 
 
3.6.4.2 E-Voting Server Infrastructure 
The infrastructure was redundantly distributed in two locations: the Computing Center at 
BRZ, and the Parallel Computing Center at BRZ. The locations are approximately 5 
kilometers away from one another.  
 
Both locations satisfy the requirements of the most modern and secure computer 
centers with regards to physical security, power supply, fire protection,  
access control systems, recording systems (real-time video monitoring, recording 
accesses) and much more.  
 
The E-Voting system was regarded as a highly critical system, and for this reason, it 
was subject to the highest security mechanisms of the technical computer company BRZ. 
 
All infrastructure components of the voting system were divided at the location in 
protective storage cabinets. Access to the protective storage cabinet in a secure area of a 
server room was only granted to authorized personnel. Any access was monitored and 
recorded by the safety control group. 
 
                                                
54  Certificate published by A-SIT see http://www.a-sit.at/pdfs/ 
bescheinigungen_hsg/bescheinigung_hsg_final_sig.pdf  
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In addition, both of the protective storage cabinets for installing the mixing server were 
secured up until the secure deletion of all data following voting using metal seals and 
steel wire fasteners. The metal seals used are marked with unique numbers. 
 
 
Figure 38: Sealed protective Cabinet  
 
The security of the systems was tested using penetration tests. Special attention lay in 
securing against distributed Denial of Service (dDoS) attacks. For this reason, throughout 
the entire period of the project, a close collaboration was maintained with CERT.at55 and 
ACOnet56 for detecting and reacting to dDoS attacks across all networks.  
                                                
55  CERT.at is the Austrian national CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team). As 
such, CERT.at is the contact partner for IT security on a national level. It interconnects 
other CERTs and CSIRTs (Computer Security Incident Response Teams) from fields 
of critical infrastructure, ICT (Information and Communication Technology) and gives 
out warnings, alerts and tips to SME (small and mid-sized enterprises). With attacks 
on computers on a national scale, CERT.at co-ordinates and informs the network 
operators in each case and the local security teams responsible. See http://cert.at/ 
56  ACOnet is the Austrian scientific network for public-purpose installations for 
research, education and culture, which provides its participants with access to other 
scientific networks and the Internet. ACOnet is operated by the Central Information 
Technology Service of the University of Vienna in cooperation with other universities 
throughout the whole of Austria. See http://www.aco.net 
  114 
3.6.4.3 Integration of MOA Modules 
The integration of MOA-ID and MOA-SP to the greatest extent gave us no technical 
problems. Improved documentation for this module57 reduced the workload. In principle, 
in spite of this, the preference was for the E-Government strategy to make integrating the 
citizen cards into another service as offered easier through providing standardized 
modules. 
 
The MOA-ID and MOA-SP modules were installed by the operator BRZ, special 
configuration details from the point of view of the application were specified by the 
software supplier Scytl. 
 
Implementation of MOA-ID and MOA-SP. The MOA modules were installed in an 
especially secure manner. The basis of the E-government strategy consists, among other 
things, of provision of the MOA modules and their source codes. The knowledge and 
experience gained from the E-Voting project regarding installation, configuration and 
operating the MOA modules represent a valuable contribution to further development and 
improvement. 
 
3.6.4.4 Monitoring 
The screen for monitoring voting is connected directly to the database. There is a 
representation of the current number of voters per university who have already taken part 
on this screen. The video signal in this case is transferred into a separate observation 
room. 
                                                
57  Documentation from MOA-ID and MOA-SP/SS can be found at 
http://egovlabs.gv.at/docman/index.php?group_id=6. 
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Figure 39: Screen in the observation room with the current number of voters 
 
In the observation room, we could gain insight both into the current status of the voting 
(number of voters per university, status of the election, i.e., started/suspended/re-
started/completed) as well as check the physical security and non-violation of the voting 
system and the mixing laptop (real-time video monitoring of both locations including 
motion indicator and alarm system). The regulations on accessing the monitoring room 
were determined by the definition of an Election Monitor defined in HSG 1998 and was 
guaranteed by corresponding security guard personnel from the company BRZ. 
 
Monitoring the Election. Permitting more people to monitor the election would increase 
transparency. A corresponding legal basis would need to be created for this purpose. 
Technically speaking, election monitoring over the Internet would be possible. To this 
end, it is important to note the frequency of data updates. 
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3.6.4.5 The Election Administration System 
The Election Administration System58 is defined in § 1 para. 6 HSWO 2005 as a hardware 
and software system for supporting the Electoral Commission in realizing their tasks 
during the election that is to be carried out. 
 
The elections to the Austrian Federation of Students take place at 21 universities. In 
this process, a series of tasks are cared out by the Chairs of the Electoral Commissions 
and their Vice-Chairs at the respective university, which up until now were determined 
by individual solutions and auxiliary equipment. For example, in each case they had an 
individual electronic system at the Vienna University of Economics and Business or at 
the University of Graz, which supported the efforts of the Electoral Commission 
electronically. Both the technical realization as well as the extent of support was different 
for each system tried until now. Electoral Commissions from other universities had no 
such type of system available, and their tasks were characterized by self-generating Excel 
macros, Excel tables and Word files, which normally could be drawn up quickly. 
 
It was decided in the course of the project for the Austrian Federation of Students 
Elections in 2009 to develop a central electoral administration system and to make it 
available to all 21 Electoral Commissions and the Federal Election Commission. The aim 
was to develop a standardized system, which supports the activities of the Federal 
Election Commission and of the 21 Chairs of the Electoral Commissions and their Vice-
Chairs. Some of the activities and functionalities are listed here: 
                                                
58  The election administration system may not be confused with the almost identically 
named admin system of the E-Voting System. The admin system of the E-Voting 
system is that component which runs as a service on the mixing laptop and which in 
the course of an audited process with the Federal Election Commission creates the 
cryptographic key for voting as well as carrying out configuration of the electronic 
votes being cast. 
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- Drawing-up the electoral rolls, which are printed out and hung in a public place 
for reference; 
 
- Configuration of voting, whereby the corresponding paper ballot papers are 
generated and reproduced on site. The number of the 374 different ballot papers 
required is determined by the voting administration system; 
 
- Generating letters of notification to those elected; 
 
- Generating different forms filled out corresponding to HSWO 2005. 
 
During paper-based voting, the voting administration system is also used by the 
Electoral Sub-Committees at the respective universities to draw up a standardized 
reconciliation list corresponding to § 40 para. 2 HSWO 200559.  
 
 
Figure 40: Using the voting administration system during paper-based Voting 
 
Operated by a member of the Electoral Sub-Committee, this acts as an additional 
opportunity to monitor the paper-based reconciliation list, which is managed by another 
member of the Electoral Sub-Committee. 
 
                                                
59  § 40 Abs. 2 HSWO 2005: At the same time, a non-binding reconciliation list must be 
managed in the voting administration system by a member of the Electoral 
Commission. 
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At universities at which polling stations are set up in such a way that students can cast 
their votes at more than one polling station, there is a requirement for the respective 
Electoral Sub-Committee at a polling station to know about the voting rights that have 
been exercised at other polling stations in order to prevent multiple votes being cast. Up 
until now, this was marked by a stamp printed by the Electoral Sub-Committee in the 
Student’s ID document on casting a vote. Through the voting administration system, it is 
now possible for Electoral Sub-Committees to now query those entitled to vote centrally 
online60. Therefore, we only need to fall back to the previous system (e.g., using a stamp) 
in the case of a system failure or in the case of not being able to access the voting 
administration system. 
 
The basis for the E-Voting system consists of the electronic electoral roll recorded in 
the voting administration system as well as the defined elections. The results of the paper-
based voting input by the Electoral Sub-Committee are counted by the voting 
administration system together with the outcomes for electronic votes cast. The overall 
results are exported from the voting administration system and are published in text and 
graphically in the web portal. 
 
In order to prevent failures or outages associated with the voting administration 
system, it was operated redundantly at two locations. The voting administration system 
is technically separate from the E-Voting system. It runs on its own servers, and they have 
no access to the E-Voting system. Any data transfer from the E-Voting system to the 
voting administration system and the other way around takes place by CD/DVD. The 
authenticity of the media was assured cryptographically and through audited 
organizational processes. 
 
                                                
60  An appropriate computer must be available it the Electoral Sub-Commission in the 
polling station for this. This is regulated in § 33 para. 1. HSWO 2005. 
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Access to the voting administration system was protected by using certificates as well 
as a user name and password.  
 
Further development of the election administration. As part of the introduction of a 
central system for election administration to support the activities of the electoral 
commissions, a process of continuous improvement and further development should be 
commenced.  
 
The need for further development arises because it was not possible to implement all 
the desired functions due to time constraints and because the focus was on the stability 
and realization of functional requirements rather than optimum usability. Consideration 
must also be given to all experiences that were gained after practical implementation. 
Additional changes to the election administration system may arise through modifying 
the legal basis.  
 
In any case, centralized operation and further development of a uniform election 
administration system for all 21 universities leads to targeted standardization and 
improvements in quality. This centralization represents an efficient solution vis-à-vis the 
individual solutions that existed until now and that have been implemented, leading to 
more transparency for all involved. 
 
3.6.4.6 Personal Computers at Universities for Electronic voting  
§ 33 para. 1 HSWO 2005 specifies that the Dean must provide students adequate numbers 
of personal computers with Internet access and the technical components for using citizen 
cards in accordance with § 4 E-GovG and privacy shields in accordance with § 34 para. 
5 Z 6 HSG 1998 throughout the period in accordance with § 62 HSWO 2005, and they 
must make them publicly accessible for casting votes by means of E-Voting. 
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In consultation between the Federal Ministry and the Central Information Technology 
Services of the universities corresponding to legal guidelines, setting up PCs in each 
university city was considered adequate. Personal computers, on which it was possible 
for students to cast their vote electronically were set up on site; they were installed and 
operated in all university towns in sufficient numbers by the respective ZID. 
 
The principal consideration of deciding whether personal computers should be set up 
centrally or otherwise and installed by local ZID was made in favor of the local solutions 
on grounds of complexity of a standardized solution and the short project duration period. 
The local ZIDs were supported by the Federal Ministry through specifications and 
recommendations; however, the realization was almost completely the responsibility of 
the competency of the ZID. Operation was likewise predominantly smooth during the 
voting phase, even when there were numerous cases of vandalism (intentional 
destruction) and acts of sabotage to PCs. 
 
Setting up PCs at the universities. The integration of IT centers into the overall project 
should take place at an earlier point in time in future elections. The provision of a sample 
application and implementation of a test election are decisive factors. In addition, a 
suitable communication platform must be established between the IT centers and the 
project team, particularly with regard to reporting incidents during the voting phase. The 
decision as to whether locally or centrally installed PCs should be used must be evaluated 
under new perspectives. The decision as to whether locally or centrally installed PCs 
should be used must be evaluated under new perspectives. 
 
The PCs at the universities were viewed very positively by the disability officers in 
universities; however, continual improvement of universal accessibility in terms of the 
access to and operation of the PCs in universities was also highlighted. 
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3.6.5 Pre-Voting Phase  
The realization of the project commenced in November 2008 with the specification phase. 
Following this, the project was presented to the media in a specialist conference. Parallel 
to this, the university publicity departments prepared for the project with the “Unitour”. 
The usability test in March 2009 was the last test prior to the legal start of voting on the 
key date. The verification of voter entitlement (of the right to vote) at the end of April 
was the first opportunity for students to try out the citizen registration card in the context 
of this project. 
 
3.6.5.1 Enquete 
On December 3, 2008, a conference took place in Vienna, Austria, initiated by the BMWF 
on the subject of “Political Opportunities to Participate using New Media” with the 
participation of national and overseas experts in the fields of “Participating over the 
Internet”, E-Democracy as well as E-Voting. The aim of the conference was to explain a 
number of facets of political participation using the Internet in general as well technical 
and legal aspects and also in particular E-Voting to the interested audience of experts. 
Ultimately, the conference served to deliver both to advocates as well as critics of E-
Voting a platform in order to exchange arguments in what were sometimes very intense 
and controversial discussions.  
 
3.6.5.2 University Tour  
The tour of the universities was initiated between August and October 2008 by the 
BMWF. The aim here was to visit as many universities as possible in the seven university 
towns (Vienna, Graz, Linz, Salzburg, Innsbruck, Klagenfurt and Leoben) and to enter 
into discussions with the stakeholders (usually the Vice-Deans, University Chancellors, 
employees of the CITs and also members of the local electoral Commissions) as well as 
with the local student unions.  
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Preparation for visits and their implementation was completed by staff of the BMWF 
or of the Federal Electoral Commission as well as by externals of the BMWF Team. The 
aim, with respect to the elections to the Austrian Federation of Students, was to already 
make reference to the additional E-Voting channel in May 2009 and to make the 
university employees and the local Student unions aware of the subject. By the end of 
November 2008, such visits had been completed at almost all universities. 
 
3.6.5.3 E-Government Initiative studi.gv.at 
3.6.5.3.1 Background 
In cooperation with the Austrian Federal Chancellery, the Austrian Ministry of Finance, 
the Principal Association for Social Security Funding Agencies as well as the BMWF, 
the campaign studi.gv.at was initiated in September 2008 in order to start an E-
Government Strategy for the field of students. This project was set up in parallel with the 
E-Voting project, since mutual synergies arose and both projects profited from one 
another to an equal measure. The general degree of recognition of the citizen card as well 
as of the opportunities to use it – in particular, for students – was the focus of attention 
for this project. 
 
3.6.5.3.2 Realization 
Numerous measures were commenced in order to achieve as large a number of activations 
as possible: 
 
- A dedicated website www.studi.gv.at was set up. The students were able to inform 
themselves on the citizen card and the applications relevant for students. During 
the summer semester, increasing opportunities to use the citizen card for E-Voting 
was also at the center of attention; 
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- Card-readers were distributed to students free of charge. The card-readers were 
distributed directly to the universities free of charge in the context of the initiative 
to those students, who allowed their citizen card to be activated; 
 
- Advertising took place for studi.gv.at at universities throughout Austria using 
billboards and flyers; 
 
- Free of charge citizen card activation services were provided at universities: 
Tutors were specially trained and authorized for this, with their number increasing 
throughout the course of the project from 22 to 30. The coaches had specially 
designed laptops, mobile data cards, information folders, polo shirts, laptop cases 
and covers, badges and roll-ups. Furthermore, detailed documentation regarding 
the citizen card as well as its uses and its meaningfulness were put together; 
 
- In addition, student volunteers were trained as “Registration Officers”, which 
were able to activate further citizen cards according to the snowball principle. 
 
3.6.5.3.3 Outcome 
From the start of the studi.gv.at initiative up to and including the election phase for the 
Austrian Federation of Students, we were able to record more than 14,000 citizen card 
activations by students. The following table presents activations by month, divided up in 
sequence for the phases mentioned above. In addition, the overall activations are shown 
as well as the distribution by percentages of activations for each respective phase. 
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Table 6: Number of Activations 
 
The table above shows the activations per month, which is divided in sequence into 
the phases named above. In addition, the overall activations are shown as well as the 
distribution by percentages of activations for each respective phase. 
 
 
Figure 41: Percentage Distribution of the Activations per Phase 
 
The graphic illustration shows that in the pre-voting phase and the voting phase, the 
most activations were triggered by percentage. 
Month	 New	
Activations	
Number																		
per	Phase	
Percentage	
per	Phase	
October	08	
Introductory	and	
Set-up		Phase	 2,458	 17.23%	November	08	
December	08	
January	09		
Pre-voting	Phase	 5,660	 39.67%	
February	09	
March	09	
April	09	
May	09	 Voting	phase	 4,529	 31.74%	
June	09	 Election	Follow-up	
Phase		 1,621	 11.36%	July	09	
	
17% 
40% 
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  125 
Sustainability of citizen card registrations. Particularly during the entry phase and 
development phase of the authorization process, a number of unexpected server 
breakdowns occurred, rendering authorization impossible during these periods. Through 
direct communication with responsible persons at the central register and A-Trust, further 
similar problems were largely avoided throughout the course of the project.  
 
Students were pleased that card readers were distributed free of charge as part of the 
studi.gv.at campaign. However, there were complaints that there was no personal contact 
via a telephone hotline for rapid responses to queries. 
 
A lot of information was gathered regarding the students’ acceptance of the citizen 
card and its functions through the studi.gv.at campaign. In addition, a very good overview 
of the opinions in the individual study facilities and universities was compiled, 
particularly regarding E-Voting. 
 
The information on the studi.gv.at website regarding application options offered by 
the citizen card should be integrated into existing information services (help.gv.at or 
bmwf.gv.at). 
 
In the longer term, the physical presence during authorization, the lengthy duration 
and inputting two different PIN codes pose problems in terms of usability for the use of 
the citizen card.  
 
Regular use of corresponding applications seems to be the key to sustainable use by 
students.  
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3.6.5.4 Certification 
Corresponding to § 64 para. 3 HSWO 200561 as well as § 34 para. 6 HSG 199862, the 
technical components used and the components used directly for casting a vote and for 
verifying identity must be certified according to the latest level of technology in 
accordance with § 19 Signature Act by a Confirmation Office. Certification must be 
completed up to 60 days before the first day of voting, whereby recommendations from 
the Council of Europe on legal, operational and technical standards for E-Voting are 
monitored.  
 
  
                                                
61  § 64 para. 3 HSWO 2005: The client and the election server software must be certified 
by 60 days before the first day of voting by a Certification Agency in accordance with 
§ 34 para. 6 HSG 1998. As part of the certification, fulfilling the security requirements 
by electronic voting system with the involvement of recommendations from the 
meeting of Ministers of the Council of Europe on Member Countries in accordance 
with Article 15 para. b Statute of the Council of Europe, BGBl. 121/1956 in the 
currently valid edition, no. Rec(2004)11 dated September 30th 2004 on the legal, 
operational and technical standards of E-Voting (“Legal, Operational and Technical 
Standards for E-Voting”) must be tested. Furthermore, in the examination, the existing 
useable protection profiles should be considered. 
62  § 34 para. 6 HSG 1998: The technical components used by the Electoral Commission 
and the components, which are used directly for casting votes and for verifying 
identities, must be tested sufficiently according to the latest status of technology and 
must be tested continuously. The fulfillment of security requirements must be certified 
by a Certification Agency in accordance with § 19 SigG [Signature Act]. This 
Certification Agency also pronounces recommendations for the other technical 
components, which are used when casting the vote. 
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3.6.5.4.1 Object for Testing 
Testing took place from December 1, 2008 until March 25, 2009 on the basis of 
transferred documents and the source code. Using the documentation from the 
manufacturer, we examined whether the security architecture for the software could fulfill 
the security requirements of HSG 1998 and HSWO 2005. Using the source code provided 
by the manufacturer, we were able to understand whether the security functions presented 
in the documentation phase were also correctly implemented. 
 
The actual technical installation was not the subject of the test nor operation of the 
certified components nor the infrastructure required for this. The designs intended for this 
were evaluated by expert reports, and based on this, the corresponding conditions for use 
were defined, which must be followed throughout the life cycle of the components and 
data elements used. 
 
3.6.5.4.2 Certification and Conditions for Use 
On March 27, 2009, A-SIT completed the certification process and published the 
results online63. The following five conditions for use were defined in the course of 
certification with consideration of the object being examined:  
Condition for Use 1: Key Lengths 
Client and election server software must be configured so that the key lengths for the 
cryptographic algorithms used are selected in such a way that these correspond to the 
latest level of technology and achieve the level of security required for qualified 
electronic signatures.  
Condition for Use 2: Client 
For secure use of the client, we must set as a prerequisite that the computer chosen by 
the voter in each case is free from software that could influence the correct functioning 
of the client or that we can observe it. For this reason, corresponding security 
                                                
63  See http://www.a-sit.at/de/bestaetigungsstelle/bescheinigungen_hsg/index.php 
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information must be provided via the web portal, which must be displayed to the voter 
prior to casting the vote. In particular, a representation must also be made of how they 
can check the genuineness of the clients and how they can prevent residual information 
being stored on the client’s computer.  
Condition for Use 3: Election server software 
The prerequisite must be set for secure operation of the election server software that 
these are compiled and installed on trustworthy systems. The concepts presented in the 
course of certification for the compilation and installations must be strictly kept to for 
this reason, and the steps carried out must be protocolled. For systems used in the 
generation of security-relevant keys, secure processes must be used, which reliably 
and continuously prevent a detection of residual information for the keys being 
generated.  
Condition for Use 4: Electronic Ballot Box and Electoral Commission Key  
The electronic ballot box and the Electoral Commission‘s partial components of the 
private key must be deleted or destroyed in a secure manner following counting of the 
votes, and this must be proven in an independent audit. The systems and data involved 
must be monitored throughout the entire life-cycle, including all components and data 
elements and protocolled and operated in such a way that manipulation or data transfer 
to an external recipient can also be excluded by the organization of the system. 
Should deletion not be possible on legal grounds, then the organization must ensure 
that the owner of the partial components of the Electoral Commission’s private key 
has no access to the electronic ballot box and that opening the electronic ballot box 
(for any possible new implementation of the mixing process) can only be carried out 
under the same secure conditions as during the course of the election. Where the 
electronic ballot box has been stored, we must further ensure that if the lengths of the 
keys used for encryption no longer achieve the required level of security required for 
qualified electronic signatures, an addition encryption of the electronic ballot boxes 
must be provided. The infrastructure and the encryption process in this case must be 
subject to technical and organizational monitoring during the life-cycle of the 
components and data elements. The key used in this case must be generated under the 
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same secure conditions as during the course of the election, it must be divided into 
partial components and it must be handed over to the Chair of the Electoral 
Commission as well as to further members of the Electoral Commission. 
If one of the owners of a partial component should no longer exercise their function in 
the sense of HSG 1998 or HSWO 2005 during the life-span of the partial components 
of the private Electoral Commission’s key, then care must be taken to ensure secure 
transfer of the partial components to a member of the Electoral Commission, who does 
not hold any further partial components for safekeeping. 
Condition for Use 5: Election Key CA 
The security and operational concept of the certification agency (“Election-CA”), 
which will issue the certificates for the election software, must demonstrably 
correspond to the safety requirements of the electronic election in the spirit of 
HSG 1998. 
Figure 42: Conditions for Use 
 
3.6.5.4.3 Fulfilling the Conditions for Use 
Appropriate consideration must be given in the project to fulfill the conditions of use. The 
length of the key for cryptographic algorithms was configured to 2048 bits (1); the 
corresponding information, instructions and information were published via the web 
portal (2); the processes for compiling and installation of the election software was carried 
out, verified and audited according to the concepts presented (3); the details on data 
destruction were followed and were implemented and audited in a verified process (4) 
and likewise the security details for constructing the Election CA for the voting key were 
followed (5). 
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3.6.5.4.4 Online Citizen Card Environment 
On the basis of the integration of the online citizen card environment (MOCCA), changes 
were made to the certified election software during the later phases of the project. The 
changes included supporting the XML Signature Requests in order to make the use of the 
online citizen card environment possible. In this way, casting votes was made possible, 
requiring no further software installation to the client computer for the citizen card 
function, whereby the risk of any conspicuous targeted manipulation of the client as part 
of the installation was significantly reduced.  
 
A-SIT confirmed on May 15, 2009 that the changes completed had no influence on the 
confirmed fulfillment of the security requirements of § 34 HSG 1998 as well as of 
§ 64 HSWO 2005 on certification A-SIT-1.078. Supplement no. 1 associated with the 
certification was published on the A-SIT website64. 
 
3.6.5.4.5 Experience for Future Certification 
Successful certification is based to the greatest extent of the experience of the company 
Scytl with different certification processes from previous projects. The corresponding 
documents were provided in good time, and queries on additional, detailed information 
were answered quickly. 
 
Certification task. The effort involved in the certification process is considerably 
reduced when using the same election software, since the source code has already been 
checked. In case of any changes or adaptations (e.g., in the user interface), these should 
simply be analyzed further (taking the overall context into account) by the independent 
certification center.  
 
                                                
64  http://www.a-sit.at/pdfs/bescheinigungen_hsg/ 
ASIT_bescheinigung_hsg_erg1_090515_sig.pdf 
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A prerequisite for this is that the source code already used is available to the 
independent certification center in order to allow differences between the old and new 
source code to be identified clearly and securely, which is the case with A-SIT. 
 
3.6.5.5 Usability Test 
A usability test was carried out on March 18, 2009 at the WU Vienna University of 
Economics and Business and at Montanuniversität Leoben. The aim was to verify the 
ease of use of the voting system for students. A preliminary version of the voting system 
was used, into which all of the internal project improvements desired regarding the voting 
transaction has been implemented. Feedback from students was supposed to be collected 
in order to verify the development process sought and, where necessary, to adjust it 
through additional or changed functionalities. 
 
Preparing for the test, an election was configured in which the best skiing country 
(similar to an election to the University Representative Board) and the best skier (similar 
to an election to a University Studies Representative Board) stood for election. On the 
day of the test, which was set to run from morning until afternoon, the required 
infrastructure was built up at both universities. All students were able to take part, to enter 
discussions with members of the projects and to take part in continuous improvement of 
the voting process. The feedback collected to the greatest extent corresponded to the 
targeted intention of the project and was converted for use in the genuine election. The 
votes were counted at the end of the usability test. This step served the function of the 
first test run for the technical and organizational processes for recording votes in the 
genuine election.  
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Contrary to diverse reports65, there were absolutely no systemic crashes of the E-
Voting system. The system functioned without any problems both during the usability 
tests as well as during the genuine election following it. 
 
3.6.5.6 Check of Right to Vote  
The check of the right to vote was provided from 23 to 30 April 2009. It provided the first 
opportunity to use the citizen card. At this opportunity the individual voter could check 
their own entitlement and right to vote following identification by means of their citizen 
card. The check of entitlement and right to vote was used by approximately 370 different 
people66. At this time it was already shown that a number of people had forgot the PIN 
codes for their citizen card, or had entered it incorrectly. There was a hotline available 
throughout the entire duration of the check of entitlement of the right to vote. 
 
On the basis of complaints received against the lists of voters during the right-to-vote 
verification, missing datasets could be subsequently uploaded from the university data 
sharing, and so data synchronization between the universities and the data sharing could 
be improved. 
 
Use of the voting rights check. The electronic voting rights verification, taking into 
account the customary low use of the same opportunity in paper form, can be considered 
a great success. The high number of incorrectly entered PIN codes was a large problem 
for the acceptance of the process. The coordination between universities and the data 
network should be further improved for cut-off date queries in the future. 
 
                                                
65  See, amongst others, Hauser (2009). 
66  This is stated precisely from 370 different citizen cards. One individual person may 
have several. 
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3.6.5.7 Inspection for Members of the Electoral Commissions 
The aim of inspection access for members of the Electoral Commission is the fulfillment 
of the statutory legally prescribed requirements. At the same time, a high level of 
acceptance for the development of the election and the inspection should be generated. 
The modality of the inspection is governed in § 64 para. 7 HSWO 2005. According to 
this paragraph, the Federal Minister must grant Members of the Electoral Commission 
insight into the client source code and into the election software. Furthermore, the right 
to inspect the test reports in accordance with§ 64 par. 3 HSWO 2005 must be granted. 
 
The inspection took place on May 8, 2009 in the premises of the Federal datacenter 
company, BRZ. The participants had to register in advance. In accordance with the legal 
fundamentals, only members of the Electoral Commission and their observers were 
permitted to attend.  
 
The inspection of the test report for certification and of the source code was designed 
for up to 250 people, and 28 were present. The progression was discussed with the 
participants at the start of the event. The progression was divided into a number of so-
called sessions, which introduced the overall system and operation in the form of expert 
lectures. From the first session, at the same time as this, inspection of the source code was 
possible on two notebooks in a separate room. The notebooks were operated by 
employees of the software provider Scytl, who displayed the desired part of the source 
code on request or the corresponding functionality and were available to reply to any 
queries.  
 
The test report was made available on a further, additional notebook. If there were any 
bottlenecks in capacity, further notebooks would have been available. 
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Figure 43: Presentation during Inspection for Members of the Electoral Commission  
 
Prior to the first session, the participants were reminded of their obligation to official 
secrecy, which they are subject to as a result of their role as a member of an Electoral 
Commission or as an Electoral Observer since taking up their office. On the grounds of 
protection of intellectual property, neither laptops, cell phones (with photographic 
cameras) nor similar devices were allowed to be taken in. These details were received 
from the software provider and were taken into consideration during inspection.  
 
P R E A M B L E 
The aim of this declaration for Inspection according to § 64 para. 7 HSWO 2005 in 
the sensitive area of elections is to weigh up between the greatest transparency possible 
on the one hand and between justified interests of the company implementing the 
security contract on the other hand. With E-Voting for the Austrian Federation of 
Students we are dealing with an innovation, being carried out in Austria for the first 
time. The process of inspection of the source code was accordingly designed according 
to legal guidelines. The experiences gained serve both those carrying out the 
inspections, to gain detailed insight into the technical processes as well as to the 
implementing party, to gain new development potential for designing comparable 
Session	1
Anforderungen
Session	3
Software		
Parallel	ab	Session	1
Einsichtnahme	in	den	Prüfbericht	
und	den	Quellcode
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processes. In this sense, the BMWF on the one hand requests understanding for the 
declarations required from participants, on the other hand they request support and 
assistance in continuing to develop the process. The evaluation form issued for this 
also serves this purpose. 
D E C L A R A T I O N 
The undersigned increasingly takes cognizance that in their function as a member of 
an Electoral Commission / Electoral Observer, they are an official in the legal sense 
of the word and with this are subject to regulations for official secrecy for the 
aforementioned function and in this way must fundamentally keep all facts they learn 
of from the aforementioned role secret.  
The undersigned further takes cognizance that violating official secrecy according to 
§310 StGB can be punishable with imprisonment of up to 3 years. 
Figure 44: Preamble and Declaration on Official Secrecy  
 
The entire source code for the election software was displayed, including any 
comments listed in the code. The source code was identical with that which was compiled 
in an audited process on May 11, 2009 (and was also tested at this time by a Certification 
Agency and Auditor through 1:1 comparison and was archived in a comprehensible 
manner) and was used for the elections (likewise verified by the Certification Agency and 
Auditor through a combination of a number of check sum methods as well as additionally 
through a binary comparison and comprehensively archived). It was subject to the 
certification process of the Certification Agency (testing of the source code for several 
months). Alongside the source code, the entire test report from the Certification Agency 
was available for inspection by those persons present. At no time were there any 
bottlenecks during the inspection.  
 
Accompanying talks by the Project Team contributed to an objective discussion. 
Queries were addressed in great detail.  
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Viewing the evaluation report and source code. The source code is inspected by an 
independent certification center in accordance with the legal regulations; this is the 
opportunity for electoral commissions to inspect the source code and primarily to view 
this report. The task of inspecting the source code is the responsibility of the certification 
center, in accordance with the regulations, whereby the result of the inspection is 
presented to the Electoral Commissions. From this point of view, both time-based as well 
as organizational framework conditions would be sufficient. The difference between 
review by an evaluation body and an inspection must be portrayed better. When the 
Electoral Commissions are inspecting the check report for certification and the election 
software and the client’s source code, a representative of the independent certification 
center should be present to explain the evaluation method and to answer questions 
regarding certification directly. Furthermore, the certification center can confirm the 
authenticity of the source code in advance prior to the inspection. The performance when 
viewing the report and source code, the presence of experts and the software developers 
themselves were well received. A completed event offered a broad overview of the overall 
system, whereby detailed questions could be addressed at any time. In the long term, we 
can consider using as many open-source-based components as possible to increase 
acceptance. 
 
3.6.5.8 Project Advisory Board 
The Project Advisory Board was set up by Federal Minister Johannes Hahn in January 
2009 and has met a total of three times under the direction of departmental chief Friedrich 
Faulhammer6733. It was the aim of this Project Advisory Board to inform people in the 
region of this project about the project on an up-to-date basis and to accept critical 
suggestions for the further progression of the project. 
 
                                                
67  The three meetings took place on January 22, April 30 and June 16, 2009 in the offices 
of the BMWF. 
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The Project Advisory Board is comprised of representatives from the following 
institutions: the Austrian Federation of Students, the Federal Election Commission for 
the Austrian Federation of Students 2009, the University Conferences, the office of the 
Federal Chancellery, the Federal Ministry for Home Affairs, the Federal Ministry for 
European, Integration and Foreign Affairs, the Federal Ministry of Finance as well as of 
the Federal Ministry for Science and Research, the Principal Association for Social 
Security Funding Agencies, the data Protection Commission as well as scientists 
(political scientists, representatives of technology and constitutional law)68. 
 
In constructive meetings, the partial project outcomes were presented and were 
discussed, and recommendations were also accepted for the further course of the project.  
 
The last meeting took place after the election in June 2009, and the participants’ 
experiences were presented there. 
 
Project Advisory Board. Setting up a project advisory board is advisable for future 
elections using E-Voting because it allows critical feedback to be obtained on individual 
project stages from representatives of various institutions (e.g., stakeholders, federal 
ministries, science). 
 
  
                                                
68  The members of the Project Advisory Board included the following: Samir Al-
Mobayyed, Thomas Buchsbaum, Peter Filzmaier, Michael Holoubek, Karl Korinek, 
Waltraut Kotschy, Gabriele Kotsis, Manfred Matzka, Christian Rupp, Peter Parycek, 
Klaus Poier, Reinhard Posch, Volker Schögerhofer, Günther Simonitsch, Robert Stein, 
Gregor Wenda, Arthur Winter, Harald Wögerbauer, Heribert Wulz. 
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3.6.5.9 Council of Europe Recommendation: List of Ethical Principles 
The Council of Europe has already driven through some significant developments in the 
field of electronic voting. It issued its legal, technical and organizational 
recommendations for E-Voting6935 in 2004, which represent the first standardization 
document for an international organization of the subject. 
 
Since that time, the Council of Europe has also used these developments in its member 
countries in the field of use for Information Technology and communication technology 
during the voting process. Based on experiences in Estonia70, where  
E-Voting was in very high demand, the Council of Europe recommended a List of Ethical 
Principles similar to those used in Estonia. This document was translated into German 
and was relayed on to the Electoral Commissions at the respective universities. 
 
List of Ethical Principles for E-Voting 
Principles for the correct and proper implementation of E-Voting 
Through the Estonian advances in the use of information technology in different 
areas of life and the readiness of citizens, to use these new communication media, in 
the context of anchoring E-Voting in law, an opportunity was seen to support the 
legal voting principle of free choice through selecting this additional channel for 
casting votes. 
It is important to establish that E-Voting does not mean the role of traditional 
methods of casting votes. It is also part of the general responsibility that E-Voting 
takes place legitimately and successfully. This task was written down in the 
following principles for the correct and proper implementation of E-Voting: 
1. The election process of E-Voting – and in particular the condition that the 
guarantee of privacy of casting a vote is a detail derived from legal election 
                                                
69  (Council of Europe, 2004) 
70  (Trechsel, 2007) 
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principles – should be explained to the voters neutrally and impartially; the voters 
should have risks cleared up which are associated with surrendering the citizen 
card and the PIN Code to other people.  
2. No joint E-Voting activities (amongst others election parties, E-Voting Service 
Desks) should be organized on E-Voting days. Such events are viewed as 
violations of the legal principle of voting in free elections.  
3. Voters may not be compelled to cast their votes by E-Voting, in which case 
computers are made available, at which the voter should cast their vote, in order 
to influence him or with the clear intention, of collecting their votes. 
4. Advertisements on the Internet containing a link to the dedicated E-Voting 
webpage should be prevented in order to reduce the risk of accessing an incorrect 
webpage (phishing). This hyperlink could be used to record personal voter 
details. 
5. No election advertising or campaigns should take place in the sphere of public 
PCs, which are equipped with card-reading devices.  
6. Where the possibility exists, a neutral and honest person should be included in 
the role of an election monitor and both the election commissions as well as the 
public should be informed of the results. 
7. During the election campaign and following the election, if the legitimate 
progression of the E-Voting was checked, E-Voting and the legitimacy of the 
entire voting process should not be scrutinized on political grounds. 
Figure 45: List of Ethical Principles 
 
Agreeing to a statement of ethical principles for E-Voting. For future elections, a body 
of experts with representatives from all groups involved in the Austrian Federation of 
Students and interested in standing for elections should develop its own agreement – 
developed specifically for elections for the Austrian Federation of Students – regarding 
ethical principles for E-Voting. This process should be set in motion in the semester 
before the semester of the election. 
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3.6.5.10 Training 
Along with the introduction of E-Voting, the use of the voting administration system was 
the second large new development for the Austrian Federation of Students Elections in 
2009. This system presented a fundamental paradigm change for the Electoral 
Commission; however, almost all technical voting administration processes were 
supported by the system. 
 
In order to design the use of the system to be as smooth as possible for the Electoral 
Commission, training for the Chairs and their deputies were organized at the same time 
as the final development steps. The following appointments were held: 
 
- 2/4/6 March 2009: Training sessions in Vienna, Salzburg and Graz; 
 
- 17 March 2009: PC Training at BRZ in Vienna; 
 
- 15/17 April 2009: PC training in Vienna, Salzburg and Graz; 
 
- 20/25 May 2009: PC training - Sub-election Commissions in Vienna, Salzburg 
and Graz. 
 
The training was carried out by means of training documents and by means of 
specially prepared training scenarios. The training sessions were made more difficult by 
the continuous and dynamic development of the voting administration system, which was 
necessary on the basis of the short project duration.  
 
Training electoral commissions. The training and the final operation of the election 
administration system were both faced with special challenges during the ongoing further 
development in terms of teaching end-users non-final elements and operational steps. In 
the future, the software and training documents should be available in advance. While the 
training of electoral commissions in two days at three locations approximately two weeks 
before the cut-off date can easily be organized, training sub-electoral commissions is only 
possible by spending a half-day, shortly before paper-based voting takes place, as the 
members of the sub-electoral commission are only appointed immediately prior to the 
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election. A problematic issue here is that the members of the sub-electoral commissions 
change very regularly throughout the election period. In order to combat this, several 
measures are recommended for the next election, such as a training program for tutors 
who could carry out fixed training on site at short notice. Furthermore, it would be 
possible to provide more online help and training videos.  
 
3.6.5.11 Parliamentary Inquiries  
During the project duration of the Austrian National Union of Student Elections in 2009, 
a number of parliamentary questions were asked and answered by the Federal Minister 
of Science, Research (and Economy). Table 7 summarizes these. Both the questions and 
the replies can be downloaded from the website of the Austrian Parliament. 
 
Query# Query asked by Date of Query Response# Date of Response 
0873/J71 Dr. Martin Graf et.al. 12 Feb 2009 882/AB 72 04.07.2009 
1149/J73 Musiol, et.al. 05 Mar 2009 1171/AB74 05.04.2009 
1167/J75 Grünewald, et.al. 09 Mar 2009 1262/AB76 05.08.2009 
2000/J77 Musiol, et.al. 07 May 2009 1968/AB78 07.06.2009 
2550/J79 Musiol, et.al. 24 June 2009  2562/AB80 08.24.2009  
Table 7: Overview of Parliamentary Questions  
                                                
71  http://www.parlament.gv.at/PG/DE/XXIV/J/J_00873/pmh.shtml 
72  http://www.parlament.gv.at/PG/DE/XXIV/AB/AB_00882/pmh.shtml  
73  http://www.parlament.gv.at/PG/DE/XXIV/J/J_01149/pmh.shtml  
74  http://www.parlament.gv.at/PG/DE/XXIV/AB/AB_01171/pmh.shtml 
75 http://www.parlament.gv.at/PG/DE/XXIV/J/J_01167/pmh.shtml 
76  http://www.parlament.gv.at/PG/DE/XXIV/AB/AB_01262/pmh.shtml 
77  http://www.parlament.gv.at/PG/DE/XXIV/J/J_02000/pmh.shtml  
78  http://www.parlament.gv.at/PG/DE/XXIV/AB/AB_01968/pmh.shtml  
79  http://www.parlament.gv.at/PG/DE/XXIV/J/J_02550/pmh.shtml  
80  http://www.parlament.gv.at/PG/DE/XXIV/AB/AB_02562/pmh.shtml 
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3.6.5.12 Data Protection Authority 
In the Data Protection Act of 2000, as a second official commission alongside the 
Austrian Data Protection Authority, the Data Protection Council was also set up. In the 
Data Protection Council, unlike with the Data Protection Authority, we are concerned 
with an authority providing consultation and advice. The Data Protection Authority 
remained skeptical concerning the (at that time planned) change to the Federation of 
Students election regulation and recorded that before E-Voting could be introduced, an 
extensive discussion on constitutional law was first required.81 
 
The Austrian Data Protection Authority carried out a preliminary check during the 
course of the project for the data applications E-Voting and the election administration, 
in which all the relevant legal data protection aspects were checked. Following a 
successful legal examination by the Data Protection Authority, a data registration number 
was issued both for the election administration as well as for the voting system. 
 
Data protection and E-Voting. Fulfilling the requirements of data protection laws 
presented a special challenge during the project. From a purely organizational point of 
view, for example, a total of 231 forms had to be filled out and approved by the Data 
Protection Authority. 
 
  
                                                
81  http://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20080714_OTS0138 
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3.6.5.13 Forming a sector-specific Personal Reference Number (‘bPK’) in 
collaboration with the Population Register and the Data Protection 
Authority 
Forming sector-specific personal reference numbers for the Austrian Federation of 
Students Elections was carried out in six steps.  
 
Step 1: After only partial advance checks were arranged from the organizations 
responsible up until the Austrian Federation of Students Elections 2009, which 
conformed to the Datenschutzgesetz 2000 (Data Protection Act 200), further provisions 
were made as part of this project. For this purpose, notification of two data applications 
was given by the Chairs of the respective Electoral Commissions at the universities: E-
Voting and the election administration system. Following successful approval by the 
Austrian Data Protection Authority, the systems could start operating from the start of 
April, and the electoral roll lists could be drawn up.  
 
Step 2: The basis for the lists of the voters’ data is found in data that is shared by the 
universities, which is governed in § 7 UniStEV 2004 and is managed by the  
BRZ. In this case, we are dealing with an information technology sharing system in 
accordance with § 50 DSG 2000. In order that the Chairs of the Electoral Commissions 
could draw up the lists of voters, the Chairs of Electoral Commissions first had to call up 
the information according to § 7a UniStEV 2004. This authorization to call up is further 
governed by § 8 para. 2 Educational Documents Act, where administrative processes are 
also standardized for data security. Once this first step has been completed, the data for 
the list of voters in accordance with § 18 HSWO 2005 are physically in the possession of 
the Chairs of the Election Commissions. 
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Step 3: The Chairs of the Election Commissions now commissioned the BRZ to draw up 
the electoral rolls, and in this case, they are a legal data protection service provider. A 
service provider agreement in conformance with DSG 2000 was concluded between each 
Chair and the BRZ for this purpose. 
 
Step 4: The Chair of the university in each case applied to the sourcePIN registration 
authorities, contained within the offices of the Data Protection Authority, to be issued 
with the initial sector-specific personal identifiers by the sourcePIN authorities.  
 
Step 5: Following the approval by the sourcePIN registration officials, the service 
provider for the Chair could transfer the data to the Central Register of Residents at the 
Department of the Interior, which then computed the Personal Reference Number (bPK) 
or identified non-matching events. 
 
Step 6: Some 10% of the sourcePIN data could not be issued with a sector-specific 
Personal Reference Number (bPK) by the Central Register of Residents (ZMR) on the 
grounds of different styles of writing, special symbols, input errors and similar data 
quality problems. The BRZ worked through these cases manually, and in this way, in a 
second run, 100% of the bPK allocations could be achieved. 
 
Future use and storage of sector-specific personal identifiers. The sector-specific 
personal identifiers created for the 2009 elections for the Austrian Federation of Students 
should also be capable of being used for future elections and applications in the Austrian 
universities sector. Storage in universities’ data network would be logical for this. To this 
end, changes in the legal basis are required. This could increase the spread of citizen card 
uses in universities. 
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3.6.5.14 “Distributed Denial of Service” Attack  
A separate section is dedicated to a so-called distributed Denial of Service attacks (dDoS). 
dDoS is a targeted attack on a service coordinated by many attackers, with the aim of 
generally overloading the system, so that it is no longer available to any possible users. 
A typical example would be for 100 people to agree with each other and to constantly 
ring up the emergency response number for assistance, whereby (almost) no genuine 
emergency telephone calls could be processed there any longer. The access becomes 
significantly more dangerous by being automated – for example, by using a computer that 
dials the emergency response number around the clock at very short intervals without any 
human involvement. 
 
At the election to the Austrian Federation of Students, there was an organized attack 
on the system. In the time before the elections82, an open appeal took place through ARGE 
DATEN to subject the E-Voting (and later the application) to an “availability test”, 
through which one should or could also permit a program50 likewise published by ARGE 
DATEN to run continuously throughout the entire duration of electronic voting. The 
appeal to use this including instructions for use was carried out amongst other things by 
e-mail dispatch and targeted positioning on the website. It should be noted that the voting 
system was not published until the start of electronic voting, for which purpose at this 
time neither the voting system nor the web address deposited were known. 
 
Evaluation by CERT.at83 
In the time before E-Voting commenced for the Austrian Federation of Students 
elections in 2009 a “test tool” written in JavaScript on the website of ARGE DATEN 
(‘BAD DATA’) was published for the availability of the E-Voting systems. CERT.at 
has taken a closer look at this and came to the following realizations:  
 
                                                
82 The ‘availability test’ tool used Javascript and was published on a website from ARGE 
DATEN 
83 CERT.at provided this expert opinion to the BMWF. 
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The Tool 
The tool was implemented inside a normal website using JavaScript. An input screen 
first prompted a page for testing for inputting URLs (once by HTML, and once as a 
picture), secondly suitable URLs for the E-Voting system were prescribed and third a 
waiting time between tests and ‘loading coefficient’ (number of downloads running 
in parallel)	had to be entered. The default had been re-set here for 500 msec and five, 
i.e., ten times per second the page (and the image) should be called up. 
After the script commenced, the corresponding number of (invisible) iFRAMES 
were inserted into the document, and these were regularly loaded again by means of 
a timer with the page to be tested. Parallel to this, the image given is also called up in 
the same frequency. 
A code in the main part of the page tries to compute an availability statistic from the 
log of downloads and displays this. 
The ARGE DATEN server is only involved in downloading the tool embedded in the 
HTML, and the actual test is completed entirely in the user’s browser. 
 
Evaluation of Potential for Danger 
At first glance, the tool is harmless: it does not attempt any of the classical attacks, 
such as SYN Flood, SQL Injection, XSS or even especially extensive queries. The 
problem arises simply from the scaling, that is, if a) the parameters are changed 
and/or b) many people use the tool in parallel. 
Even a short test showed that with corresponding parameterization (some 10 copies 
every 5 msec), a PC can fully use up the bandwidth of an ADSL or cable connection 
and can access more than 10 Mbit/s of data from specified web servers. If only one 
hundred Internet users with a good Internet connection followed the appeal from 
ARGE DATEN, the distributed use of this tool would have caused a bandwidth 
requirement in the region of gigabits for the operators of the E-Voting server.  
The attacks in Estonia in May 2007 were based on similar principles: Instructions 
and simple scripts were published in web forums, on even inexperienced users can 
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take part in ‘distributed Denial of Service’ attacks. The contribution of each 
individual person involved was insignificant, but the total of these gave rise to an 
attack that severely affected the country.  
CERT.at transmitted these doubts to ARGE DATEN on May 14, 2009. 
 
Measuring Availability or an Attack tool? 
It is legitimate to examine the availability of E-Voting systems and to want to 
measure how well E-Voting functions. The points listed below should be followed: 
-  Each active measurement influences the system to be measured, and in this way, 
it falsifies the result. (See, for example, Heisenberg uncertainties in physics.) 
Example: If we wanted to test the prompt achievability of the European 
emergency response number 112, then it would not make any sense to make 
several thousand test telephone calls per second, as this is a multiple of the 
normal load and in this way the genuine achievability is falsified. 
-  What load must the E-Voting system be designed for? Completely unrealistic 
numbers were named by ARGE DATEN for this.  
As with normal elections in polling stations, we must not assume that all voters 
wish to vote at the same time. In particular for the Austrian Federation of 
Students’ election, which lasts for a number of days, it would be absurd and 
unnecessarily expensive to design the voting booths and the E-Voting server in 
such a way that all voters (or even those entitled to vote) could vote at the same 
time. A brief rough estimate (1% of E-Voting of typically 250,000 voters, 
distributed throughout five days for 18 hours/day) on average shows around one 
voting transaction every two minutes. We cannot expect this will run so evenly; 
however, even with a correction factor of 100, the result still lies at less than one 
voting transaction per second. A test that carries out several queries per second 
thus dominates the legitimate load of the server very easily.  
-  Every safeguard of the server makes the measurement worthless. The classical 
defense mechanisms against ‘distributed Denial of Service’ attacks are based on 
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the fact that the server ignores troublesome queries or that these are already 
blocked before they reach the server.  
Publishing a ‘test tool’ with the proposal to use this over as extensive an area as 
possible is therefore not expedient if we were really trying to determine the correct 
availability information. 
Frequent use of the laptops would force the operator of the E-Voting system to 
perform one of the following: 
-  to completely unnecessarily overdesign the server and the connection in order to 
be able to reply to all queries, which would cause unnecessary costs; or  
-  to allocate the tests as dDoS attacks and to block these. 
Defense Mechanisms  
The task of securing a webserver against such attacks is one of the problem situations 
that operators of popular or controversial websites must solve regularly. The 
techniques for doing so are well-known, and there are appropriate books, software 
and also appliances available for purchase on the market. 
We are always concerned with differentiating legitimate users from problematic 
attacks and filtering out the lattermost as efficiently as possible. In the simplest case 
(which still would have proved sufficient here), we simply recognize whether the 
same client calls up the same URL at short intervals time and again repeatedly. 
Blocking clients is also problematic if in parallel to the disturbing action, access is 
also attempted from a legitimate user from the address. This could occur if, for 
example, one voter starts the “Test Tool” prior to attempting to vote or if many users 
access the election system from the same IP address by means of Network Address 
Translation (NAT).  
However, an analogy to normal paper-based voting is valid: If a polling station is 
besieged by demonstrators, legitimate voters must reckon with obstacles and delays.    
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Summary  
-  The tool was not suitable for making meaningful measurements of availability.  
- An extensive use of the tool would have a similar appearance to a “Denial-of-
Service” attack. 
- Publication of the tool must at least be classified as clumsy. 
- Defending against such an attack would have been possible without any problem 
provided that corresponding provisions had been made.  
- Interference with legitimate voters by users of the “test tool” cannot be 
completely excluded. 
- In general, we must emphasize that with the spread of broadband Internet 
connections, it becomes easier and easier to cause a high server load with simple 
tools.  
Figure 46: Evaluation of the dDOS attacks by CERT.at  
 
Although the attack could very easily be stopped by appropriate applications upstream 
of the voting system, of the web portal as well as through a special JavaScript84 and the 
availability and functionality of the electronic voting system was not endangered at any 
time, we must note here that such a type of planned attack on an election is unique and is 
also not known of in other countries. In any case, it is doubtful in a democratic political 
system that a legitimate election could be obstructed and prevented in Austria by these 
methods for the first time.  
                                                
84 The attack was based on pages called within invisible iFRAMES. The attack tool was 
ended immediately by means of a Javascript query of whether the page is called up in 
such an iFRAMES and where necessary the entire pages must be re-loaded outside the 
iFRAMES. This Javascript was specified at the start of the project by experts 
monitoring the project for the integration of the election software and was an integral 
constituent part of the certified election software solution. The Javascript was likewise 
integrated in the web portal when electronic voting started, whereby all the tools 
running up until that time for ‘availability checks’ were automatically ended. 
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Furthermore, it is dubious that a tool will be made available precisely for ARGE 
DATEN and will be accessed for use, with which one can also attack all other networks 
and data without any problems, except for the actual individual addresses of ARGE 
DATEN, (as for argedaten.at, .com or .net …), which were not accepted.85  
 
Risk of a dDoS attack. The risk of dDoS attacks is not specific to E-Voting. Handling 
of dDoS attacks was part of the security concept of the E-Voting system and led to 
corresponding organizational and technical security precautions being taken and being 
planned for in the project. A key security measure is that § 48 para. 4 HWSO 200586 and 
HSG § 39 para. 787 state that if E-Voting is declared invalid due to impaired security or 
functionality during the election, voters who submitted their vote through E-Voting must 
be permitted to submit their vote again at the polling station. 
 
                                                
85 The addresses cited were configured in the tool for “Check for Availability” as non-
legitimate addresses in the source code, whereby this list has been changed a number 
of times or was added to. After the tool was deactivated, this check was also removed 
including the addresses. 
86 § 48 para. 4 HWSO 2005: If the E-Voting has been declared invalid according to § 39 
para. 7 HSG 1998, then the voters who cast the vote by means of E-Voting are 
approved for submitting a new vote in the polling station. 
87 § 39 para. 7 HSG 1998: The Chair of the Electoral Commission must discontinue 
voting when the security or the functionality of the electronic components deposited 
with the Electoral Commissions is compromised during voting. In such cases, the 
Electoral Commission must decide on the validity of the electronic votes cast prior to 
termination with the involvement of a Confirmation Office in accordance with § 19 of 
the Signature Act. 
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3.6.6 Voting Phase 
3.6.6.1 E-Voting 
Punctually, on May 18, 2009 from 08:00, casting electronic votes was possible. This was 
released by the voting system. One minute later, the first legally valid vote had already 
been cast.  
 
On Monday morning, it was discovered that the abbreviations were missing on the 
ballot papers for all 21 University representative elections. Furthermore, it had been 
determined that one party had been described merely a ‘Young Student Initiative’ (Junge 
Studenteninitiative) instead of as the ‘Junge Europäische Studenten Initiative’ (Junge 
Europäische Studenteninitiative) on the ballot sheet for the University representative 
elections at the University of Vienna. The reason for the mistake with the abbreviation 
lies in a communication problem during the data export from the voting administration 
system to the election system.88 The lack of a part of the name of a party arose from a co-
ordination problem.89 
 
It is important to emphasize here that these were not mistakes from or  
by E-Voting, but they represent mistakes during the preparation of the elections, which 
arose for both the paper-based voting as well as for E-Voting; this point is often 
represented incorrectly. In this case, reference has in particular been made to the mistakes 
discovered in the electoral rolls of the University of Salzburg during paper-based voting.  
Casting electronic votes technically successfully ended on May 22, 2009 at 18:00. 
 
 
 
                                                
88 The electronic voting system merely portrays the data exported from the election 
administration system. 
89 The ‘Young European Student Initiative’ (Junge Europäische Studenteninitiative) was 
still incorrectly entered in the voting administration system at the time of data export. 
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Implementation of E-Voting. During preparations for paper-based and electronic 
elections in the future, a technical and organizational authorization process should be 
introduced in agreement with the relevant chairperson of the electoral commission at the 
corresponding university. 
 
3.6.6.2 Support 
Alongside the help setting on the homepage of the project, telephone support from BRZ 
was also available on a number that could be reached for a local rate. During the first test 
run, telephone and e-mail support was offered as part of the check on voting entitlement 
(right to vote). 
 
First- and second-level helpdesks with telephone-based and e-mail  
support were provided for the duration of the checks of voting entitlement and of 
electronic voting, and were staffed from Monday to Friday from 08:00 h until 17:00 h 
every day. 
 
Help and Assistance. Support by telephone and by e-mail was not in great demand. This 
allows us to conclude that the help and assistance for the electronic election was very well 
documented on the website and that the actual problems experienced clearly arose before 
this, for example, during installation of the card reader or through forgetting citizen card 
PIN codes. Mobile signatures could be a great help here, as the main problems (inputting 
PIN code / card readers) would no longer occur. 
 
3.6.6.3 International Election Monitors 
On May 18-19, 2009, the Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs, 
held an international workshop on the subject ‘E-Voting from overseas’ in English 
language. At the invitation of the Federal Minister Science, Research and Economy, those 
attending the workshop could observe the elections to the Austrian Federation of 
Students.  
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Observers realized there that monitoring E-Voting must follow new approaches, in 
particular, end-to-end monitoring of the entire process chain must be possible, since pure 
observation of the processes on the day of voting only permits minimal conclusions to be 
made.  
 
Monitoring Electronic Elections. It seems logical to make the essential E-Voting 
processes (i.e., generating the keys, sealing, voting system, counting votes) accessible to 
election monitors during future elections, following comprehensive instruction. 
 
In order to illustrate the status of the elections more transparently, and in particular the 
complexity of the Austrian Federation of Students elections, the level of detail of mapping 
on the election monitoring screen should not only be on a university by university basis, 
but it should also show the number of voters on a study course basis. The misleading 
presentation of numbers of votes obtained should be improved. The difference between a 
submitted vote and the voter’s profile should be depicted more clearly.  
 
3.6.6.4 Paper-based Voting 
Paper-based voting was carried out from May 26-28, 2009. For the first time, support 
from electronic voting administration system was available to the Sub-Electoral 
Commissions at all 21 universities. An online electoral list was used based on the electoral 
roll for the polling station. Precisely in the electronically supported record of the 
allocation between students and polling station, there were faults prior to commencement, 
which were swiftly discovered at the start of the first day of voting and were also resolved. 
For those polling stations, based on allocations according to the starting letter of surnames 
(as opposed to those based on student matriculation numbers or which had no additional 
division), students whose surnames started with a special symbol were not taken into 
consideration. For example, the following were defined:  
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- Those students with surnames starting from A to M were assigned to polling station 1; 
 
- Those students with surnames starting from N to Z were assigned to polling station 2.  
For example, there was no definition which polling station “Mr. Franz Ísak” or Ms. 
“Marta Ásdís” were to be allocated. This could be swiftly resolved through an 
additional filter. 
 
During elections at the University of Salzburg, during paper-based voting, it was 
discovered that the electoral roll was incorrect. The cause for this can be derived from an 
operational error of the voting administration systems.  
 
Improvements to the election administration system for support at the polling 
station. A process for evaluation and continual technical and organizational improvement 
of the election administration was launched in the form of workshops to support the 
activities of the chairs of Electoral Commissions and members of the sub-electoral 
commissions. Missing features, improvements – above all in usability – as well as faults 
were recorded and should be transformed for the next elections to the Austrian Federation 
of Students. An online platform is recommended in order to achieve the best transparency 
possible for the chairs of electoral commissions at the universities and agree on the 
requirements. Requested changes as well as jointly worked out realizations are listed in 
the form of open project management.  
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3.6.7 Post-voting Phase 
The post-voting phase commenced with counting of paper-based and electronic votes on 
May 28, 2009 and ended with the destruction of the data. 
 
3.6.7.1 Counting the Votes 
Counting the paper-based votes had already started at the universities once the last of 
their own polling stations was closed. Counting electronic votes was carried out in public 
in the presence of the Electoral Commission in the offices of the Austrian Federation of 
Students of A-SIT as well as of the operational team of the BRZ from 17:00 on the last 
day of voting. After completing comprehensive security and documentation processes, 
the electronic results were available 1.5 hours later in the voting administration system. 
For individual Electoral Commissions at smaller universities, this waiting time was too 
long, and they postponed the announcement of the final result until the next day. A further 
delay arose from results of the electronic vote not being accessible at the respective 
universities until the results of the paper-based votes for the Electoral Commissions had 
been input. In particular, this presented a problem because the media wanted to have the 
results immediately. The time is however prescribed by § 46 para. 8 in combination with 
§ 32 para. 2 HSWO 2005.  
 
Availability of results. In order to reduce pressure from the media, it makes sense to 
legally permit counting the electronic vote as early as during the course of the afternoon 
in the electoral rules. A news blackout on the results would then need to be imposed for 
those universities whose polling stations have not yet closed. Results of the electronic 
vote could – after examining the law basis – also be made available on an individual basis, 
since this was very much in demand from the media. 
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3.6.7.2 Destroying Voting System Data  
The data to be destroyed is recorded in the Austrian Federation of Students Election 
Ordinance 2005 in the following paragraphs: 
 
- § 69 HSWO 2005: E-Voting data and software must be archived three weeks after 
the last day of voting and handed over to the Chair of the Electoral Commission for 
the Austrian Federation of Students. This person must store the data in a suitable form 
for five years in accordance with § 53 para. 4 in the case of an appeal in accordance 
with §§ 58 or 59 at least up until the end of the final appeal process. In particular, 
voting secrecy must be guaranteed. 
 
- § 53 para. 4 HSWO 2005: The Electoral Commission of the Austrian Federation of 
Students and Electoral Commissions at the universities must store election files in an 
ordered and clear form for a period of five years and ballot sheets or ballot papers for 
a period of two years. The act of voting for the Electoral Commission at the Austrian 
Federation of Students includes acts of voting concerning the voting community and 
the list associations standing for election. 
 
From, this it was ascertained that with an electronic voting system, the electronic ballot 
sheets, source code and the voting software code compiled for must be stored. The 
electronic ballot sheets are those data that are the outcome of the counting process. In this 
case, the electronic ballot sheets must be handled similarly to ballot papers in paper-based 
voting59, during which time the secrecy of the ballot must not endangered through 
ownership. The electronic ballot sheet contains no form of reference to voters.  
 
All other electronic voting system data must be destroyed within three weeks of the 
last day of voting as a consequence of the legal obligation to deletion under data 
protection. In particular, this includes the electronic ballot boxes.  
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Although one could consider a virtual destruction as sufficient by repeatedly 
overwriting the data with random values, a conscious decision was made on grounds of 
security and transparency for a physical and thermal destruction of all media. Therefore, 
all of the hard discs from the election servers and laptops (in particular, from the mixing 
laptops) were physically destroyed in an audited process by the company Reisswolf and 
were subsequently melted down. All media were uniquely marked during the setup and 
were transported in a sealed safety container and were for their identity and their 
completeness during the course of destruction. 
 
 
Figure 47: Physical Destruction of Data  
 
Two of the four smartcards with the interrupted private voting key were likewise 
destroyed with auditing following the data destruction90. The two other smartcards were 
destroyed by other member of the Federal Electoral Commission. 
                                                
90 Care must be taken that three of the four smartcards are required to de-code the 
electronic ballot boxes as well as the passwords with which the smart cards have been 
secured (locking the card following three incorrect attempts to input the code). Both 
the knowledge as well as the property has been distributed to members of the Federal 
Electoral Commission. The Federal Electoral Commission in turn has no unmonitored 
physical access to the electronic ballot box as opposed to with the paper-based 
election, in which the Electoral (Sub-)Commission in the respective university opens 
the ballot box when counting the votes with the exclusion of the public and the media 
and counts them. 
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Destruction of data. Destruction of data should take place in public similarly to counting 
the electronic votes. To this end, the corresponding spatial and organizational framework 
conditions should be created. This includes, for example, accessibility of the physical data 
destruction facility, appropriate moderation and presentation to a large number of people, 
transferring a large number of people from one location to another and much more. Video 
transmission could be considered.  
 
3.6.7.3 Arbitration Process and Monitoring Commission  
In the period from March 3 to May 4, 2009, there was a conciliation process between one 
of the blind students concerned and the BMWF. This had shown that a group of blind 
people could possibly be excluded. These circumstances were discussed in a constructive 
atmosphere, and agreements were reached. Unfortunately, on legal grounds, information 
for the use of certain Screen readers could not be published in the intended manner on the 
web portal www.oeh-wahl.gv.at. One possibility to improve these circumstances was 
accepted as part of the evaluation consultation.  
 
The number of students with disabilities who used the opportunity to cast their vote 
electronically is not known. However, this resulted in a telephone call to a blind student 
during the election, who evaluated successfully casting their vote very favorably. 
 
On July 21, 2009, a meeting took place at the Federal Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs 
and Consumer Protection of the independent Monitoring Commission, in which the E-
Voting Project and the legal fundamentals at that time with regard to universal 
accessibility for casting votes conventionally at Austrian Federation of Students votes 
was discussed. 
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On one hand, the E-Voting Project and the efforts connected to this were praised 
without exception; on the other hand, errors with the legal fundamentals of paper-based 
voting at that time were identified. Therefore, in the Monitoring Commission’s opinion, 
§ 37 para. 4 HSWO 2005 must be adjusted to the Equality Act. In particular, the 
introduction of voting templates was proposed, since they have also been in use for the 
elections to the Austrian Parliament since 1992.  
 
On August 18, 2009, arbitration negotiations took place in Klagenfurt between a blind 
student and BMWF, the content of which was likewise the introduction of voting 
templates. The complainant was satisfied with the outcome of the negotiations on grounds 
of the approval by representatives of the Federal Ministry to recommend to the Federal 
Minister the realization of the best possible legitimate use of voting templates before the 
coming elections in consultation with Chairs of the Electoral Commissions, disability 
speakers at the universities and also in direct collaboration with disability associations. 
  
Integrating people with disabilities. People with disabilities were always a target group 
of the project, as electronic forms of voting precisely accommodate this group of people. 
As this advantage of E-Voting was not actively communicated, fears increased that these 
voters could be excluded by this new technology. In the end, it became clear that much 
can be learned from E-Voting, particularly in the non-electronic field. However, for the 
future, it will be necessary to integrate this group even more closely into the 
communication channels from the start of the project. 
 
Introducing ballot papers suitable for those with disabilities for paper-based voting is 
also an important suggestion to come from this project. Corresponding preliminary work 
has already been carried out, and such ballots can be implemented in a legally compliant 
manner during the next elections to the Austrian Federation of Students. 
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3.6.8 Presentation of the Evaluation Report 
In the beginning of 2010, a Rochade took place within the executive branch when the seat 
of the Minister of Science and Research became vacant. Johannes Hahn had become the 
successor of Benita Ferrero Waldner as the Austrian member of the European 
Commission and was followed by Beatrix Karl. The evaluation report was released on 
April 2, 2010, and she announced in an interview with the newspaper Der Standard not 
to continue the use of E-Voting in the upcoming federation of Student elections in 2011 
(2010). While it was expected that this would end the discussions around E-Voting, this 
was not the case. Instead, it provided new impetus to the debate.  
 
The discussions around E-Voting, in particular the doubts about the legality of its 
implementation, led to some 20 appeals against the election results of the 2009 Federation 
of Students’ elections as well as the legal basis as established in the Federation of 
Students’ law, and in its corresponding ordinance for the conduct of the elections. The 
Austrian Constitutional Court bundled several of the appeals and rejected most of them 
for formal reasons. In December 2011, however, after a public hearing, the court came 
forward with several decisions with regards to E-Voting, out of which most were rejected. 
The constitutional court came to the conclusion that the regulations with regards to E-
Voting in the Federation of Students’s law was in line with the constitution; however, the 
ordinance, which provided the essential organizational framework, was considered to be 
not in line with the law because it lacked legal determination. The main problem was due 
to the lack of possibility for the electoral commission to fully take account for the conduct 
of the electronic part of the election without the help of a third party, including that 
advance elections (like in the case of the E-Voting for the student elections) need to be 
regulated in the law. This decision was also discussed controversially in literature (see 
amongst others, Poier [2013], Oswald [2016], Balthasar and Prosser [2012], Goby and 
Weichsel [2012]). Nevertheless, Parycek et al. (2017) propose a synthesis of requirements 
for E-Voting based on decisions of the constitutional court. One of the proposed points, 
verifiability, is also discussed in a subsequent chapter. 
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3.6.9 Summary 
The year-long discussions and preparations for a first attempt to use Internet voting for a 
legally binding election had its culmination in the effort around the Federation of 
Students’ elections. At the time, it was one of the most ambitious E-Government projects 
of the year in 2009. The objective here was to supplement the paper-based voting process 
used up until now with an electronic voting channel and therefore to create new 
possibilities for casting votes. 
 
It has been demonstrated that in the legal context, statutory legal specifications were 
supplemented by numerous implementation regulations in the Federation of Students’ 
ordinance.  
 
A very high level of security was also provided in the area of technical infrastructure 
through the citizen card. In particular, the highest level of data protection could also be 
guaranteed with the use of sector-specific Personal Reference Numbers. 
 
In the area of socio-political discussion, it was shown that many contents of dialogues 
for introducing remote voting had to be carried out for the first time. This was surprising 
because the year before votes could be cast by postal vote in elections to the Austrian 
Parliament. The intense preoccupation of parties campaigning for the election in principle 
had no positive influence on the intrinsic perception of the institution of the Austrian 
National Federation of Students. 
 
With the realization of components of Internet voting, significance was placed on 
state-of-the-art technology, and therefore comprehensive measures for universal 
accessibility were put in place as well as a sample application for familiarization purposes 
with the voting process. Importance was placed on the highest level of security when 
realizing the voting process itself – both in identification using citizen cards as well as in 
operating failsafe computer data centers at two separate locations. The continuous casting 
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of votes was overseen using the vote monitoring function, and operation was also 
monitored with cameras. For the first time, the introduction of a voting administration 
system supported the work of the Electoral Commission throughout the course of the 
entire election process. 
 
The implementation of the project can be illustrated in three phases. In the pre-voting 
phase, numerous activities were implemented in order to facilitate this use. An open 
discussion was held in December 2008 in the context of a specialist conference and an 
accompanying tour including conversations with stakeholders at all university locations. 
The software used was certified by A-SIT to increase transparency, and a review of this 
evaluation report and the source code was facilitated for members of the Electoral 
Commission. Before the elections, numerous training sessions were held in order to 
familiarize the Electoral Commission with handing the system. One challenge was to 
issue the Electoral Commission with sector-specific personal identifiers for the first time, 
which was combined with the initial regulation of data protection for the voting system.  
 
The project studi.gv.at was planned at the same time as a measure to increase 
penetration of citizen cards at universities. Comprehensive information in the form of 
flyers and posters were circulated amongst students, and public consultation meetings 
were held. At the beginning, however, the number of authorized students only developed 
slowly, which above all could be derived from the lack of applications available. 
Authorization only became more appealing as E-Voting drew closer and closer. 
 
The pre-voting phase was characterized by intensive discourse as well. Along with 
numerous podium discussions, information campaigns using flyers and even movie spots 
placed by the Austrian National Federation of Students, there were also numerous 
parliamentary questions to be answered from the BMWF. Likewise, a swift technical 
defense against dDoS attacks proved effective; however, it led to many discussions.  
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The voting phase itself consisted of electronic voting and paper voting. The former 
was possible in the context of casting votes brought forward to the earlier dates of May 
18-22, 2009 and which ran without any technical problems. 2,161 students, or almost one 
percent, used the opportunity to cast their vote(s) electronically. The biggest problem was 
that students forgot their PIN Code associated with their citizen card. Incorrect ballot 
papers (with abbreviations missing or the wrong name of a faction campaigning in the 
elections), problems caused through incorrect inputting and lack of communication can 
be prevented in future by introducing improved administrative processes. The voting 
administration system proved itself in the development of paper voting, even though the 
level of training provided for the Electoral Sub-Committees could be improved. 
 
In the post-voting phase, counting votes and destruction of data was completed; this 
was necessary in accordance with the Data Protection Act. Consideration should be given 
here to time-based components when publishing the results of future elections, as this is 
of very great interest to the media. The discussions regarding E-Voting did not loosen 
either once the results were published, but they were kept alive through a large number 
of appeals and complaints to the Constitutional Court. 
 
Despite all efforts, the areas of transparency and accountability did not receive enough 
attention due to a lack of public confidence in the election technology and the election 
itself. This subsequently led to the discontinuation of the pilot and also a number of 
appeals against the election results leading to the Constitutional Court lifting of the 
election result, which showed that, most importantly, the implementation of the law’s 
principles into an ordinance needs to include technical detail (Goby and Weichsel, 2012).  
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3.7 Overview of the Experience with Internet Voting in Austria 
To this date, the efforts to conduct Internet voting for the Austrian Federation of Students’ 
elections in 2009 has been the only effort aiming for a legally-binding result, as was 
described in the previous chapter. Clearly, the experiences with implementing such new 
election technologies have shown that what once seemed a technical problem became 
much more. At the beginning, the technical solutions for the main problem of verifying 
the eligibility of voters and maintaining secrecy was at the center of attention. Later, more 
sophisticated algorithms were developed, and functionalities like quota in election 
commissions were added. However, the experiences showed that accurate legal 
regulations are needed, which not only show the interaction with the constitutional legal 
texts but also on how to give accountability to a remote electronic voting channel through 
legal means. International standards were a first step, but regulations based on actual 
experience are necessary to show how remote electronic voting channels can be realized 
and where it is needed in order to avoid problems identified in pilot implementations. 
Furthermore, this practical knowledge also shows that sophisticated algorithms are not 
always the key to success. Rather, several key implementations make use of very basic 
technical means to realize the tasks given by law.  
 
One should not forget about the voters. They not only need to use such systems but 
also need to understand the processes in order to build their trust.  
 
It can be ascertained that early efforts testing Internet voting in Austria were 
uncoordinated and lacked a more general strategy. Early on, it was clear that the 
Federation of Students’ election would play an important role.  
 
As such, the Austrian premiere of a first implementation of a remote electronic voting 
channel in a legally binding election showed successfully how a participation via the 
Internet is possible in a political decision-making process. The pilot projects offered 
experiences from which to learn. This especially includes the adaptation of paper election 
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processes to the requirements of processing electronic votes as well as the intensive public 
discussion. The public discourse had to be led and was very important to the topic of  
E-Voting as well as to the discussion of remote voting channels in Austria in general. It 
also shows that an electoral context with a history of heated debates about electoral 
reforms did not turn out to be the best place for introducing new voting technologies. It 
has framed the debate about electronic voting in Austria (Wenda, 2016) and provided 
important technical, organizational, political and legal lessons (Prosser and Krimmer, 
2004a). Table 8 provides an overview of the E-Voting implementations in Austria.  
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Table 8: Internet Voting Implementations in Austria 
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4 Identification of Building Blocks 
When introducing information and communication technology to any given electoral 
process, very similar decisions need to be made. Based on the analysis of the experiences 
in the previous chapters, we explored and identified decision modules or building blocks 
that could be used when developing an electronic electoral process. We identified twelve 
important areas when designing, building and finally deploying a remote electronic 
voting channel via the Internet:  
 
1. Deciding on the form of electronic voting used; 
2. Adapting the legal basis; 
3.  Selecting the technical means to solve the main paradox of unequivocally 
identifying the eligible voter;  
4. Ensuring the secrecy of the vote;  
5. Observing, assessing and verifying all steps of the electoral process; 
6. Giving the election commission control over the process; and  
7. Evaluating that the software works as required;  
8. Enabling overall transparency for the process; 
9. Designing a fair ballot sheet;  
10. Protecting private data; 
11. Providing for the organizational context;  
12. Conducting a feasibility study to determine all of these steps ahead of a first 
implementation. 
 
Figure 48 gives an overview of these topics, and in the following, these building 
blocks are described in more detail.  
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Figure 48: Building Blocks of Internet Voting 
 
In this chapter, we present these twelve building blocks that seem important for the 
conduct of Internet voting in more detail.  
 
4.1 Forms of Voting Technology 
The question about which means are actually used to count, transmit or cast votes is 
crucial for the determination of the process and the entire election.  
 
(1) Stand-alone voting machines. Elections can be supported by electronic means 
through stand-alone voting machines that store the casted votes locally and count and 
transmit the results at the end of the election. However, these machines can be designed 
in very different ways. They can consist of a computer limited by software to that 
particular use. The machines can also utilize push-button machinery or touchscreens. 
There are also voice-activated machines for visually-impaired voters, but naming all 
possible designs is not the objective of this study. Another option with stand-alone voting 
machines are stand-alone machines that have no connection to other machines, which 
would require the election results to be summed up by election officials.  
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(2) Internet elections are possible in many ways and have several subgroups and 
different names, such as remote E-Voting or mobile voting. The important aspect of this 
voting method is that the vote must be able to be casted from any laptop, tablet or mobile 
phone, and the eligibility to vote must also be verified via an online channel. Internet 
voting is the electronic equivalent of postal voting. Next to these four clear election forms, 
there are two additional election processes that cannot be accounted to one group alone.  
 
(3) Ballot scanning is one of such mixed forms, as the system still uses paper ballots that 
are scanned and accounted for electronically. The scanning process is usually conducted 
in one of two forms. First, a central counting center is erected, where the ballots are 
transported and counted. Second, a scanner is installed above every ballot box; when a 
voter introduces the vote, the scanner scans the ballot directly and transmits the result to 
a central counting position. 
 
Scanning is usually a suitable technology to accustom voters and election officials to 
an electronic back-end system, since important parts of the election process are now 
conducted electronically, but voters do not have to get used to changes within their 
election habits. 
 
The last possibility is a mixed form between remote and presence voting. (4) Locally 
operated Internet voting systems voting uses electronic election machinery, but the 
machinery is, in this case, not placed in ballot stations but in libraries, schools or other 
public buildings. The environment is not controlled in this situation.  
 
The following table from (OSCE/ODIHR, 2013) summarizes these forms in the 
following overview. This table exemplifies the different possibilities within an election 
design.  
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 Place of  
 voting 
Medium 
Used in a Controlled 
Environment 
Used in an 
Uncontrolled 
Environment 
Used in Mixed 
Environments 
Voting with 
paper ballots 
Voting with paper 
ballots in polling 
stations 
Postal voting Mobile ballot box 
voting 
Voting with 
electronic means 
(1) Electronic voting 
systems; 
(4) Locally operated 
Internet voting 
(2) Internet voting Hybrid electronic 
voting solutions:  
Systems using 
Internet voting 
technology 
Paper ballots 
and electronic 
counting 
(3) Ballot scanner   Centrally-counted 
postal votes using 
ballot scanners 
Table 9: Overview of Different Possible Uses of Voting Technologies 
 
4.2 Legal Basis 
When designing the legal basis for electronic voting, among the first questions is whether 
or not it is in line with international commitments. Hence, most publications on national 
legislation regarding remote electronic voting concentrated on whether it is in line with 
the constitutional requirements of the respective country (Ziska, 2004, Karpen, 2005). 
Also, the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe commissioned a study 
(Grabenwarter, 2004a, Grabenwarter, 2004b) that found general compatibility.  
 
On the international level, the Council of Europe also passed the only legal document 
– though not legally binding – with a recommendation on how electronic voting systems 
should be designed (Council of Europe, 2004). At the third meeting to review the 
recommendation, it was amended by two documents to reflect recent developments in 
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transparency and certification (Council of Europe, 2011a, Council of Europe, 2011b). In 
2017, an updated version of the recommendation was released. The recommendations 
have been updated and condensed, and the overall number of recommendations have been 
reduced. Furthermore, the guidelines were matched to relevant recommendations, and 
thereby the scope of the document was expanded. Also, guidelines can be more easily 
amended and changed compared to the actual recommendation.  
 
4.3 Identification 
The identification of voters is an essential part of the whole voting process, and it is 
closely linked to the available online identity management infrastructure in the country 
where the election is being conducted. Early on, this was identified as one of the core 
components of developing voting technology solutions (Krimmer, 2002). Several forms 
of identification exist.  
 
The first form of identification is to use a (1) token, which can be designed in different 
ways. The token usually provides a one-time code to the voter. Reusable token solutions 
are also easily possible if the distribution and disposal process ensure absolute anonymity. 
One-time solutions are usually based on a random number. These codes usually have 
between five and 15 alphanumeric figures, which are usually produced in secure printing 
center and then protected by a scratch field. This prevents the number from being seen by 
all third parties. The scratch field as well as the printer need to comply with several 
security requirements for the protection of the number. In addition, after the field has been 
scratched, security must be ensured, which means that a transition of the number should 
be made impossible. A transition is only not possible if the code is provided to the voter 
immediately before the vote is cast.  
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The identity of the voter is safe if the token is disposed or destroyed immediately after 
the successful casting of the vote. The token solution does not automatically provide 
secrecy. Any of the solutions provided in this chapter can be matched with any form of 
anonymization. 
 
Transaction numbers have various advantages. As a rather simple system, they require 
relatively small administrative capacities and are easy to handle for the voter. 
 
The second and simplest way of identification is via the combination of a (2) user name 
and password. Every voter gets an individual user name and password, but the weakness 
of this simplistic approach is that secrets could be shared and, therefore, become known 
to unauthorized third parties.  
 
A third and more permanent version is to use a signature or (3) identity cards. These 
chip cards require a card reader to enable the identification of individual voters. Identity 
cards can and should be equipped with digital signature functionality. This method is 
among the most secure ways of personal identification and is more reliable than any other 
currently available system. The most prominent issues of the procedure are the need for 
a strong, reliable software system and problems with the handling of cards. The use of 
passwords, card readers, different software front-end interfaces and digital signatures can 
be challenging for the inexperienced user. 
 
Some countries have equipped their citizens with such cards (Maaten, 2004), and in 
Austria, the smart cards are linked to the existing population registers (Leitold et al., 
2002). For others, such solutions were (i) too costly, (ii) delayed due to data protection 
concerns (Reichl et al., 2005) or (iii) delayed for a long time due to lack of national 
certification providers (Schweizer Bundesrat, 2007). In such cases, one-time passwords 
(transaction authorization numbers – TANs) were used, which resulted in high costs for 
printing and distribution of voting cards for each election (Braun, 2004). However, the 
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increased level of security came at the price of usability. While TANs are easily used by 
voters, smart cards can require high level of transaction costs to issue them as well as 
prove a high barrier to participation, which is hard to overcome.  
 
For the successful conduction of any election, it is essential to only allow voting by 
persons who fulfill the eligibility criteria. It is also of paramount importance that the 
participating person is really the person who he or she claims to be.  
 
4.4 Vote Secrecy and Anonymity 
Ensuring the freedom of the voter to cast a ballot of his/her choice requires that it remain 
impossible to link a voter and his/her vote – both at the time of casting the vote as well 
as in the future. Many algorithms have been proposed in the past 30 years, all of which 
hide either the vote or the voter by cryptographic and/or organizational means. For an 
overview of different available algorithms, see Paulsen (2011) and Sampigethaya and 
Poovendran (2006).  
 
However, most of this research does not include real-world elections. This can be 
assumed to be the reason why most algorithms used in practice are of less sophisticated 
nature than those considered state-of-the-art in research. 
 
The importance of the anonymization process is based on the difficulty of protecting 
electronic data in the long term. Depending on the identification method, the different 
phases of the election process may also be of importance. In the case of transaction 
numbers, for example, the rest of the paper should also be anonymous. If personalized, 
which might be helpful for a smooth organization, the personalization should only be 
printed or written on the paper after the protective layer of the scratch field protects the 
code below. This aspect is particularly linked to the randomized token system described 
below, as it can be designed in a very similar manner. 
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The first approach is to hand out randomized (1) tokens that the voters use to interact 
with the machines. The tokens should be handed out immediately before the election to 
prevent a third party from seeing the particular number and, thus, identifying the vote 
within the computer system. The tokens should also be collected again directly after the 
ballot is cast due to the same reasons.  
 
Another approach would consist of a hardware-based solution. In the case of (2) stand-
alone voting machines, this procedure is possible. The voter either does not enter 
credentials at all, or the source code could provide a separation within the data storage 
mechanism. In this manner, it is not possible to identify an individual vote without having 
the code and having access to both data storages. The approach of not entering credentials 
at all is a very simple solution, but it requires that an external solution is the organization 
of the election process itself. A voter must not be able to vote multiple times while at the 
station.  
 
The currently most promising software-based solution is the (3) cryptographic solution. 
Many different forms of cryptographic solutions are possible using hardware modules, 
one of which is also used in the Estonian Internet elections—that is, the double-envelop 
method. The concept is simple but particularly promising because it imitates the postal 
voting process. One envelope with the identification contains another envelope that is 
anonymous. This anonymous envelope contains the vote and is then stored in a database 
with only this information. More information on how to treat the data in the long term 
can be found in the data protection decision module. Other proposals include using blind 
signatures, such as proposed in Kofler et al. (2003).  
 
The most successful form of supporting free vote casting is allowing the voter to cast 
a vote more than once while ensuring that only the last vote counts (Volkamer and 
Grimm, 2006). However, this requires changing legal regulations, which, for example, in 
the Austrian case described in the previous chapter, was not possible.  
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4.5 Observation and Verifiability 
In the municipal elections on May 7, 1989, the former German Democratic Republic 
(GDR) organized for the last time. The electoral system in use did not follow full 
democratic principles, but it was rather an administrative process where the goal of a 
polling stations election administration was to have the highest possible voter turnout and 
the highest approval rating for the unified party list. Actually, the voters also had no real 
choice: they could only take the ballot paper and put it into the ballot box, but there was 
only one way to make a real choice by invalidating all candidates on the ballot paper. As 
an example, civil society wanted to show that they were not satisfied with the ruling party 
by invalidating as many ballot papers as possible. Also, the voters were allowed to stay 
in the polling station to conduct a domestic election observation activity. Therefore, they 
stayed and counted the number of invalidated votes. The election authorities, however, 
did not report the correct number of invalidated votes (they reported rather ameliorated 
numbers), and the voters in turn demonstrated a month later in what was known as the 
election fraud demonstrations. These demonstrations proved how corrupt the system was.  
 
This experience was a leading motive when the German Constitutional Court had to 
assess the appeal of a citizen against the 2005 Bundestag elections finally in March of 
2009. Its ruling was a bit surprising but was of revolutionary nature: it ruled that voting 
machines – without the possibility for voters to count the votes without prior knowledge 
(“laymen”) – were to be considered unconstitutional (and thereby demanded that voter-
verifiable paper audit trails would have to be introduced) and that ended the story of E-
Voting in Germany (Federal Constitutional Court, 2009). 
 
Verifiability. Elections are generally considered to be one of the essential elements of 
modern-day democracy in order to establish “the rule by the people.” The procedures by 
which elections are held have evolved considerably over time and differ depending 
largely on the context in which they take place and the available technology. Over time, 
many different methods have been used, including casting votes by shouting, a show of 
hands, swords, stones, wax tablets, etc. Today, the predominant form of casting votes 
worldwide in order to participate in elections is to fill out a paper ballot (see also Krimmer 
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[2012]). Internationally accepted norms depicting the voting process such as the Int. 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (United Nations, 1966) or the Copenhagen 
Document (OSCE, 1990) are used to establish what constitutes a democratic election. 
While these do not mention a preference for a particular form of casting a vote, it is clear 
that they have been developed and written with the paper-based voting process in mind.  
 
The evolution of more-sophisticated voting technology than the paper ballot originated 
in the mid-19th century. This period saw the discussion of mechanical vote-casting 
devices, which was followed by proposals for electrified voting machines for parliaments. 
The U.S. can be considered the forerunner in adopting various forms of mechanical and 
electr(on)ic vote-casting and counting devices, including pull-lever machines, punch-card 
systems, direct-recording E-Voting machines or ballot scanners (Jones, 2003). Their 
adoption flourished due to the decentralized nature of the U.S. election administration 
and their decision-making processes (Harris, 1934). 
 
All of these voting technologies have one inherent problem in common: The process 
from casting votes to counting votes is pretty much unobservable, due to the need to keep 
the voters’ choices secret as well as the problem that one cannot touch bits and bytes 
(Lenarčič, 2010). Despite some critical voices (Saltman, 1975, 1988), these technologies 
were nevertheless considered safe for a long time.  
 
The U.S. presidential elections of 2000, particularly in the state of Florida, changed 
this picture considerably. In the close presidential race between George W. Bush and Al 
Gore, the high failure rate of punch-card systems combined with the lack of a robust legal 
framework led to problems in trying to determine the “original voter intent” and a delayed 
determination of the election’s outcome. Not only did this lead to a decline in the public’s 
confidence in voting technology but also in the validity of calling the U.S. the “greatest 
democracy on Earth.” Contrary to expectations, the U.S. invested even more heavily in 
voting technology, believing that the source of the problem was the choice of the wrong 
voting technology instead of a complete overhaul of the way the election administration, 
legal framework and voting technology interact. (Saltman, 2006) 
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This debacle, however, provided impetus to cryptographic researchers who since the 
early 1980s had been trying to realize fully E-Voting processes (Chaum, 1981, 1982). 
With computer systems, the sharing of power is difficult to implement. Early on, 
proposals included functionalities to allow for the public to check whether the election 
administration reported the results honestly and did not manipulate the elections. In 
paper-based elections, this can be verified by recounting the ballots. In e-elections, 
recounting the ballots does not necessarily result in greater confidence in the results as 
long as the system being utilized for the count does not use a programming system that is 
different from the original tool. Hence, there was a need for a different method to verify 
the election administrators and their honest reporting of election results. Subsequently, 
the concept of verification by individual voters and the general public was born (Benaloh, 
1987, Schoenmakers, 1999, 1998).  
 
As one of the first examples, the OSCE/ODIHR took up this development and defined 
“verifiability on an individual basis [… where] voters are provided with possibilities to 
verify that their vote was cast as intended, stored as cast, and (ideally) counted as 
recorded.” On a universal (public) level, a voting technology with verifiability 
“provide[s] means for an independent third party to establish that the result of an election 
was reported honestly and without manipulation through either manual or mathematical 
checks” (OSCE/ODIHR, 2013). 
 
With the transformation of transactions in the private and public sector through the 
general availability of the Internet in the 1990s, it seemed only a matter of time until 
elections would also be held via the Internet. A real race had begun to see which country 
would be the first to offer Internet voting (I-voting) to all of its voters (Kubicek et al., 
2002). Despite promising initial efforts in the U.S. (Gibson, 2001) and Germany (Otten, 
2001), it was Estonia that succeeded with a rather simple system in 2005 (Drechsler and 
Madise, 2004, Madise and Martens, 2006). However, only a small number of countries 
followed suit to offer I-voting for first-order elections, including the Netherlands, France, 
Switzerland and Norway (Krimmer and Kripp, 2009). Furthermore, most of the 
algorithms used were rather simplistic in their design and did not offer any possibility for 
voters to verify their votes (Krimmer et al., 2007).  
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The 2009 verdict of the German Constitutional Court changed the public view on E-
Voting machines when the court decided that it must be possible for voters to ascertain 
for themselves without “prior knowledge” that election results had been reported honestly 
and that their votes had been entered in the results (Federal and Constitutional Court, 
2009). This led the project managers of the Norwegian I-voting project to look for 
solutions to this problem, and during their procurement process, a verifiable I-voting 
protocol was proposed by researchers from Estonia (Ansper et al., 2009). The Norwegian 
elections in 2011 can be considered the first use of verifiability in Europe (OSCE/ODIHR, 
2012).  
 
In the same year as the first use of verifiability, an Estonian student managed to 
program a Trojan horse that would cast a different vote than the one intended by the voter 
in the 2011 Riigikogu elections. He consequently filed a complaint, which was eventually 
turned down by the Estonian Constitutional Court (Vinkel, 2012). This incident led to an 
electoral reform process where it was decided to introduce individual verifiability for 
upcoming elections where I-voting is offered (Vinkel, 2012). It was first used in the 
October 20, 2013 municipal elections in Estonia. Furthermore, Switzerland also 
announced the introduction of verifiability as a requirement for elections with full I-
voting (Schweizer Bundesrat, 2013). 
 
As such, some questions can be put forward with regards to verifiability. Thinking 
along the lines of the above regarding verifiability, some questions come into mind that 
can guide our future investigations on the topic:  
 
1. What are the aims provided in the academic (mainly technical) literature for 
introducing the concept of ‘verifiability’ to existing election processes, including 
I-voting, and what purported use do the decision makers in practice plan to gain 
from introducing this concept? 
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2. How does verifiability actually work in practice, and what would a generic process 
model for individual and universal verifiability look like? 
 
3. Does verifiability as a concept also have applicability for paper-based elections, 
i.e., without Internet voting?  
 
On the basis of the existing academic literature, one can put forth the following 
working hypotheses: 
 
1. Verifiability is a new concept that enables voters on an individual level to verify 
whether their votes were cast as they intended, recorded as cast and counted as 
recorded as well as on a universal level that no manipulations occurred, and the 
results were reported honestly.  
 
2. Verifiability adds a new paradigm to the world of elections. It has the potential to 
add a considerable level of control for the general public over the conduct of 
elections.  
 
3. Verifiability has been invented and defined by cryptographic researchers and 
hence needs to be translated into the reality of elections—for example, a legal 
framework must be defined for its use, it must be usable and understandable by 
voters so that it actually makes a difference, etc.  
 
4. In line with the general trend to provide more accountability to the public, future 
elections must offer voters the potential to control the election administration. 
Therefore, in the future, verifiability will play an important part not only for 
election administration of I-voting but also of paper-based elections.  
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Forms of Verifiability. There are two general forms of verifiability possible: individual 
and universal verifiability. Both of these topics are critical for the trust that the electronic 
system can trigger within the voting community. A third form can be identified when 
combining both approaches.  
 
(1) Individual verifiability is easier to achieve, because it means that the voter is able to 
control what was counted as intended. The problem with this process is that the vote must 
be cast-as-intended, transmitted-as-cast and counted-as-transmitted in order to enable a 
control for the individual. The process is made further problematic by the fact that the 
voter should be able to control the result without being able to prove the vote to anyone 
else in order to prevent vote buying and other forms of influencing the clients. One 
established form of dealing with these challenges is the “paper-audit-trail,” which is a 
process of printing the results in anonymized form. The paper trail is then thrown in a 
ballot box to enable a control of the full result and to prevent voter fraud. If the printout 
shows that the vote was wrongly cast, the voter must have the ability to recast the vote. It 
is of vital importance that if a paper-audit trail is used, then the legislation states clearly 
if the ballot box with the paper trail or if the electronic results are seen as the primary 
results. The legislation should, thus, clearly state which of the two methods is used for 
the election count and which is used for the re-count in case of a challenge against the 
results of the election. 
 
Another form of achieving individual verifiability is to hand out code sheets. The 
code sheet consists of two rows of codes. If the voter would like to verify the vote, he or 
she can introduce the appropriate code of the first code line. If the vote was counted 
correctly, the screen will show the matching code out of the second code line. If this is 
not the case, the voter needs to be able to recast the vote.  
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(2) Universal verifiability, on the other hand, is a much more complex issue. It is a 
cryptographic process with the target of providing mathematical proof that all votes were 
counted correctly without having a database that states who voted for what. Universal 
verifiability means that a person with sufficient technical knowledge can confirm that the 
election results match the votes cast and that the election was conducted accurately. 
Universal verifiability also enables a true recount, which individual verifiability does not 
provide. 
 
(3) Full end-to-end verifiability means that both individual and universal verifiability 
are properly functioning. Although end-to-end systems are still rather rare, they are the 
objective of every election system, since only this step can show that there were no 
alterations and manipulations to the election results. 
 
4.6 Control by the Electoral Committee 
Traditional voting processes are organized by an election committee. Oftentimes, election 
administrators have a legal background and only limited technical experience. They often 
consult with technically experienced personnel or companies to conduct the electronic 
voting processes. Still, election committees should remain in full control of the conduct 
of the election. This becomes challenging when there is a need to allow the election 
commission to start, stop or interrupt the process. Most algorithmic solutions propose no 
technical means for this and therefore require organizational measures through regulation, 
such as detailed contractual relations with the vendor helping to implement this control 
element. As such, practice and theory agree on this. Some academic proposals even 
implement cases when the members of the electoral commission do not agree (Prosser et 
al., 2004a). 
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4.7 Evaluation and Certification 
In addition to the necessity of overall trust- and transparency-enhancing measures, the 
correct functioning of the electronic voting software is in doubt if it is not verified before 
its actual use. Before evaluations can be performed, one has to translate legal 
requirements into functional and organizational requirements. Here, the technical part of 
the Council of Europe recommendation has made a fundamental contribution to the 
development of generally accepted technical requirements. Before such international 
technical standards can be used for certification, it was necessary to develop national 
approach in the case of Austria (A-SIT, 2009). Re-use of these techniques by others is 
limited, since they are either designed for specific existing systems, tied to national 
(electoral) legislation or too generic (Volkamer, 2009). Further guidance can also be 
found in Barrat et al. (2015). 
 
4.8 Transparency 
Paper-based voting processes are easy to understand and to follow. The use of electronic 
means presents the inherent problem that electronic bits and bytes cannot be seen. This 
results in a process that requires access to documentation of the actual proceeding of the 
operation of the electronic voting system as well as advanced mathematical and technical 
knowledge to understand the overall logic behind it. While early efforts introduced 
confirmation numbers that would allow voters to verify that their confirmation number is 
included in a public bulletin board, recent research proposes the use of end-to-end 
verifiability approaches (Ryan et al., 2009), which would allow the voter to verify 
whether his/her vote was cast as intended, recorded as cast as well as counted as recorded. 
The proposals use (mathematical) proofs to allow these checks. Practical experience with 
end-to-end verifiable systems is limited (only available in Norway and Estonia), and trust 
and transparency in the conduct of the electronic election remain pre-requisites. They 
may be enhanced through efforts like this, in particular, when considering universal 
approaches that could support observation efforts (Krimmer and Volkamer, 2006b, 
OSCE/ODIHR, 2013). 
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4.9 The Ballot Sheet 
When considering electronic voting systems, two issues with ballots arise. First, the 
display of ballots can be cumbersome; second, the options available to the voter need to 
be discussed. The options in this chapter should always be observed under the condition 
that the electronic system profits from being as closely designed to the paper election as 
possible. 
First, we will discuss the ballot display. Given a possibly large number of candidates, 
it might not be possible to display all candidates on one screen page. Solutions to this 
could be a (1) scrollable list of the candidates in the order established within the lists. 
Another method would be to display the ballot sheet as a (2) reduced/compressed image 
in size that allows the voter to increase the size in whatever part he/she wants. Another 
alternative for the design is a (3) random order process in which every candidate has an 
equal chance to be at the top of the list and every voter receives a different list. With this 
procedure, it is guaranteed that all candidates have the same chance of being elected. 
Second, the ballot options should be discussed. Given that not all voting processes 
necessarily have to use electronic means, both voting channels (paper-based and 
electronic) need to be treated equal. Hence, all options available on paper ballots need to 
be provided in electronic ballots as well. Therefore, the electronic ballot sheets also need 
to have possibility with regards to (1) abstention and (2) invalidity, since the results and 
democratic rights of the voters would be influenced if these possibilities were not 
provided. An issue of interpretation is whether or not the election administration wishes 
to inform voters about potential (3) over and under voting before the vote is cast. A 
warning prevents unwanted invalidity while enabling voters to vote in any form they 
prefer.  
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4.10 Data Protection 
The decision-module anonymization previously mentioned that data protection is a 
continuous issue that is essential to maintain trust in the entire system. Nevertheless, most 
experts recommend a physical destruction of the data when they are not needed anymore 
and the legal storage time has been reached. Determining this time in terms of fixed legal 
rules is important in order to prevent an unnecessary security breach.  
 
For all methods, it is crucial to also think about the anonymity of the data after the 
election. Therefore, even though a randomized token was used during the election, the 
stored data should be additionally secured and encrypted to prevent a possible decoding. 
This accounts for the scenario where cryptographic technologies are used to protect the 
anonymity of the data as the calculation capacities constantly improve, which makes older 
encrypted data easier to solve for newer systems.  
 
The protection of electronic data should be based on a legal framework with regards 
to data protection. Regulations should clearly state for how long and where the data 
should be stored. After that period, the data should be (1) overwritten or, as an even more 
secure yet drastic method, (2) physically destroyed. In the case of physical destruction, 
everything stored in memory that is associated with the election should be destroyed, 
which might not be feasible for numerous election designs, as it would include all 
computers and tablets involved.  
 
The storage of data must be controlled at any given point in time. The same accounts 
for the storage of the rest of the electronic voting equipment before, during and after an 
election. The access to the machines and data needs to be controlled at any given point to 
prevent manipulation and fraud.  
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4.11 Organizational Context 
For the introduction of electronic means, a number of organizational issues need to be 
considered, including sourcing, management, software review and public acceptance 
testing. 
 
In-/Outsourcing. The setup and the use of electronic voting systems is a task that requires 
specialized skills on the network and the application level. Naturally, (1) outsourcing of 
either function may be considered as a real option, but it is also possible to develop the 
systems (2) in-house. Outsourcing requires considerable amount of training of the 
electoral commissions in order to retain control of the electoral process. Also, outsourcing 
requires time-consuming procurement but allows for using state-of-the art technology. 
For in-house development of an application, a considerable amount of know-how would 
need to be built up, which might be difficult to retain.  
 
Source code publication. Whether or not the source code should be published is an 
important issue. (1) Open source technology can ensure trust with a new election system, 
since it allows independent verification of the contents and functions of the software but 
may require help/input by academics. (2) Closed-source software is the standard way 
for commercial solutions.91  
 
Election management is also crucial for a smooth development. The management needs 
to decide of how to educate the election support staff and the commission members so 
that they can effectively run and observe the voting process. The legal aspects of what 
election commission members are allowed to access and what they do is also to be 
determined or interpreted by the electoral management. Control is also a crucial aspect, 
and the ‘four-eyes’ principle should be respected at all times during the entire electoral 
process. The principle states that at all times and during every process there must be at 
                                                
91  For further information, see Clouser et al. (2014). 
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least two people observing or handling the particular step in the election procedure 
without the need for help by third parties.  
 
Public acceptance testing. For any changes in the election process, it is of fundamental 
importance that the voters recognize and support the changes. Trust in the new system 
can only be ensured if the electors agree to the development; if not, they must provide a 
way to test the system. Therefore, it is crucial that the role and formation of election 
bodies during the elections is discussed thoroughly. 
 
External evaluation of the software. In order to establish trust with the given electronic 
system, it is useful to consider external evaluation of the system. It is therefore important 
to determine the requirements against which the system shall be evaluated against.92  
 
Schedule. Election organization is not determined in a single day. There are three phases 
within any election process: The preparation, the election and the determination of the 
results. These three steps can be understood as a cycle where the first stage begins when 
the last stage ends. The introduction of technical support in all of these three stages is 
accompanied by risks and possibilities. Electronic counting – including the use of 
scanners or similar machines – covers the last phase of the electronic cycle, and electronic 
voting covers both the second and third phase of the elections. Both of these technologies 
lead to a loss in controllability for the average voter. Trust in the system and the 
administration must hence be ensured before the election process begins. Clear legislation 
that paves a way for clear procedures for all cases is an important aspect for these 
developments. Elections are ultimately cyclical, and administrations learn through every 
election, and changes must be adapted and accounted for in the preparation process for 
the next election. Usually, newly discussed changes to the election process are not made 
for the next election but for the following election.  
                                                
92  For further guidance, see Barrat et al. (2015). 
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The schedule is dominated at the preparation level. Training of the staff, feasibility 
studies and the evaluation of the systems takes up most of the time. The electronic system 
will benefit from (1) holding a pilot in an election in the upcoming election and an 
evaluation of that pilot with the effective introduction of E-Voting for the subsequent 
election. 
 
An introduction at (2) the next upcoming election would be risky and lacks proper 
study and experience gathering.  
 
4.12 Feasibility Study 
The first central step in the procurement process is to extend and revise the feasibility 
study to be undertaken by the Secretariat. This extended study shall investigate the 
following issues. 
 
Time. The time frame to the next election is short. Requirement Engineering, 
Procurement, Training and Deployment take time. We recommend that the Secretariat 
carefully considers all issues regarding time and lets this determination feed into the 
decision making process about which technology to procure. 
 
Requirements. Based on the requirements we have outlined above in Section 5, the 
specific requirements for the voting solution to be used for the election shall be 
determined. Vote Integrity, Vote Secrecy and Verifiability are those that are 
indispensable. Any compromises among these three should be taken into account and 
documented with utmost care. 
 
Operational Capacity. Running an election using electronic voting equipment will 
require qualified personal to configure, setup, and monitor the electronic voting 
technologies. Also, those who will act as election commission members will have to be 
trained to interact with the system. The allocation of resources is necessary well in 
advance. Plans must be made. 
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Budgets. Budgets must be made available for procurement, quality control, running the 
election and optionally for the secure storage of the technology, such as iPads or other 
hardware artifacts. 
 
Building Blocks. All of the issues described in these building blocks should ideally be 
discussed and determined when conducting a feasibility study. It is clear that a study 
cannot cover all possibilities, but the effort needs to be genuine and as detailed as 
possible.  
 
4.13 Summary 
The identification and definition of building blocks greatly helps to discuss and design an 
electronic voting process before an actual election takes place. While these building 
blocks were based on Internet voting, they can easily be adapted to other voting 
technologies and applied in most contexts where such technology shall be introduced to 
an existing paper-based voting process. Discussing electoral reform is inherently difficult 
due to the political interests of the decision makers involved, and electronic voting makes 
it even more complicated. Having a clear agenda based on these building blocks should 
be helpful and should provide for a more educated and transparent discussion.  
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5 Conclusions 
This thesis describes the development of remote electronic voting and has derived 
building blocks that can be used when designing future implementations. Clearly, what 
once seemed as merely a technical problem became a much more complex issue.  
 
The work presented herein focused on the following questions:  
 
1. How did Internet voting originate? 
 
2. What were the significant moments associated with Internet voting in Austria? 
 
3. What building blocks can be identified for developing future Internet voting systems 
within Austria and throughout the world?  
 
First, Internet voting is part of a transformational movement regarding the widespread 
application of information and communication technologies. It is only logical that 
elections also apply electronic (remote) communication technologies. While early efforts 
were driven by the belief that elections could make easy use of the Internet, it was shown 
that while the principles must be interpreted and consequently applied in a different way, 
a number of principles (e.g., integrity, secrecy, transparency, accountability, public 
confidence) remain important. The need to have forms of decision making in electronic 
networks has been identified in its beginnings and received continuous attention 
throughout its further development. At the height of the excitement about the possibilities 
of the Internet, several countries tried to become the first to implement electronic voting 
systems, including Costa Rica, Bosnia Herzegovina, Germany and the United States, and 
Estonia succeeded in 2005. To date, Estonia is the only country that has introduced this 
form of voting without any preconditions or other limitations.  
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Second, in Austria the intentions to use ICT in elections used to be concentrated on 
parliamentary affairs. Then, the efforts around student elections in Germany sparked the 
wish to conduct Internet voting in Austria in 2000. In the years thereafter, considerable 
progress was made at WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, and therefore, 
the university can be considered the driver of the debate in the early 2000s. At the 
beginning, the technical solutions for the main problem of verifying the eligibility of 
voters and maintaining privacy was at the center of attention. Later, more sophisticated 
algorithms were developed, and functionalities like quota in election commissions were 
added.  
 
The Federation of Student elections in 2009 was a remarkable event that provided a 
great deal of experience for how heated and divided the political debate around the topic 
could become. This debate continued after the elections were held in May 2009, which 
suffered from the intense debate and consequential organizational shortcomings. 
Furthermore, the experiences showed that accurate legal regulations are needed, which 
not only show the interaction with the constitutional legal texts but also demonstrate how 
to give accountability to a remote electronic voting channel through legal means. 
International standards were a first step, but regulations based on actual experience in 
pilot implementations were especially important as well. This practical knowledge also 
shows that sophisticated algorithms are not always the key to success. Rather, several key 
implementations make use of very basic technical means to realize the tasks given by law. 
One should not forget about the voters. They not only need to use such systems, but they 
also need to understand the processes in order to build their trust with the systems. The 
Constitutional Court ruling that lifted the results of the election and ruled that the 
respective ordinance was not in line with the requirements of the law put high 
requirements and thereby barriers for offering Internet voting channels in future elections. 
While the election administration system, which was a pre-requisite for the Internet 
voting system, was discontinued in the election thereafter, it returned in recent elections 
where postal voting had to be offered. 
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On the basis of these experiences, it was possible to derive a set of twelve building 
blocks related to electronic voting systems. These building blocks include simple design 
decisions, such as the form of electronic voting, adaptations of the legal base, the 
technical means for identification and secrecy, observation, control functions for the 
electoral commission, evaluation processes, transparency functions, ballot sheet designs, 
controlling the organizational context, and the provision of options for planning and the 
implementation. This framework therefore facilitates and eases the generation of 
feasibility studies and other analyses and decision making ahead of using Internet voting 
in an election. With little adaption it can also be used for the use of other voting 
technologies. 
 
This work utilizes theoretical work and knowledge gained in the areas of adaptations 
of legal texts. Through a literature review, this work provides information for how to 
implement identification and anonymity functions in remote electronic voting as well as 
for how to test and certify systems and identify areas that require transparent procedures. 
The findings also show that the implementation of remote electronic voting is a complex 
topic. It requires trust in the election administration; otherwise, suspicion will arise with 
the introduction of more technology in an election process. Remote electronic voting is 
one of the most challenging IT projects. Not only does the requirement for secrecy of a 
vote rule out many approaches towards IT security in the Internet, but elections 
themselves are inherently special projects: they must take place on a fixed date and time 
regardless of whether the system is functional.  
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